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This dissertation is a synthesis of social, political, and international histories of 
decolonization in Korea and Japan.  My study demonstrates how the liberation of Korea became 
a foundational historical event not only for the colonized but also for metropolitan society.  
Despite the recent emphasis on the need to treat the metropole and colony as one analytical field, 
scholars have yet to approach decolonization as a mutually constitutive process that restructures 
both the metropole and the colony.  The fields of Area Studies and International History often 
divide their focus on the regional aftermath of the Japanese empire into separate national units of 
analysis, resulting in histories split between the U.S. and Soviet occupations of Korea (1945-
1948) and the U.S. (Allied) occupation of Japan (1945-1952).  In a radical departure from the 
more nation-centered scholarship, my work treats post-empire Japan and Korea, U.S. occupation 
policy in Japan and Korea, and Japanese and South Korean anti-Communist regimes as one 
analytical field. 
In order to maintain a focused line of inquiry through the complexity of the decolonizing 
world, I position the Korean postcolonial population in Japan, or the so-called “Korean minority 
question,” as a primary methodological site in my work.  With such an analytical focus, I pose a 
key set of different questions that turn our attention to the transnational processes of dismantling 
the Japanese empire.  First, how did the problem of repatriating both Korean colonial conscripted 
workers from Japan and Japanese colonial settlers from Korea molded popular nationalistic 
sentiments and mutual antagonisms in post-empire Japanese-Korean relations?  Second, how did 
post-1945 everyday encounters between the Japanese and Koreans, the defeated and the 
liberated, frame the Japanese “embracing” of defeat and colonial independence along with U.S. 
occupation?  And third, how did the politics of Korean diasporic nationalism emerge in Japan 
from the struggle over self-determination and autonomy from Japanese power and how did it 
develop into the critical locus of U.S.-Japan-South Korea cold war containment policy?  By 
exploring these issues previously overlooked in the existing historiography, my work offers a 
new framework that overcomes a dichotomy and separation between histories of post-1945 Japan 
and Korea.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
“Overlapping Territories, Intertwined Histories”  
Kim Sijong, a well-known contemporary zainichi Korean (Koreans-in-Japan) writer, 
experienced the historical moment of August 15, 1945 on Cheju Island, southern Korea.  
Japanese Emperor Hirohito’s speech announcing the end of the war was broadcast on the radio at 
noon, and during that evening, Kim witnessed crowds of Koreans storming the streets and 
shouting “manse!” (hurrahs!) with the Korean national flag in their hands.  For Kim, who had 
grown up “believing innocently” in the imperial slogan of “naisen ittai” (“Japan and Korea as 
one body”) and “striving” to become a genuine “Emperor’s subject,” it was not easy to accept 
this inverted reality in an instant.  Kim even felt like he was suddenly “abandoned” to the Korea 
that he used to hold in contempt from the vantage point of the colonizer’s gaze.  The liberation of 
Korea started as a bewildering moment for him. 
Kim soon began to seek his own “liberation” by learning the language and history of the 
nation he had once neglected.  At the same time, Kim also joined the communist South Korean 
Worker’s Party in search for his new political subjectivity.  In 1948, Kim took part in the so-
called “Cheju uprisings” initiated by the Worker’s Party on April 3, where popular protests 
against rightist and state terror and the establishment of a separate regime in U.S.-occupied south 
Korea ended with one of the most brutal civilian massacres in post-liberation Korean history.  
Surviving the counterinsurgent raids, Kim finally fled to Japan in June 1949, taking a small 
smuggling fishing boat that his father had arranged for his secret escape.  After he settled in a 
small Korean town in Osaka, Kim continued his political activism and became a member of the 
Japanese Communist Party.  When war broke out in the Korean peninsula on June 25, 1950, Kim 
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devoted himself to radical “anti-war” movements that targeted the U.S. remaking of Japan into a 
pivotal rear base for military intervention in the Korean War.
1
 
Kim Sijong’s experience of the liberation of Korea lays out a story that neither Korean 
nor Japanese mainstream historiographies have told us.  While mainstream historical narratives 
have focused almost exclusively on the political and socio-economic facets of decolonization, 
Kim’s story presents an unexplored dimension of “liberation” from Japanese colonial rule – how 
deeply “empire” was embedded even in the interior world of the colonized.  Simultaneously, his 
experience of the Cheju uprisings and the aftermath in Japan provides us with a glimpse of how 
the history of post-liberation Korea intersected and overlapped with the history of postwar Japan 
and vice versa.  The story of Kim Sijong’s life reveals how experiences and structures on the 
ground were necessarily already transnational, and the clear national division between Japan and 
Korea was artificial, especially in the context of the aftermath of the Japanese empire.  My study 
aspires to create a space for decentralizing national historiographies of modern Japan and Korea, 
to pave a common intellectual ground for understanding what Edward Said once called 
“overlapping territories and intertwined histories” of the postcolonial world, of post-1945 Japan 
and Korea.
2
   
  Previously, in their focus on the process of dismantling the Japanese empire, historians 
divided their analysis into separate national units, resulting in histories split between the U.S. and 
Soviet occupations of Korea (1945-1948) and the U.S./Allied occupation of Japan (1945-1952).  
Studies of post-liberation Korea have primarily examined the politics of decolonizing Korea 
within this national framework or the context of U.S.-Soviet cold war international relations.  In 
                                                 
1
 On Kim Sijong’s life and experiences of the Cheju Uprisings, see Kim Sŏkpŏm and Kim Sijong, Naze 
kakitsuzukete kita ka naze chinmokushite kita ka (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2001); Kim Sijong, “Zainichi” no hazama de 
(Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2001); Kim Sijong, “Hitobito no naka de,” Gendai shisō 35, 17 (December 2007, special issue: 
“Sengo minshū seishinshi”). 
2
 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993).  
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a similar vein, Japan historians have understood the post-1945 transformation of the imperial 
power of Japan into a nation-state as simply the product of the U.S.-led occupation and 
reconstruction of a defeated Japan.  Moreover, despite the recent emphasis on the need to treat 
the metropole and colony as one analytical field in the studies of empire in general, scholars have 
yet to approach decolonization as a mutually constitutive process that restructures both 
metropolitan and colonial societies.
3
  Then, where do empire’s metropolitan-colonial relations fit 
within the history of decolonization and the histories of post-1945 Japan and Korea?    
 
Writing the “Empire” back into the History of Decolonization  
The mainstream English and Japanese language historiographies of postwar Japan, 
particularly the so-called Japanese “narration of the postwar” (sengo no katari), have employed a 
common temporal and relational framework in narrating the formation of post-empire Japan.  
Their temporal framework is premised on the discontinuity between pre- and post-1945 Japan, 
and the relational binary framework of U.S.-Japan positions the formation of a post-1945 Japan 
                                                 
3
 Recent colonial studies and new imperial history (or the so-called “imperial turn”) have written “empire” back into 
European history by illuminating the constitutive impact of modern European imperialism on metropolitan politics 
and society.  These new studies present “empire” and “home,” “colony” and “metropole” not as separate but 
mutually interrelated spheres.  For instance, see Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: the 
British in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., 
Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in A Bourgeois World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); 
Antoinette Burton, At the Heart of the Empire: Indians and the Colonial Encounter in Late-Victorian Britain 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism (New York: 
Routledge, 1998); Ann Laura Stoler, “Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American 
History and (Post) Colonial Studies,” The Journal of American History 88, 3 (December 2001); Antoinette Burton, 
ed., After the Imperial Turn (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); Wendy Webster, Englishness and Empire, 
1939-1965 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Jordanna Bailkin, The Afterlife of Empire (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012).  In a similar vein, historians of modern Korea and Japan have also started to 
explore connections and interactions between colonizing and colonized societies during Japan’s imperialist 
expansion.  For instance, see Andre Schmid, “Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem’ in the Historiography of 
Modern Japan: A Review Article,” The Journal of Asian Studies 59, 4 (November 2000); Todd Henry, “Sanitizing 
Empire: Japanese Articulations of Korean Otherness and the Construction of Early Colonial Seoul, 1905-1919,” The 
Journal of Asian Studies 64, 3 (August 2005); Mark E. Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 
1910-1945 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009); E. Taylor Atkins, Primitive Selves: Koreana in the 
Japanese Colonial Gaze, 1910-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press,, 2010); Jun Uchida, Brokers of 
Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2011).   
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as solely the product of U.S./Allied occupation or U.S.-Japanese postwar encounters.  In those 
narratives, the “postwar” as a new beginning starts with the emperor’s radio broadcast 
announcing the end of the war, and postwar Japan appears both disconnected and inverted from 
its wartime and prewar bleak (or “feudal”) past.4   
Critical challenges to this discontinuity thesis came out during the 1990s, although some 
historical studies rejecting such temporal framework had already began to appear during the 
1980s.
5
  By refusing a conventional view of pre-1945 Japan as “premodern” society and postwar 
democracy as modern “enlightenment,” U.S., Japanese and German scholars formulated a new 
analytical concept of “total war system” that put forth the continuity between the two eras.6  In 
the cutting-edge interdisciplinary study Total War and “Modernization” that was published both 
in Japan and the United States, the contributors presented drastic social transformations during 
the late 1930s and the early 1940s within a long historical trajectory straddling the wartime and 
postwar periods.  Similarly, historians Andrew Gordon and Nakamura Masanori have presented 
“trans-war” history as an alternative temporal framework for the history of the 20th century 
Japan.
7
    
New studies on the U.S./Allied occupation of Japan have also questioned the dominant 
temporal and narrative framework in the history of occupied Japan.  Those studies reject a 
conventional approach that framed the U.S./Allied-led democratic transformation of Japan as 
                                                 
4
 On the disconnection and inversion in the representation of postwar Japan, see Carol Gluck, “The ‘End’ of Postwar: 
Japan at the Turn of Millennium,” Public Culture 10, 1 (1997).    
5
 See Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1982); Andrew Gordon, The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan Heavy Industry, 
1853-1955 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); John Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and 
the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988). 
6
 Yasushi Yamanouchi, J. Victor Koschmann, and Ryūichi Narita, eds., Total War and “Modernization” (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998).  The Japanese version is Sōryokusen to gendaika (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1995). 
7
 Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan: from Tokugawa Times to the Present (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003); Nakamura Masanori, Sengoshi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005); Andorū Gōdon, “Shōhi, seikatsu, 
goraku no ‘kansenshi,’” in Narita Ryūichi, et al., Iwanami kōza Ajia Taiheiyō Sensō 6: nichijō seikatsu no naka no 
sōryokusen (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006); Andrew Gordon, Fabricating Consumers: The Sewing Machine in 
Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).  
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either something “imposed” from the outside or something irrelevant to Japan’s own historical 
processes.  By incorporating the new perspective presented by Total War and “Modernization,” 
Japanese historians started to shift their focus toward the endogenous and wartime origins of 
democratic reforms accomplished by the U.S./Allied Occupation.
8
  In this new framework, 
democratization in postwar Japan is understood as the amalgamation of Japanese experiences of 
wartime social transformations and Occupation’s “democratic revolution from above.”  The 
formation of postwar Japan no longer appears as a completely “reborn” entity but as the product 
of a long process continuous with past transformations.      
While U.S. and Japanese scholars have successfully challenged the existing temporal 
binary framework in the conventional “narration of the postwar,” the relational binary of U.S.-
Japan, another axis of the dominant narrative mode, still remains unquestioned.  Previously, U.S. 
historians, in particular international and diplomatic historians, examined the U.S./Allied 
occupation of Japan through a U.S.-centered, top-down approach.
9
  Although recent studies have 
employed new approaches by incorporating “history from below” (John W. Dower), “race” 
(Yukiko Koshiro) and “gender” (Mire Koikari) into the analysis of occupied Japan, the formation 
of a postwar Japan is still essentially a story about “U.S.-Japanese” collaboration, collusion, or 
“embracing.”10  Despite methodological innovations, their narratives are still corralled within the 
existing paradigm of the U.S.-Japan relational binary.    
                                                 
8
 For a recent study, see Amakawa Akira and Masuda Hiroshi, eds., Chiiki kara minaosu senryō kaikaku: sengo 
chihō seiji no renzoku to hirenzoku (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shupppansha, 2001); Amemiya Shōichi, Senryō to kaikaku 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2008). 
9
 For instance, William Borden, The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade 
Recovery, 1947-1955 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); Michael Schaller, The American Occupation 
of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Howard Schonberger, 
Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 
1989). 
10
 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999); 
Yukiko Koshiro, Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 
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Historian John W. Dower’s Pulitzer Prize-winning work, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the 
Wake of World War II, is the most significant achievement in the field and the most 
comprehensive study of U.S./Allied-occupied Japan.  In his reevaluation of the U.S. remaking of 
a defeated Japan, Dower places primacy upon the agency of the occupied population, not only 
Japanese elites but also ordinary “people.”  While previous scholarship has primarily analyzed 
how the American “victors” or “occupiers” crafted, implemented, or imposed “demilitarization” 
and “democratization” on defeated Japan, Dower examines the social and political developments 
of the occupation along a critically different line of inquiry: how did the “occupied” react, resist, 
negotiate or collaborate?  With the narrative’s emphasis on the active roles that the occupied 
played in the radical transformation of post-defeat Japan, the birth of a “democratic” and 
“pacifist” nation is no longer understood as a victor’s creation.  Rather, it is presented as the 
product of U.S.-Japanese mutual endeavors and interactions, or the Japanese “embracing” of the 
occupation. 
 What remains unexplored in Dower’s achievement and, more generally, in the field of 
postwar Japanese history itself is how “decolonization” mattered to the formation of postwar 
Japan.  The narrative frame of the “postwar” has elided the temporality of the “post-empire,” and 
the aftermath of the dissolving empire and metropolitan-colonial relations is nowhere to be found 
in the narration of Japan’s transformation from imperial power into a nation-state.  In other 
words, the impact of decolonization on metropolitan society is completely missing.
11
  More 
importantly, such a narrative framework is partly responsible for reproducing what historian 
                                                                                                                                                             
1999); Mire Koikari, Pedagogy of Democracy: Feminism and the Cold War in the U.S. Occupation of Japan 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008). 
11
 Recently, historian Lori Watt has explored the Japanese repatriation from now-liberated colonies and Manchuria 
and its impact on metropolitan society.  See her When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in 
Postwar Japan (Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University Press, 2009).   
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Carol Gluck has characterized as the “amnesia of empire,” the unfortunate reality that the past of 
imperial aggression barely enters Japanese collective memory.
12
   
Regarding the origins of Japanese “amnesia of empire,” scholars commonly understand 
that A-bomb catastrophes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki resulted in the “self-victimization” of 
Japanese people, turning the victimizers into victims and “atomic memory” into “imperial 
denial.”13  At the same time, some scholars also attribute the Japanese collective oblivion of 
empire to the way through which Japan’s colonies were decolonized.  Unlike France who had to 
give up French Algeria after the long bloody colonial war and international and domestic 
disputes over the “Algerian question,” Japan lost its colonies all at once as a result of defeat in 
World War II and thereby experienced no such drawn out traumatized process like French and 
Algerian decolonization.
14
  In this view, the sudden event of Korean independence was not a 
moment for Japanese collective reflection regarding what they had done to colonial Korea.  In 
short, the imperial past and formerly colonized others simply became forgettable in Japanese 
imaginary without posing any fundamental questions and challenges to their “self-victimization.” 
The problem of these scholarly views and critiques of the Japanese “amnesia of empire” 
ironically reproduces another “amnesia of empire,” the dismissal of the Japanese empire’s 
immediate legacies.  For instance, Gluck argues that “empire was never brought into the 
imagination of postwar Japan” because there was “no such a trauma as France had vis-à-vis 
Algeria, nor such an influx of immigrants from former colonies as Europe faced.”15  However, as 
I demonstrate in this study, Japan indeed had traumatized encounters with the “problem” of the 
                                                 
12
 Carol Gluck, “The ‘End’ of the Postwar: Japan at the Turn of the Millennium,” Public Culture 10, 1 (1997).  
13
 Gluck, ibid.  On Japanese “self-victimization” see Lisa Yoneyama, Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the 
Dialectics of Memory (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1999); James J. Orr, The Victim as Hero: 
Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 2001). 
14
 For instance, see Ōnuma Yasuaki, Tōkyō saiban kara sengo sekinin no shisō e (Tokyo: Tōshindō, 1993), pp.91-92; 
Arai Shin’ichi, “Sengo 50-nen to sensō sekinin,” in Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai, ed., Sengo 50-nen o dō miru ka (Tokyo: 
Aoki Shoten, 1995), pp.70-74.    
15
 Kyaroru Gurakku [Carol Gluck], “‘Sengo’ o koete,” Shisō 980 (December 2005). 
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over a half million Korean formerly colonized subjects remaining in Japan after the war, who 
were now performing a new subjectivity as “liberated people” with a posture of defiance.  
Moreover, postwar Japan soon faced an influx of “illegal” immigrants from Korea, who were 
mostly former Korean long-term residents in Japan returning to their former country of residence 
after repatriating to their homeland in the aftermath of Korean liberation.  In other words, the 
legacies of empire did pose challenges and “problems” to the Japanese, who had positioned 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki prominently in historical memory, which facilitated the forgetting of 
the imperial past and the making of the new identity as victims.  Thus, one has to ask about the 
question of the contemporary Japanese collective oblivion of the empire differently: How did the 
“amnesia of empire” and “self-victimization” occur despite the specter of the empire, despite 
Japanese everyday encounters with their formerly colonized subjects after the war?    
This study aspires to overcome the “amnesia of empire” both in contemporary Japan and 
the U.S. and Japanese mainstream scholarship by writing the “empire” back into the history of 
decolonizing, U.S./Allied-occupied Japan.  In a radical departure from the dominant paradigm 
centered on the U.S.-Japan relational binary, I bring metropolitan-colonial, Japanese-Korean 
encounters to the fore in analyzing the process of decolonization and the formation of 
“postcolonial” Japan.   
Decolonization is a formative event, not merely a temporal break or an interlude between 
empire and after.  Simultaneously, decolonization is a mutually constitutive process, not simply a 
process of mutual separation between the metropole and the colony.  This analytical focus on the 
process of decolonization as it impacts both metropole and colony opens up the opportunity to 
ask a new critical question regarding the history of U.S./Allied-occupied Japan: How did the 
liberation of Korea mold the template for the Japanese practice of “democracy” and “pacifism,” 
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the two central principles underlying the early U.S. occupation project of “democratization” and 
“demilitarization”?   
  
Race, the “Multi-Ethnic” Empire, and “Postwar Democracy” 
It is now commonly understood that the Japanese wartime empire in the late 1930s and 
early 1940s presented itself as a “multi-ethnic” empire.  With the aim of reinforcing the 
integration (“Japanization”) of colonial subjects under the total war regime, the Japanese empire 
made a drastic shift in its racial ideology and policy, from an “exclusionary” toward 
“inclusionary” form of racism in the words of Takashi Fujitani’s recent work, Race for Empire.16  
After the defeat in World War II, however, the latent “myth of mono-ethnic nation” (tan’itsu 
minzoku shinwa) reemerged into public discourse, and postwar Japan was reimagined as a 
homogenous, rather than “multi-ethnic,” nation according to Japanese scholar Oguma Eiji.17  
Historian Naoki Sakai characterizes this process as the transformation of Japanese nationalism, 
from “imperial nationalism” based on a “universal” concept of Japanese national identity and 
ethnic multiplicity into ethnocentrism, or “ethnic nationalism.”18   
What is important and not yet discussed is how such a transformation, the Japanese 
reimagining of a “mono-ethnic nation” out of the “multi-ethnic empire,” actually took place on 
the ground and in popular social imaginary, rather than in intellectuals’ discourses on race and 
                                                 
16
 Fujitani argues that the Japanese (and U.S.) total war regime shifted “decisively toward the strategy of disavowing 
racism and including despised populations” like colonial subjects within its “national” community, if not the 
elimination of “systemic racialized violence.”  Takashi Fujitani, Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and 
Japanese as Americans during World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), p.7. 
17
 Oguma Eiji, Tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen: “Nihonjin” no jigazō no keisei (Tokyo: Shin’yōsha, 1995).  
English translation is A Genealogy of “Japanese” Self-images (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2002). 
18
 Naoki Sakai, “Subject and Substratum: On Japanese Imperial Nationalism,” Cultural Studies 14, 3-4 (2000); 
“Imperial Nationalism and the Comparative Perspective,” Positions 17, 1 (Spring 2009). 
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ethnicity.
19
  How did national boundaries become (re)racialized within both the political and 
social realms of the decolonizing “multi-ethnic” empire?  If, as the political thinker Seyla 
Benhabib has formulated, “empires have frontiers; democracies have boundaries,” then the 
colonized Korean subject was exactly the “frontier” that needed to become a “boundary” as post-
defeat Japan moved from being an empire to a nation-state under U.S./Allied occupation.
20
  My 
study shows that the postcolonial Korean population in Japan, or the “Korean minority 
question,” became a central locus for defining the formations of post-empire Japanese citizenship 
and the national imaginary, where political disenfranchisement, racialized discourse on social 
problems, and popular everyday violence intersected.   
The racialization of national boundaries occurred immediately after the war, especially in 
the realm of concerning the legal status of imperial subjects of colonial origin.  In fear of Korean 
postcolonial empowerment, the Japanese government suspended political citizenship (male 
suffrage) of Korean and Taiwanese former imperial subjects in Japan in December 1945.  Later 
in April 1952, when Japan was about to regain its full sovereignty from the U.S./Allied 
Occupation, the government deprived the entire Korean and Taiwanese minority populations of 
the Japanese “nationality” (kokuseki) that the Japanese empire had once imposed upon every 
single colonial subject through its imperialist expansion.  Since then, Korean and Taiwanese 
minorities of colonial origin have been the “boundary” of so-called Japan’s “postwar 
democracy” implemented under U.S./Allied occupation. 
Along with the politics of disenfranchisement, the redrawing of national boundaries also 
developed through the racialization of social problems, or the making of the “Korean problem.”  
                                                 
19
 Recently, Tessa Morris-Suzuki has examined the formation of the postwar immigration system and discussed the 
transformation of post-empire Japanese national boundaries.  Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Borderline Japan: Foreigners 
and Frontier Controls in the Postwar Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).             
20
 Seyla Benhabib, “Borders, Boundaries, and Citizenship,” Political Science and Politics 38, 4 (2005), p.675  
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During the wartime, the Japanese empire had presented “race” as a unifying ideology for the 
“multi-ethnic” empire against Western imperial powers and global white supremacy, and the 
government and media had framed Koreans as “brethren” under the imperial slogan of “naisen 
ittai” (“Japan and Korea as one body”).  After the war, the Japanese old guard political forces 
reformulated the “Korean problem” in public discourse at the moment of the so-called “postwar 
crisis,” the crisis of the hegemony of the capitalist economy.  During the crisis, “race” became 
the central signifier for the deepening social problems.  The presence of Koreans was associated 
with social disorder, and they now emerged as a “problem” or the “enemy within” in the 
Japanese social imaginary. 
Simultaneously, the racial “othering” of Korean former imperial subjects in Japan also 
took more violent form on the ground.  The defeat in the war made Japanese people extremely 
uneasy about their future hierarchical racial status vis-à-vis not only their Western “racial 
enemies” but also those whom the Japanese had treated as an “inferior” race during imperial 
expansion.  Their deeply-entrenched ideas about Japanese superiority over their “Oriental” others 
drastically transformed into anxiety and even sparked a strong fear of possible racial 
subordination to the now-liberated Koreans and Chinese.  As Albert Memmi emphasizes, “fear” 
always accompanies the “undertaking of hostility” and is the fundamental driving force of the 
practice of racism, “aggression.”21  Indeed, Japanese everyday encounters with Koreans 
performing new subjectivity as “liberated people” on Japanese soil became increasingly infused 
with tensions and hostility, fomenting Japanese violence against Koreans in Japan.  This 
everyday racial violence embodied the popular practice of reclaiming Japanese racial superiority 
and masculinity as well as defining who would belong to the post-empire Japanese nation. 
                                                 
21
 Albert Memmi, Racism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), pp.102-103. 
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In sum, this study shows that the (re)racialization of the post-empire Japanese nation-
state was not a teleological process.  It was enacted at the levels of state policy and on-the-
ground encounters as a response to a twofold crisis spurred by the event of decolonization: the 
crisis of imperial capitalism and the shattering of colonial racial hierarchy.  Moreover, I argue 
that the reimagining of a new “democratic,” “pacifist” nation-state out of the “multi-ethnic” 
empire was not necessarily a democratic or peaceful process of “embracing defeat” on the part of 
defeated people. 
 
Decolonization, the Cold War, and the “Korean Problem” in Japan 
The emergence of North and South Korean regimes in post-liberation Korea is probably 
one of the most remarkable historical events where decolonization and the cold war converged.  
Japan’s surrender in the war brought U.S. and Soviet occupation troops into colonized Korea and, 
as historian Bruce Cumings has discussed, a “quintessential Cold War relationship” immediately 
took form between U.S. and Soviet military occupations “from day one in Korea.”22  The 38th 
parallel that the United States and the Soviet Union had initially agreed as temporary 
demarcation to disarm Japanese imperial soldiers soon turned into the frontline of U.S.-Soviet 
global cold war confrontation by 1948.  Under U.S. and Soviet occupations, Korean political 
movements also divided into rightists and leftists, the north and the south, the proponents and 
opponents of the establishment of a separate regime.  The indigenous political struggles over the 
vision of a decolonized nation became a flashpoint of the nascent cold war, developing into the 
internationalized civil war of 1950, the cold war’s first “hot war” in Korea.   
                                                 
22
 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p.xxvii. 
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Cold war historian Odd Arne Westad understands the cold war in the “Third World” as 
the product of U.S. and Soviet “Cold War interventions” in political and social changes in the 
colonial and postcolonial world.  Although Washington’s and Moscow’s objectives were “not 
exploitation or subjection, but control and improvement,” the cold war appeared as nothing but a 
“continuation of colonialism” for Third World countries.  Washington and Moscow competed 
each other to impose “their version of modernity” on those countries and thus, Westad argues, it 
is “easy … to see the Cold War in the South as a continuation of European colonial interventions 
and of European attempts at controlling Third World peoples.”23  He also points out: 
Cold War ideologies and superpower interventions therefore helped put a number 
of Third World countries in a state of semipermanent civil war.  In some cases 
there is likely to have been violent conflict at the end of the colonial period 
anyhow, but the existence of two ideologically opposed superpowers often 
perpetuated such clashes and made them much harder to settle.
24
 
 
What happened to post-liberation Korea would be a typical example of U.S. and Soviet 
“Cold War interventionisms.”  The Korean peninsula in 1945 was, in the words of Cumings, 
“ripe for revolution,” swept by roaring “demands for thoroughgoing political, economic, and 
social change.”25  The Soviet Occupation used indigenous revolutionaries and even radicalized 
and hastened Korean efforts for the revolutionary transformation of their decolonizing society.
26
  
For instance, the radical land reform enforced in the Soviet-occupied north was such a product of 
Soviet “interventionism” and collaboration with the north Korean leadership.  Korean 
Communists’ land reform plan initially focused on the reduction of rent for tenant farmers, rather 
                                                 
23
 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp.1-5, 396-397. 
24
 Ibid., p.398. 
25
 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, pp.xx, xxvii. 
26
 Korean sociologist Kang Chŏnggu has discussed the consequences of the Soviet occupation of the north in terms 
of the “radicalization” of a Korean indigenous “historical course.”  See Kang Chŏnggu, Chwajŏl toen sahoe 
hyŏngmyŏng: Mi chŏmnyŏngha ŭi Namhan, P’illip’in kwa Pukhan pigyo yŏn’gu (Pusan: Yŏrumsa, 1989).  For a 
comprehensive comparative study on Soviet and U.S. occupations, see Pak Myŏngnim, Han’guk chŏnjaeng ŭi 
palbal kwa kiwon II (Seoul: Nanam Ch’ulp’an, 1996). 
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than land distribution.  Yet, the actual land reform policy implemented through Soviet-Korean 
collaboration extended to the confiscation of land from the landlord class without compensation 
and its distribution to poor and landless peasants.
27
  Moreover, the Soviet-facilitated radical 
social revolution in the north created the flood of political refugees to the U.S.-occupied south, 
turning them into fierce anti-communist, anti-North political forces of the South Korean regime.   
On the other hand, U.S. “Cold War interventionism” in the south took a completely 
different form and brought much more unfavorable, hostile consequences to decolonizing Korea.  
If Korea was “ripe for revolution,” what the U.S. Occupation had done within several months 
from occupation, as Cumings has analyzed, was to forge a counter-revolutionary order by 
reviving Japanese colonial legal-governmental apparatuses and allying itself with Korean 
colonial collaborators and political elites representing the privileged class.  The U.S. Occupation 
delegitimized spreading Korean demands for a fully liberated nation, both politically and socio-
economically, as Soviet-inspired movements.  The massive peasant uprisings in southern Korea 
during late 1946 manifested people’s disillusionment with the promise of liberation under U.S. 
occupation.  For many Koreans, U.S. occupation policy did appear as a “continuation of 
colonialism,” if not European but Japanese colonialism. 
 While U.S. occupation in Korea is characterized as quasi-colonial cold war 
interventionism like in the Third World, the cold war in U.S./Allied-occupied Japan is more 
complicated and far from one-dimensional.  Some scholars approach the U.S. remaking of Japan 
as “neocolonial revolution from above” (Dower) or as “American imperialistic intervention” 
comparable to “European colonialism” (Koikari).28  In a similar vein, one could see in the cold 
                                                 
27
 English language study on the land reform in Soviet-occupied north, see Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean 
Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp.74-81. 
28
 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.561; Mire Koikari, “Rethinking Gender and Power in the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 
1945-1952,” Gender and History, 11, 2 (July 1999), p.316. 
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war in occupied Japan the continuation of European colonialism that Westad has understood in 
the Third World context.  In other words, the U.S. cold war politicization of occupied Japan, or 
the so-called “reverse course” in U.S. occupation policy, could be positioned within the same 
historical process of the cold war vis-à-vis the Third World.  However, the quasi-colonial 
interventionism practiced by the Japanese government vis-à-vis the “Korean problem” in cold 
war occupied Japan complicates the more binary framework of the U.S. and Japan relation.  The 
continuation of colonial practices by the Japanese state in regards to its formerly colonized 
subjects renders the cold war Japan context distinct from Westad’s characterization of Western 
powers in the colonial and postcolonial South. 
My study unravels these multi-layered relationships between the cold war and the 
continuation of colonialism in U.S./Allied-occupied Japan.  I argue that if U.S. and Soviet “Cold 
War interventionisms” in the Third World emerged as a “continuation of European colonial 
interventions,” then U.S. cold war interventionism intersected with unending Japanese colonial 
interventions in the locus of Korean liberation in Japan.  In my study, I illuminate the 
convergence of the two on-going quasi-colonial projects: U.S. global cold war interventions and 
the Japanese state’s pursuit of lost sovereignty over now-liberated Korean colonial subjects in 
Japan.   
Moreover, in the words of cold war historian Steven Hugh Lee, U.S. cold war 
interventionism in the Third World looked like the making of “informal empire.”29  As Lee has 
formulated, the U.S. global cold war strategy of communist containment required establishing 
anti-communist allies of indigenous “pro-Western governments” and “collaborators.”  The 
United States attempted to “influence” both international and domestic affairs in the Third World 
                                                 
29
 Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995). 
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through “informal mechanisms” rather than “formal colonial control.”  The “relatively 
independent” and also “interdependent” local actors on the communist perimeter were expected 
to play significant roles in containing communist expansion “without direct American 
involvement or expenditure of resources.”30   
In this sense, the governments of South Korean and U.S./Allied-occupied Japan were 
crucial “collaborators” for the cold war U.S. “informal empire” building.  Since the end of U.S. 
military occupation in 1948, the Syngman Rhee administration reinforced the “Koreanization” of 
the American-made counter-revolutionary political landscape in South Korea by using U.S. 
military and economic aid.  The Japanese newly formed Yoshida administration in early 1949, 
the first solid single-party administration (the “third Yoshida Cabinet”), capitalized on the cold 
war turn in Washington’s foreign policy and pushed forward an anti-communist agenda in Japan 
with the U.S. Occupation’s support.  South Korea and Japan had become critical components of 
U.S. “informal empire” in East Asia. 
This study illuminates the overlapping territories of U.S. “informal empire” and the 
intertwined politics between the two “collaborator” regimes in Japan and South Korea.  The 
territories did not merely overlap at the site of completing sovereignties over the Korean 
postcolonial population in Japan.  The boundaries between Japan and Korea as two separate 
entities also became blurred in the wake of the Korean War, as the United States transformed 
occupied Japan into a primary rear base that was directly linked with the UN war effort on the 
Korean peninsula.  Similar to how the territories overlapped and boundaries became blurred, the 
anti-communist politics of the Japanese and South Korean governments developed 
simultaneously and became intertwined in the practice of containing Korean leftist activities in 
Japan.  Yet, cold war collaboration between the two “collaborator” regimes never went smoothly 
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without postcolonial frictions, and U.S. “informal empire” was not necessarily the monolithic 
transnational regime of communist containment in East Asia.  My study unravels this complexity 
of the overlapping, intertwined and contentious political landscape of Japan-South Korea 
relations in the mid-twentieth century, where conflicting postcolonial and cold war temporalities 
coexisted side by side next to each other.         
 
Sources and Organization  
For a synthesis of international, political and social histories of the U.S./Allied 
occupation of Japan, my study draws on wide-ranging and multi-linguistic sources obtained at 
numerous archives and libraries in the United States, Japan and South Korea.  The primary 
sources upon which I base my multi-layered analysis vary from declassified U.S. military top 
secret documents and U.S., Japanese and South Korean governments’ records to previously 
unexamined materials produced by zainichi Korean (Koreans-in-Japan) rightist and leftist 
organizations, such as their internal documents, underground newspapers and political leaflets. 
My focus on everyday Japanese and Korean encounters draws upon not only U.S. 
military and Japanese police intelligence reports but also private memoirs and zainichi Korean 
newspapers included in the Gordon W. Prange Collection, the collections of Japanese and 
zainichi Korean newspapers and magazines censored and held by the Occupation.  I use 
numerous private letters sent to General Douglas MacArthur by ordinary Japanese citizens in 
order to analyze the complexity of popular sentiments and views on Koreans in Japan.  For an 
examination of occupation policy, I take full advantage of declassified U.S. military and State 
Department documents available at the National Archives in Maryland, as well as published 
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microfilm collections of those documents.  I also use Japanese and South Korean national 
assembly records for my analysis of Japanese and South Korean domestic politics.   
Chapters 1 and 2 cover the immediate aftermath of Japan’s defeat in World War II, the 
early occupation period of 1945-1947.  The first chapter, “Unendurable Subjects: Race and 
Violence in the Birth of a Pacifist Nation,” discusses how Japan’s post-empire “peace-loving” 
nation was borne out of racial hostility and violence toward the now-liberated Korean minority in 
Japan.  This chapter illuminates how Japanese and Korean repatriation and everyday on-the-
ground encounters between the Japanese and Koreans in both metropolitan Japan and colonial 
Korea rekindled long-enduring racial tensions in both societies.  Korean conscripted workers 
brought over their immediate memories of the harsh treatment they had experienced in 
metropolitan Japan, and they often ended up avenging themselves on the Japanese colonial 
settlers remaining in now-liberated Korea.  Simultaneously, the forcible repatriation of Japanese 
colonial settlers from Korea and the stories of their doomed fate in the inverted colonial world 
fomented Japanese hostility and violence toward formerly colonized Koreans in Japan who were 
now performing “liberation” on Japanese soil.   
 The second chapter, “Racializing the Postwar Crisis: Democratization and the Remaking 
of the ‘Korean Problem’ in Japan,” demonstrates how “race” was reformulated in Japanese 
political discourse and became the central signifier for a postwar social crisis that converged with 
the crisis of the hegemony of the Japanese old regime.  I examine how the Japanese 
government’s making of the “Korean problem” intersected with popular racial anxiety.  The 
initial Occupation’s democratization of Japan encouraged the rise and resurgence of Japanese 
democratic forces and facilitated the crisis of the hegemony of the Japanese “old guard,” who 
had been the guardians of the Emperor-centered imperial “national polity” and the 
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conglomerate(zaibatsu)-dominated capitalist economy.  The Japanese old guard government 
started to racialize the social crisis by associating the presence of the Korean minority in Japan 
with food scarcity, skyrocketing inflation, and the rampant black-market economy.  This 
racialized view of social problems provided a Japanese individual with the meaning with which 
to interpret one’s own suffering and hardships in the war-torn country. 
Chapters 3 to 5 explore a critical moment of the historical conjuncture between 
decolonization and the Cold War during 1947 and 1952.  The third chapter, “Liberation Betrayed: 
Zainichi Korean Search for Self-Determination and the Cold War,” shows how the Korean 
practice of liberation in Japan became a flashpoint of the U.S. cold war confrontation in East 
Asia.  As U.S.-Soviet cold war confrontation developed on the Korean peninsula, U.S. policy-
makers both in Washington and Japan began to approach what they called the Korean “minority 
question” through the lens of cold war politics.  In early 1948, the U.S.-Japanese joint crackdown 
on zainichi Korean struggles for their own schooling in Japan epitomized a crucial convergence 
between the Japanese “postcolonial” problem and U.S. global cold war confrontation.     
The fourth chapter, “Containing Zainichi Korean Leftists: The ‘Reverse Course,’ 
Japanese and South Korean Anti-Communist Regimes, and the ‘Korean Problem’ in Japan,” 
analyzes the transnational linkages of anti-communist politics in South Korea and Japan.  I 
demonstrate that the “Korean problem” in Japan became a locus of possible mutual 
collaborations and postcolonial frictions between anti-communist governments in the former 
metropole and colony.  Both the South Korean Syngman Rhee and Japanese Yoshida Shigeru 
administrations emerged as significant “collaborators” for U.S. cold war strategy of communist 
containment in Asia.  The South Korean and Japanese governments shared the common agenda 
of diminishing the predominance of the leftist Korean political forces among zainichi Korean 
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communities.  However, the two governments approached the mutual concern with conflicting 
interests.  Their relations drifted between postcolonial tensions and “anti-communist 
cooperation.”     
The final chapter, “Fighting the Korean War in Japan: Revolutionary and Counter-
Revolutionary Struggles and Blurred National Boundaries,” examines how the Korean War 
brought the two separate national entities of Japan and South Korea into the same field of vision 
and practice of revolution and counterrevolution.  Zainichi Korean Communist leaders mobilized 
massive “antiwar” campaigns to oppose U.S. military intervention in the Korean affairs and tried 
to sabotage the U.S. remaking of Japan as a rear base for the Korean War.  Working for the cause 
of national unification under the North Korean regime, the zainichi Korean Communist leaders 
also participated in Japanese Communist revolutionary movements, believing that the 
Communist seizure of power in the rear base would be the only way to defeat the ongoing U.S. 
military “invasion” of their nation.  I also argue that U.S.-Japan-South Korea’s attempts to 
contain the Communist solidarity in Japan resulted in undermining the nascent pacifism of 
postwar Japan. 
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PART I 
The Collapse of the “Multi-Ethnic” Empire and After, 1945-1947 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
Unendurable Subjects: 
 Race and Violence in the Birth of a Pacifist Nation 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“Imperial Edict” (August 14, 1945) 
We have resolved to pave the way for grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and 
bearing the unbearable [tae gataki o tae, shinobi gataki o shinobi]. 
—Emperor Hirohito 
 
“The Responsibility of Koreans and Chinese Living in Japan to World Peace” 
Remember, if some of those Orientals [Tōyōjin] lord a privileged attitude over the Japanese, it will become the cause 
of another war in the future.  Although historically Japan did not enter the civilized world of great powers until the 
Tokugawa period, it has become a civilized, industrial country thereafter and joined the world of creation.  If [those 
Orientals] hold such feeling [of being privileged] toward this [Japanese] race, an angry eruption from the Japanese is 
inevitable. … Those [Orientals] living in Japan have to banish the thoughts that they are victorious: such thinking 
should not be applied toward a superior and developed nation [minzoku], because it will lead to a war.     
—A Letter from Sakura Seizō to General Douglas MacArthur1  
 
“How I Feel as a Korean” 
I felt the urge to hate the Japanese so much when I overheard someone saying in a packed train, “Korean bastards 
[senkō no yatsu me] are now swaggering around.  We will see.  We will bring it back to what it was used to be 
soon.”  … As long as the Japanese hold such thoughts, amity between Koreans and Japanese will never happen, and 
Oriental peace [Tōyō no heiwa] cannot be secured.   
—Chang Tusik, “Chōsenjin wa kō omou”2 
 
At 12:00 p.m. on August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito’s recorded speech went on the air 
across the Japanese empire through a radio broadcast.  His short speech conveyed an imperial 
sovereign’s decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration, the Allied Powers’ demand for Japan’s 
                                                 
1
 A letter to MacArthur, (no date) [stamped on June 4, 1946], Box 231, Assistance Chief of Staff, G-2, SCAP, 
Record Group 331 (Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II), National Archives and Record 
Administration, College Park, MD.  (Henceforth, G-2, RG 331, NARA.) 
2
 Minshu Chōsen 3 (June 1946). 
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“unconditional surrender” and its relinquishment of colonial territories.3  It was the first time that 
Emperor Hirohito spoke directly to his people, “one hundred million” imperial subjects including 
Koreans and Taiwanese.  In his message of defeat – although Emperor Hirohito never uttered the 
word “defeat” or “surrender” – the Emperor expressed the deep pain and grief he felt over the 
suffering that his imperial subjects had gone through and would still have to undergo thereafter.  
The Emperor also called on his war-exhausted subjects to “endure the unendurable, bear the 
unbearable” alongside him in order to create a “peaceful” future together.  This Emperor’s 
message of defeat came as a complete surprise to his imperial subjects who had been told to fight 
the war to the bitter end.  In the wake of Japan’s defeat, the words “endure the unendurable” 
soon became a mantra for the Japanese populace living through the confusion and hardships of a 
war-torn, foreign-occupied country.     
In retrospect, the reconstruction of post-defeat U.S./Allied-occupied Japan as a 
“democratic” and “peace-loving” nation indeed appears as if the Emperor’s appeal to his people 
had been realized.  According to widely accepted narratives, Japanese people, enduring the 
anguish of defeat and the disgrace of their direct subordination to the former “racial enemy” on 
their own soil, soon stood up from ashes to rebuild the country.  People responded and 
participated in the project of “demilitarization” and “democratization,” the radical reforms that 
                                                 
3
 On July 26, 1945, the U.S., British and Chinese governments issued together the Potsdam Declaration that defined 
terms for the Japanese surrender.  The declaration addressed the issue of Japanese territories, which was laid out as 
follows: “The terms of Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands 
of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”  The Cairo Declaration, which 
was put forth by the U.S., British and Chinese governments on November 27, 1943, more specifically defined 
Japanese territories and the future treatment of Japan’s colonies as follows: “It is their [the U.S., Britain and China] 
purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the 
beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as 
Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.  Japan will also be expelled 
from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.  The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of 
the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and 
independent.”  For the full texts of the Potsdam Declaration and Cairo Declaration, see Division of Special Records, 
Foreign Office, Japanese Government, ed., Documents concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, 
Volume I: Basic Documents (January 1949), pp.1, 7-12.   
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the victors had initially imposed in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration.  As historian John 
W. Dower has vividly narrated in his book Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War 
II, the Japanese “embraced” defeat and understood the U.S./Allied remaking of Japan, or 
“revolution from above,” as an opportunity for peace and democracy.4  Within a year and half 
after the beginning of U.S./Allied occupation of Japan, newly elected Japanese lawmakers 
adopted, after heated debates and multiple modifications, a draft of the new Japanese constitution 
that General Douglas MacArthur and his staff had originally composed for disarming the 
militarist authoritarian nation.  The Japanese people also participated directly and indirectly in 
the constitutional process.  Some wrote their own drafts of a new constitution, some lobbied 
Japanese lawmakers and occupation policy-makers for certain rights, and some wrote petition 
letters to MacArthur in the hope that the victor would listen to the voices of the vanquished.  The 
birth of the new Japanese constitution marked a symbolic collaboration between the victor and 
vanquished.  The postwar constitutional process indeed epitomized the Japanese “embracing” of 
defeat, and this story has been replicated and often glorified in both academic and public 
narratives on postwar Japan. 
Yet, did the Japanese majority also embrace defeat in relation to now-liberated colonial 
subjects as they did to their conquerors?  Did the Japanese populace also “endure the 
unendurable” of defeat and sought possible reconciliation and peaceful future with their formerly 
subjugated Korean minority who were now acting as “liberated people” before their eyes?   
In early June 1946, the time when heated debates over the drafting of the new Japanese 
“democratic,” “pacifist” constitution was about to start in the National Diet, one Japanese man 
named Sakura Seizō wrote to MacArthur that the attitudes of “Orientals” (Koreans and Chinese) 
in Japan acting like “victorious” and “privileged” nationals were unacceptable.  Sakura warned 
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that their attitudes would cause “an angry eruption from the Japanese” and thus “lead to a war.”  
At a similar time, one Korean intellectual living in Japan was shocked to overhear in a packed 
train hostile daily conversations targeting Koreans and worried about the possible “amity 
between Koreans and Japanese” and “Oriental peace.”  Indeed, as I examine in this chapter, 
hatred, fear, and antagonistic attitudes toward the now-liberated Korean minority were surging 
among the defeated people under foreign occupation, through unexpected day-to-day encounters 
with the Koreans demonstrating their liberation on Japanese soil.
5
  Those grass-roots sentiments 
and attitudes fomented pervasive racial violence on the ground, and sometimes exploded into 
brutal assaults like the military-like execution of two Korean men in mid-1947, an appalling 
racial murder later called the “Yorii incident.” 
In the early morning on August 1, 1947, Korean residents found the corpses of two young 
Korean men in a village of Saitama Prefecture.  Their bodies were covered with numerous deep 
gashes – one body had its head completely chopped off, while the head on the other corpse had 
not been completely chopped off.  The Korean residents living nearby the village were the ones 
who had to carry out the investigation as the Japanese police simply ignored the matter.  The 
investigation revealed that late in the night on July 31, a group of some thirty Japanese gangsters 
armed with cudgels and swords assaulted a group of young Korean men who were watching a 
play at a local makeshift playhouse.  One barely escaped with his life, and two were killed 
brutally – the Japanese group took turns slashing at those Korean men’s bodies in a frenzy and in 
the end hacked at their necks in attempt to behead them.  A progressive Japanese lawyers 
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association called “Jiyū Hōsōdan” and the Saitama branch of the Korean League in Japan 
(Zainihon Chōsenjin Renmei) soon issued a number of joint statements on this harrowing event.  
In their statements, they characterized the method of the execution as “reminiscent of the 
‘beheading’ [uchikubi] during feudal times” and condemned the crime as an “atrocity 
comparable to barbaric brutalities that aggressive Japanese imperialist troops had committed as 
they pleased in the battlefields.”6   
Japanese lawyer Fuse Tatsuji, the legal counsel for the Korean residents of Saitama 
Prefecture who were arrested for conducting an unauthorized criminal investigation of the racial 
murder, recognized that this brutal killing of the two Koreans signaled a much more widespread 
and broader social phenomenon in post-defeat Japanese society.  For Fuse, the killing was indeed 
an extraordinarily horrific murder committed by a group of gangsters.  Yet, he also understood 
its critical significance within a larger landscape of pervasive racial violence targeting Koreans 
in Japan.  In his view, the spreading violence against Koreans was a product of socially shared 
sentiments of “sorrow” and “grievances” about defeat, a product of what he called “defeat 
mentality” (haisen shisō) among the Japanese.  “Defeat mentality,” he analyzed, would attribute 
all things miserable to the fact of defeat and necessarily solidify into a “desire for vengeance” 
(fukushū kannen), but under the conditions of defeat, the Japanese felt that they could not vent 
such desires for vengeance on their “overpowering” conquerors, the U.S./Allied occupiers.  The 
brutality underlying the killing of the two Korean men was, in his words, the “embodiment” 
(shisōteki hyōgen) of the deep-rooted desires for vengeance over defeat among the Japanese, 
which had exploded into violent assaults against “weaker” Koreans enjoying their new life of 
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liberation.  In a later court hearing, Fuse characterized the background of this harrowing incident 
as follows: 
The feeling of vengeance and sorrow over defeat, which cannot be vented due to 
the [official] renunciation of war, is erupting in the form of frequent [Japanese] 
assaults all across Japan targeting Koreans, who are rejoicing at the restoration of 
their homeland after the war.  Thus, I take this incident extremely seriously[.]
7
  
 
What this “Yorii incident” revealed was a reality different from the image of a newly 
born “peace-loving” nation of Japan.  In other words, the Japanese embracing of defeat and the 
U.S./Allied disarmament of the militarist Japan also heralded the continuation of violent racial 
assaults from the war period on the ground.  If, as recent studies have explored, the relationship 
between the victor and vanquished under the U.S./Allied occupation was infused with 
“intimations of white supremacism,”8 quasi-“racial segregation,”9 “the American masculine 
gaze,”10 or images of Japanese men “emasculated” and “feminized” by their conquerors,11 the 
humiliation of such racialized and gendered forms of subordination (or “emasculation”) did not 
simply lie latent and passive in the defeated population as they were “enduring the unendurable.”  
The humiliation boiled over into vengeance, aggression and even violence toward the formerly 
subjugated Koreans acting as “liberated people.”  Indeed, the beheading of the Korean bodies 
seemed more revealing of how the group of Japanese men were making desperate efforts to 
reclaim their disarmed masculinity by enacting a wartime-like execution. 
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In this chapter, I discuss how Japan’s post-empire “peace-loving” nation was borne out of 
hostility and racial violence toward the now-liberated Korean minority in Japan.  Whereas 
Japanese lawyer Fuse problematized the “feeling of vengeance and sorrow over defeat” that 
could not be vented on their conquerors and was instead “erupting in the form of frequent 
assaults all across Japan targeting Koreans,” I illuminate different facets of Japanese sentiments 
underlying violence against Koreans – the sentiments of fear and racial anxiety.  As I argue 
below, defeat made Japanese people extremely uneasy about their future hierarchical racial status 
vis-à-vis those whom they had been treating as an “inferior” race under the Japanese empire.  
The decolonization of Korea sparked a strong fear among the Japanese of reprisals from and 
possible racial subordination to former Korean colonial subjects.  Fear, in the words of Albert 
Memmi, “always accompanies the undertaking of hostility,” and it is the fundamental driving 
force of the practice of racism, that is, “aggression.”12  This chapter unravels how racial fear rose 
to the surface in the daily life of Japanese people amidst the fall of the Japanese “multi-ethnic” 
empire.  
Moreover, post-empire new encounters between Japanese and Koreans, between the 
defeated and liberated, became increasingly infused with racial tensions in both Japan and Korea, 
the former metropole and colony.  The repatriations of Korean conscripted workers from Japan 
to Korea and also Japanese colonial settlers from Korea to Japan in the wake of the collapse of 
the Japanese empire added fuel to the mounting mutual antagonism in both societies.  The 
Korean conscripted workers brought over their immediate memories of the miserable conditions 
and treatment they had experienced in metropolitan Japan, and the Japanese colonial settlers 
carried with them their resentments over their doomed fate in liberated Korea.  If the metropole 
and colony are not separate entities but mutually constitutive in colonial history as recent 
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postcolonial studies have explored, the history of decolonization is also a process of mutual 
restructuring.
13
  By paying close attention to encounters and interactions between Japan and 
Korea in the wake of the collapse of the Japanese empire, this chapter brings the former 
metropole and colony, defeated colonizers and liberated colonized, into one analytical field.   
 
The Moments of Defeat and Liberation    
At 9:00 p.m. in the evening of August 14, 1945, the Japanese public radio station 
broadcasted a brief notification that the government would make an “important announcement” 
over the radio at 12:00 p.m. the following day.  In the morning of the next day, on August 15, 
Japanese newspapers also printed the notification, and the radio morning news told listeners that 
something extraordinary would soon take place: the Emperor would for the first time speak 
directly to his people and issue an imperial edict through the radio broadcast.  The radio news 
stressed that “every single national” must listen.  At 12:00 p.m., a radio announcer started with a 
strained voice and asked listeners to stand up, followed by a government official’s preface and 
the national anthem.  Then, the Emperor’s recorded speech – recorded the previous day at 
midnight – was aired.   
The Emperor’s short announcement of the imperial edict – approximately four and half 
minutes – was sprinkled with such formal and abstruse languages that it was almost 
unintelligible for the populace who were trying to catch the Emperor’s words through the noise 
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of radio static.  Following the Emperor’s enigmatic speech, the radio announcer began to explain 
– or “translate” – the meaning of the Emperor’s message.  The announcer also provided listeners 
with a narration of their supposed sentiments regarding and reactions to the Emperor’s message, 
as if he was speaking on behalf of all in order to instruct what the proper reaction to the 
Emperor’s voiced imperial edict should be.  With an emotional appeal, the announcer stated that 
“the hundred million [of imperial subjects] were all moved to tears” and continued: 
We your subjects [wareware shinmin] swear to observe the imperial edict without 
fail and sacrifice oneself for the state [messhi hōkō] in order to preserve the 
national polity [kokutai] and national glory [minzoku no meiyo].
14
 
           
Whereas the announcer demonstrated to listeners how to accept the Emperor’s message 
of defeat by swearing on behalf of all to continue further “self-sacrifice for the state” as a loyal 
imperial subject, few Japanese, let alone Japan’s colonized subjects, could easily embrace such 
sudden turnabout.  In fact, on that day, few people, not only the colonizers but the colonized as 
well, expected their imperial government to make the decision to surrender.  Upon listening to 
the Emperor’s speech at that critical moment – in the aftermath of the U.S. dropping of two 
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet Union’s entry into the war as a new 
foe – most people anticipated a government call for further collective determination to fight the 
to the bitter end.  Although more than a few imperial subjects were already predicting Japan’s 
possible defeat in the war, they still believed that the government would not surrender until the 
“hundred million” (ichioku) fought to the bitter end or, as glorified in wartime suicidal slogans, 
“died like shattered jewels” (gyokusai).   
The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey that interviewed 3,150 Japanese civilians 
immediately after the war, during the period from November 10 to December 29 in 1945, 
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observed that Japanese people were not “mentally prepared for the surrender” and “[e]ven on the 
last day of surrender, many people were still hoping for some last minute ‘Divine Wind’ to save 
the day.”  The survey explained that “[e]ven though most of the Japanese expected that they 
could not win, it was very difficult for a Japanese to admit to himself that his nation had 
definitely lost.”15  In other words, for the determined (or desperate) Japanese populace, the 
Emperor’s message of defeat suddenly came as a sheer emotional shock.  The survey 
characterized the Japanese “predominant reactions” to the government decision to accept the 
Potsdam Declaration as “one of sorrow, misery, surprise, and disillusionment.”16   
Indeed, in a Japanese top secret intelligence report dated August 27, 1945, the secret 
police, who had been keeping close watch on popular reactions to the Emperor’s radio broadcast, 
described the state of the Japanese majority as “stupefied and extremely disappointed” with 
“resentful voices spreading through the city and countryside.”17  That afternoon, immediately 
after the Emperor’s radio broadcast, one Japanese elderly man who saw a military officer in 
uniform sitting in the same bus as him suddenly went up to the officer, grabbed the officer’s cap 
and flung it down to the floor, hurling insults at the officer, “What were you guys doing all this 
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time?  These caps are useless!”  The officer simply remained silent.18  Nare Tokiyoshi, enraged 
by the Emperor’s radio broadcast, stormed out of the house with a sword in his hand and shouted 
at strangers on the street: “I heard that Japan gave up the war, but can you agree with that?”19  
On August 23, Sawada Katsumi, an assistant railway worker, was interrogated by the police for 
suspected lese-majesty, for cursing Emperor Hirohito for accepting the Potsdam Declaration in 
front of his colleagues and a police officer: “The Emperor is stupid.  I don’t need him.”20  
Similarly, Hora Toranosuke, the speaker of the municipal council in Yamaguchi City, expressed 
his anger and frustration with the government’s decision: 
Numerous sacrifices were in vain.  We also lost all hope and motivation for work.  
It is unendurably depressing [mattaku zannen ni taranai] that foreign bastards 
[gaikokujin no yarō] will rule.  I’d rather die by stabbing each other to death.21 
 
 In contrast to the reactions of the anger and disappointment, other elements of the 
Japanese populace also became relieved and started to enjoy the liberation of the body from the 
regimented life of exhausting “self-sacrifice for the state” (messhi hōkō) during the war.  Some 
were glad that family members would be able to come back alive from the battlefield, and some 
were happy that the days of fear over U.S. airstrikes had ended.  Police secret intelligence reports 
recorded popular voices on the ground, and according to the reports, one person said, “I am 
relieved that at least there will be no more air-raid sirens.  I want to go to a spa and relax.”22  
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Some also showed more opportunistic attitudes.  One Japanese soldier returned home and started 
to learn English, encouraging others to also learn it.
23
  Interestingly, on August 29, the military 
police in the Shikoku region reported on the recent local popular trend and described it as 
follows: “movie theaters had no vacancy the day after the proclamation of the imperial edict; 
Bon dance [traditional popular dance] started; the purchasing of goods increased; people started 
to study English hard – a certain vocational school replaced German with English.”24   
 Some others were poised to observe the sovereign’s words, “endure the unendurable, bear 
the unbearable,” for various reasons.  On August 23, one anonymous letter that appeared in the 
Letters to the Editor section of a national newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, called on people to “endure 
the unendurable” for the sake of the swift reconstruction of Japan.  The letter, titled “Endure 
Hardship” (gataki o shinobe), claimed that although it was understandable to have 
“disappointment” and “hate for submission” to Allied Powers, everyone should refrain from 
rashness and make full efforts for “national resurgence” (kokka saikō) by enduring the 
unendurable – that would be the “right way to respond to the Emperor’s will.”25  Similarly, a 
military police intelligence report dated August 23 recorded a voice of a military official who 
emphasized “patience” (jichō) as a good way to facilitate the early withdrawal of occupation 
forces from Japan; and similar voice of a rightist figure who insisted that “enduring humiliation” 
(kutsujoku o tae shinobu) would be a good way to “threaten the enemy.”  Another anonymous 
voice said: “It is wise to endure [gaman suru] now because it will become possible to have 
revenge after fifteen years or so.”26   
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 On the other hand, the Emperor’s radio broadcast also stoked unbridled fury among some 
militant Japanese, particularly extremist military personnel, and drove them to make desperate 
gestures of defiance against surrender, to undermine the government initiative of 
demobilization.
27
  In the immediate aftermath of the Emperor’s radio broadcast, the language of 
open defiance abruptly burst into streets across Japan, as militarist dissidents in the state organs 
launched guerrilla-like resistance to the government’s decision to surrender.  Military and police 
intelligence papers reported multiple incidents of munity among imperial soldiers and numerous 
kinds of anti-surrender leaflets that had been distributed by military aircrafts via air and by 
military trucks on the ground.  For instance, a military aircraft suddenly appeared in the skies of 
Tokyo in the afternoon of August 15 and scattered leaflets titled “An Appeal to All Nationals,” 
which called for “the uprising of all the hundred million” (ichioku sō kekki).28  On August 16, a 
military aircraft, flying over Shirakawa City in Fukushima Prefecture, scattered leaflets that 
appealed to people to “encourage the uprising of the Imperial Army.”29  On August 18, a military 
truck appeared around Shinjuku, the center of Tokyo, and distributed anti-surrender leaflets, 
which stated: “There is no honor to surrendering to the enemy!  Atomic bombs, who cares!  
Soviet Union’s entry to the war, who cares! … We are absolutely determined and poised to push 
forward the war.”30  In the streets of the towns of Iwanuma and Masuda in Miyagi Prefecture, 
some sixty anti-surrender leaflets were found posted on telephone poles on August 20.
31
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In those anti-surrender leaflets, militarist dissidents questioned the imperial edict of 
August 15, the Emperor’s announcement of the government’s decision to accept the Potsdam 
Declaration, and framed it as something illegitimate, although consciously without denying the 
Emperor as the imperial sovereign.  Their call for defiance contended, “The government’s 
decision to surrender is not the Emperor’s true will.”  One leaflet claimed, “If we accept the 
Potsdam Declaration, it means to destroy the Emperor.  Thus, if we obey the order to carry out 
the Potsdam Declaration, we commit great treason and disloyalty [taigyaku mudō no fuchū].”32  
Another leaflet written by a civilian ultra-rightist called for defiance against the government’s 
decision by questioning more radically the legitimacy of the imperial edict. 
[Through this imperial edict] the eternal national polity is now about to be 
abandoned and the Emperor’s sovereignty is now about to be put under the 
control of the enemy commander.  The Emperor’s sovereignty has to be supreme, 
absolute and unique.  Once put under the commander of the enemy, the 
Emperor’s sovereignty will be extinguished and the national polity, which is 
constituted by the unity of the sovereign and people, will collapse.  Such an 
“imperial edict” is not truly an “imperial edict” despite its form, because it is 
totally against the eternal divine will and inherited divine sprit if the Emperor 
destroys the national polity by his own will.
33
 
 
 In other words, those anti-surrender dissidents tried to undermine the government 
initiative of demobilization by appropriating the meaning and legitimacy of the “Emperor’s 
will,” the imperial edict of August 15.  Although the Emperor himself announced the 
government decision to surrender in the form of an imperial edict by speaking directly to his 
people, those dissidents framed the decision to surrender as illegitimate and incompatible with 
the Emperor’s sovereignty, that is, the sacred, inviolate foundation of the national polity.   
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When some Japanese extremists were making desperate efforts in vain to subvert the 
meaning of the imperial edict and resist the surrender that was fast becoming a fait accompli 
during the days immediately following the Emperor’s radio broadcast, a group of Korean 
political leaders were striving for the exact opposite objective.  Seizing the opportunity created 
by the Emperor’s announcement of surrender, the Korean leaders were making determined 
efforts to expand the meaning of Japan’s surrender and establish the widest possible effect of 
decolonization as possible.  Whereas Koreans were promised by the Allied Powers in accordance 
with the Cairo Declaration that Korea would “in due course … become free and independent” on 
the occasion of Japan’s surrender,34 the Emperor’s announcement did not necessarily mean 
Japan’s immediate disavowal of colonial sovereignty.  Amidst the last gasp of the dying 
Japanese empire, the Korean leaders took the initiative in eviscerating the colonial governmental 
system and paving the new political landscape of decolonization.  Their attempts to establish de 
facto decolonization coalesced into the declaration of the “Korean People’s Republic” (Chosŏn 
Inmin Konghwaguk) on September 6, which they particularly hurried in the face of the arrival of 
the U.S. occupation forces.
35
 
On August 15, the streets of colonial Korea rather looked calm that afternoon 
immediately after the Emperor’s radio broadcast, especially when compared to the metropole 
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unnerved and unsettled by scattered angry militant voices.  The capital of colonial Korea that 
afternoon was “completely quiet,” in the words of Russian diplomatic official F.I. Shabshina 
who witnessed the epoch-making moment in colonial Korea.  She wrote: 
Seoul was completely quiet.  Of course, people were aware of Japan’s surrender.  
But, many did not believe it.  They just waited with their cautious joy and hope.  
On the following day, everything changed – the enormous tide of unbridled 
jubilation literally swept through the city and across the whole country.
36
   
 
While the large majority of Koreans was perhaps still in disbelief over Japan’s surrender 
during that day, the Emperor’s radio broadcast spurred Korean independence fighters into swift 
action for what they believed was forthcoming decolonization.  In the early morning of August 
15, hours before the Emperor’s speech was broadcasted, Vice Governor-General Endō Ryūsaku 
had an urgent meeting with Yŏ Unyŏng, a long-time Korean independence fighter and leftist 
leader, and asked him for “cooperation” in preventing possible colonial mass retaliation in the 
wake of Japan’s surrender – the nightmare that the colonizers had feared the most.37  Yŏ told 
Endō that he would accept if the colonial authorities agreed to carry out his five demands: “to 
release all political and economic prisoners in Korea immediately,” “to guarantee food 
provisions in Seoul for the next three months,” “to make no interference in [Korean] activities 
for preserving and building law and order,” “to make no interference in the training of students 
and organizing of the youth in Korea,” and “to let workers all over Korea cooperate with our 
building efforts.”38  Although Yŏ’s demands stretched “cooperation” far beyond what the 
colonial government had originally wanted, Endō had no choice but to accept and rely on Yŏ’s 
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political leadership for the safety of colonizers amidst the imminent collapse of colonial control.  
Soon, Yŏ took the lead in shaping the course of the dying colonial rule and defining a political 
landscape of “liberation.”      
On the following day after the Emperor’s radio broadcast, Yŏ Unyŏng and his comrades 
started a series of critical efforts to enact an indigenous initiative for establishing de facto 
decolonization across Korea.  They embarked on the new project by announcing Korea’s 
“liberation” and their establishment of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean 
Independence (CPKI, Choson kon’guk chunbi wiwonhoe); disseminating its name and claim as 
the new authority in liberated Korea via leaflets, a radio broadcast, and a colonial government 
newspaper; organizing “peace-preservation corps” (ch’iandae or poandae) that would maintain 
peace and order by replacing the colonial police; opening the gates of colonial prisons and 
releasing imprisoned dissidents and political prisoners.  Soon, CPKI organizers and CPKI-led 
ch’iandae members started to challenge and undermine the colonial authorities by taking over 
local administration offices and police stations.
39
  Ch’iandae youths, wearing armbands as the 
symbol of new authority, swaggered on the streets and demonstrated to fellow Koreans and 
Japanese colonizers that the history of subjugation had come to an end in Korea.  As an 
alternative police force, the ch’iandae played, as historian Bruce Cumings emphasizes, “an 
important role in maintaining the peace in the August of 1945.”40        
The bold and swift initiatives that Yŏ Unyŏng and his comrades performed by 
appropriating the moment of a nascent colonial political vacuum resulted in more than reassuring 
those still in disbelief over Japan’s surrender.  Their initiatives, particularly the declaration of the 
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CPKI as the de facto new postcolonial authority, assured the wary Korean populace of 
“liberation” from Japan’s colonial rule.  As new voices of Korean liberation started to circulate 
through the radio, newspaper, leaflets and demonstrations, people crowded into the streets en 
masse and started to take over colonial public spaces that had long been the arenas of 
surveillance and violence under the colonial police.   
On the day following after the Emperor’s radio broadcast, the streets of the colonial 
capital were swept up in the mood of exaltation, overflowing with the mass of jubilant people 
enjoying the newly-formed space of freedom.  Political prisoners just released from prisons in 
Seoul poured into the streets in prison garb and started to march through the city along with their 
supporters in the welcoming crowd, celebrating and demonstrating liberation.  Trucks loaded up 
with people cheering “manse!” drove around on the streets, and trains were packed both inside 
and on the roofs with joyful crowds waving Korean national flags, a flag with the Korean 
national symbol painted over the symbol of the Rising-Sun of the Japanese national flag. 
The emergence of the new political landscape in Korea was also accompanied by some 
explosions of personal vengeance in the form of sporadic violence.  The colonial government 
recorded that 27 murders and 214 violent assaults against both Japanese and Koreans were 
reported during the ten days from August 16 to August 25.  Among them, 21 murder cases and 
185 violent incidents involved Korean victims, particularly Korean police officers and municipal 
officials, and 6 murder cases and 29 violent incidents involved Japanese victims, particularly 
Japanese police officers.
41
  In other words, the primary target of personal vengeance was not so 
much Japanese colonial settlers but fellow Korean colonial “collaborators.”  Apparently, the 
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Korean populace held more resentment toward fellow Koreans who had worked for Japanese 
colonial rule.   
In the metropole, similarly, the moment of Japan’s defeat evoked unbridled joy and 
enthusiasm among over two million Koreans living in Japan as well.  In his memoir, Pak 
Hŏnhaeng recollected how his Korean neighborhood, the Imakita district of Amagasaki City in 
Hyōgo Prefecture, was swept up in a mood of sheer exuberance on that day after the Emperor’s 
radio broadcast: 
As the evening came, Koreans who came to know Japan’s defeat began to crowd 
into the streets of Imakita.  The streets became like a large meeting ground and 
soon resounded with unceasing cheers of “manse!” “Chōsen banzai!” and 
“dokuritsu [independence] banzai!”  People were excited, drunk, and delighted, 
raising their voices.  It was like a festival.  People brought doburoku [Korean rice 
wine] from their home and played the Korean drum and small gong.  The frenzy 
of exaltation continued until midnight.
42
   
 
Some Koreans, particularly those who had had enough of hardships of labor conscription 
as conscript labors in Japan,
43
 were too jubilant and could not hold back their simmering 
grievances against those who had abused them.  According to a record of the Hokkaidō Police, 
some six hundred Korean miners in Utashinai stood up on August 15 immediately after the 
Emperor’s radio broadcast and assaulted the company’s office, accusing the company of having 
exploited and mistreated them as forced labor during the war.
44
  In Akita Prefecture, the local 
police reported that in the evening of August 15, eleven Korean miners who were intoxicated on 
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celebratory drinks broke some factory equipment and cursed Japanese supervisors, saying, 
“Japan was defeated.  This time around we will exploit you [omaetachi wo tsukatte yaru].”45   
At the same time, however, it is important to note that not all of the Koreans hailed 
Japan’s defeat and Korea’s liberation with sheer joy, excitement, or desire for revenge.  For those 
who had spent their youth going through the intense colonial educational system aimed at the 
complete “Japanization” and had accustomed themselves to the colonial demand for the denial of 
any “Koreaness,” Japan’s defeat/Korea’s liberation triggered rather agonizing confusion and 
bewilderment.  Kim Sijong, who grew up “innocently believing” in the imperial slogan of 
“naisen ittai” (Japan and Korea as one body) through colonial education, heard the Emperor’s 
message of defeat in Cheju Island in Korea at age seventeen and remembered it as a moment of 
existential bewilderment: 
[A]t the moment of sudden “liberation,” I could not believe Japan’s defeat.  I was 
so shocked that I did not even feel like eating almost for a week.  I was telling 
myself to believe that a divine wind [kamikaze] would blow soon and overturn the 
“defeat.”  
It was amid overflowing excitement and the roar of “manse! manse!” across 
Korea.  I was sitting alone on the pier of a harbor like a lone dog, unknowingly 
mumbling Japanese songs.
46
 
 
The songs that came out of his body were all of the Japanese songs he had learned through 
colonial education – songs to praise the Japanese Emperor.  Liberation made Kim feel that he 
was suddenly “abandoned” to Korea, which he used to hold in contempt from the vantage point 
of the colonizer’s gaze.  For Kim, August 15 was a schizophrenic moment – the beginning of his 
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agonizing struggle to reconcile his past as an “Emperor’s subject” and the immediate present 
reality of a liberated Korea.
47
 
On the other hand, for those who had devoted themselves to Japanese colonial rule in 
Korea or who had obtained a certain niche in metropole society, the day heralded by many as 
“liberation” and “independence” came as rather a grim and uneasy moment.  Faced with the 
sudden collapse of the colonial governmental system in Korea, colonial collaborators instantly 
disappeared, hiding themselves in fear of retaliation.
48
  Some even decided to remain literally in 
the same boat with Japanese colonizers ready to flee Korea, hoping to get on the same 
repatriation boat to metropolitan Japan.
49
  Similarly, on the shop floor in the metropole, those 
who had obtained a certain niche in Japanese industries – supervisors, assistants and translators 
who had often played an important role in the Japanese exploitation of Korean conscripted 
unskilled labor in Japan – also had to embrace Korean “liberation” with a lurking fear of reprisal 
from fellow Korean workers.
50
  Moreover, for some propertied Koreans in Japan, the fall of the 
Japanese empire created anxiety that they would have to give up what they had attained through 
rising up from the very bottom of metropole society due to possible mandatory repatriation.  For 
instance, the local police in Niigata Prefecture reported that Koreans who had been living in 
Japan for many years and owned “a considerable amount of wealth” were worrying that the 
Japanese government would send them back to Korea by force.
51
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While Japan’s defeat and Korea’s liberation evoked deep pain and apprehension in not a 
few Koreans, such ambivalent emotions of anxiety and anguish, however, barely registered in the 
mind of the Japanese imagining of Koreans’ experience of August 15.  In the eyes of most 
Japanese, Koreans simply appeared like a jubilant mass crowd noisily celebrating, intoxicated 
with Japanese defeat and Korean liberation.  In their eyes, the jubilation of Koreans even 
appeared as an insult, betrayal, or challenge to themselves and what they had believed was the 
glorious cause of Japanese empire, such as the “harmony” (yūwa) and “unity” (ittai) of Japanese 
and Koreans.  Soon, their direct encounters with the celebrating masses of Koreans on the streets 
and in public spaces began to provoke bitter sentiments and even fear in the defeated populace.   
  
Race and Racial Anxiety among the Defeated 
What followed the emotional shock of the Emperor’s announcement of surrender was the 
looming shadow of the troops of the “racial enemy” on Japanese soil.  U.S. military troops had 
been occupying Okinawa and the Amami Islands since April 1945, holding civilian residents in 
makeshift internment camps.  The U.S. troops in Okinawa and the Allied Powers were ready to 
place the entire metropolitan society under their control via military occupation as stipulated in 
the Potsdam Declaration.  In Japan, the arrival of their new conquerors whom they had 
previously depicted as dehumanized “kichiku Bei-Ei” (devil- and beast-like Americans and 
Britons) during the war dominated the imaginations of the vanquished, fomenting rumors of 
possible future atrocities that the enemy soldiers would commit upon arrival.  
During the days immediately after the Emperor’s announcement of surrender, the 
Japanese police reported numerous circulating rumors and daily conversations among people 
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which manifested the popular fear and anxiety over what “defeat” and “occupation” by the 
enemy would mean to them.
52
  Some were anxious that their conquerors would expropriate their 
scarce food and throw the hungry war-torn nation into utter starvation.  Others were fearful of 
violent reprisals from enemy soldiers.  In their conversations, a group of Japanese women 
lamented Japan’s defeat in fear of what they assumed would come next: “When the Yankee 
bastards come, they will put us together and kill us.”53  Groundless rumors about the arrival of 
enemy troops and the accompanying atrocities also spread immediately, causing further terror 
and confusion among the people.
54
  Even before the U.S. troops actually arrived in late August, it 
was rumored that “sixty thousand U.S. soldiers landed [at the port of] Yokohama and [were] now 
carrying out looting and assaults.”55  On August 19, Asahi Shimbun printed an article titled 
“Looting and Violence Will Be Improbable” and denied those rumored possible atrocities of U.S. 
occupation troops in attempt to calm down the frenzied populace.
56
  It was ironic that Asahi 
Shimbun, which had actively disseminated the dehumanized image of the enemy during the war, 
was now trying to reassure those panicked by enemy’s looming specter. 
Besides the dehumanized, terror-inspiring image of their enemy, the Japanese had good 
reason to fear and believe in possible violent reprisals from their conquerors, given what 
Japanese troops had done in their occupied foreign territories during the war, like the “Rape of 
Nanking” of 1937.  One even considered “looting and raping” as something “natural” for victors 
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according to past experiences of victorious Japanese troops in China.
57
  Likewise, even the 
Japanese government appeared to be projecting such past experiences in China upon their 
conquerors.  In fear of their conquerors’ possible random “mass rape” of Japanese women, the 
Japanese government hurried to set up “comfort facilities” and institutionalize state-run 
prostitution for U.S./Allied soldiers.
58
  At the same time, the Japanese local authorities, 
particularly those in the cities where U.S. troops were expected to land soon, advised and 
encouraged each household to “evacuate” women and young girls to the countryside.  People 
scared by the local authorities’ “advice” rushed to evacuate in droves and in a panic.59      
Importantly, what made Japanese people extremely anxious about defeat and occupation 
by the enemy was not simply the specter of violent reprisals from their new conquerors.  It was 
also “race” per se that had become an unsettling matter in defeated Japan.  In other words, defeat 
also marked a disquieting moment for the Japanese still holding imperialist racial ideology, the 
ideology of the purity and supremacy of the “Yamato Race” (Yamato minzoku), which the 
government had pushed forward during wartime until the late 1930s.
60
  On the ground, one could 
hear people talking anxiously about the fate of their race.  In the face of occupation by 
U.S./Allied troops, one worried that “negro” (kuronbo) Indian soldiers would also come to Japan 
and “breed” on Japanese soil,61 and another was concerned that the U.S. might adopt 
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“miscegenation policy” (konketsu seisaku) in the occupation of Japan.62  One Japanese man 
believed that the U.S. would “colonize” a defeated Japan, lamenting this lot to be worse than 
“becoming the third-rate nation [sanryūkoku]”63 – indeed, MacArthur called Japan “fourth-rate 
nation” later at the very beginning of the occupation, on September 11.64   
Such racial anxiety was not simply taking shape among the populace.  Rather, it 
manifested more socially shared sentiment.  In public space, chauvinistic leaflets written in the 
name of the “National Salvation Party” (Kyūkokutō) told Japanese women to “preserve the pure 
blood of the Yamato Race,” warning that those who had “intercourse with foreign race” (ijunshu 
to majiwaru) would be “punished by death.”65  A Japanese government official also revealed 
similar concern.  Upon setting up “comfort facilities” for U.S./Allied soldiers, one of the 
founding members of the Recreation and Amusement Association (so-called “RAA”) met the 
chief of the Tax Bureau of the Finance Ministry, Ikeda Hayato (later Prime Minister), and asked 
for financial support for the project.  He remembered that Ikeda told him: “I will offer as much 
as one hundred million yen.  One hundred million yen is cheap for protecting the pure blood of 
the Yamato Race.”66  In its charter, the RAA declared its intention to “protect the pure blood of 
the one hundred million” and thereby contribute to the “preservation of the national polity.”67  
Moreover, one national newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, called on people not to lose “love for our 
brethren” (dōhō ai) and a sense of “pride as Yamato Race” in going through hardships of the 
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aftermath of defeat.
68
  After the beginning of U.S./Allied occupation, the Japanese government 
started to seek for “racial equality” in the future diplomatic relations with its former racial 
enemies – the diplomatic cause that leaders of modern Japan had been obsessed with in relation 
to Western powers.
69
   
One Japanese intellectual tried to reassure the populace that defeat could never crush 
Japanese racial superiority.  In his essay printed in Asahi Shimbun on August 24, Takata Yasuma, 
one of the prominent Japanese intellectuals who had pushed forward the imperialist project of the 
“Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” by forging the new racial ideology of “multi-ethnic 
empire,” targeted and warned against a growing pessimistic view on the Japanese nation (Nihon 
minzoku).
70
  His short essay, titled “The Purity of Blood and the Resurgence of the Nation” (chi 
no junketsu to minzoku no hukkō), was replete with reassurance regarding the Japanese racial 
superiority.  Refuting a “racist” theory that assumed only “a group of the white” as the “creator 
of world culture” and thereby justified their “domination of other nations [minzoku] as the 
destiny of humankind,” Takata praised the strength of the contemporary Japanese nation, the 
strength that derived from the purity of the nation’s long-historical bloodline, if not literally 
blood per se, under one sovereign.  For him, even though Japan was defeated in the war, 
“national vitality” was still “vigorous” given its “superiority” in terms of the strength of 
“national unity” and “national sprit.”  Takata emphasized that it was the “purity of blood” (chi no 
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junketsu), underlying the strong unity and sprit of the Japanese nation, which had determined 
Japan’s historical development in the past and would determine its future resurgence from the 
ashes, from the “bare” state like Meiji Japan.  Accordingly, Takata vehemently called upon the 
Japanese to unite altogether based on the nation’s “pure blood” (junketsu naru ketsueki).71 
It is important to note that the popular sense that the Japanese nation was racially superior, 
which Takata attempted to revitalize by focusing on the purity of the historical bloodline, was 
not simply stemming from the fact of defeat or ensuing occupation by their “racial enemy.”  
Popular racial ideology was also at stake in the face of the liberation of their subjugated 
“Oriental” others.  One worried that under “MacArthur’s sovereignty” the Japanese would 
become “like slave,” being “relegated” to a position “lower than Chinese and Korean nationals” 
(shina minzoku hantō minzoku).72  Some considered such possible “relegation” as something 
extremely unendurable about defeat.  In their daily conversations, people could hear the 
grumblings on the streets – “Although we can’t do anything about the United States, it will be 
disgusting [shakuni sawaru] if we become lower than the Koreans”73; “Although we can’t do 
anything about Americans and Britons, it is disgusting to bow my head before the Chinese.”74  
One person even went so far as to say: “Since it is disgusting to be lorded over by the Chinese 
and Koreans, I’d rather die together with my children.”75   
In short, defeat also made Japanese people extremely uneasy about their future 
hierarchical racial status vis-à-vis those whom they had treated as an “inferior” race during 
Japan’s imperial expansion.  In this post-empire new historical conjuncture, their deeply-
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entrenched ideas about Japanese superiority over their “Oriental” others – Japanese as the 
“leading race” – dramatically transformed into anxiety, which sparked a strong fear of possible 
racial subordination to Koreans and Chinese.  Importantly, this racial anxiety over their 
subjugated others was often sharper than the fear of subordination to their racial enemy on their 
soil.   
Moreover, the anxiety over the Japanese “relegation” or possible subordination to their 
despised and subjugated racial others was deeply interwoven with the fear of reprisals from those 
they had subjugated.  For instance, the following remarks that the chief of Kamisakai Village in 
Chiba Prefecture, Watanabe Yoshikazu, addressed to the local police manifested such fear 
underlying the Japanese racial anxiety over now-liberated Koreans.  Concerning Koreans living 
in Japan, Watanabe told the local police as follows:   
I guess that it was since the Great Tokyo [Kantō] Earthquake that Koreans had 
started movements aimed at independence.  During the Great East Asia War 
[Pacific War], Koreans were the biggest troublemakers to the economy and made 
quite a lot of money for that.  Judging from Japan’s current situation, we will 
plummet to the bottom of the economic recession.  On that occasion, if Koreans 
come to buy and own our tenancy and lands, it is likely we will be exploited 
[tsukawareru] as tenant farmers by Koreans.
76
   
   
His anxiety, “We will be exploited as tenant farmers by Koreans,” reflected a mixed fear of both 
Korean reprisal and racial subordination, a fear that Japanese and his own dominant positionality 
might be soon overturned and they might become subordinate to now-liberated colonial subjects. 
Japanese racial anxiety and fear of reprisals particularly rose to the surface through their 
everyday, unexpected encounters with Koreans who were now performing a new subjectivity 
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with a posture of defiance.  Fear and anxiety among the Japanese over Koreans living right next 
to them fomented rumors about vengeful Koreans plotting against defeated Japan.  The Japanese 
police reported numerous groundless rumors about Korean atrocities that had emerged across 
Japan in the aftermath of the Emperor’s announcement of surrender.  On August 28, the 
Governor of Toyama Prefecture informed the Home Minister of seditious groundless rumors 
(ryūgen higo) spreading among residents, such as “Koreans are starting to riot all over Japan,” 
“Koreans are assaulting and raping Japanese women all over Japan.”77  A military intelligence 
report sent from Hokkaidō on August 28 referred to the same kinds of rumors circulating in that 
area, rumors of Korean riots and assaults on Japanese female factory workers.
78
  Such rumors 
were also mentioned in the Tottori local police intelligence report of September 12.
79
  In Niigata 
Prefecture, moreover, the police reported a malicious rumor that said: “Lots of ayu fish died in 
Miomote River.  People are saying that it was because two twenty-something-year-old Koreans 
poisoned the river.”80 
This phenomenon was precisely reminiscent of what had arisen in the post-quake social 
panic of September 1923, or what Japanese writer Takami Jun characterized as the manifestation 
of the Japanese people’s “sense of guilt” underlying their fear that “Koreans would take revenge” 
upon them.
81
  In 1923, simmering racial fear and hostility among the Japanese over the growing 
population of Koreans in Japan exploded into entirely fabricated rumors of Korean riots and 
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organized crimes in the chaotic aftermath of the Great Kantō Earthquake.  Those rumors of 
Korean atrocities – rumors of assaults, looting, rape, arson, bombing and the poisoning of the 
well – immediately spread out all over Japan with the endorsement of the police authorities and 
resulted in the frenzied brutal killing of over 6000 Koreans by armed mobs and vigilante groups 
alongside the police and military.  Two decades later, the fear that “Koreans would take revenge” 
reemerged amidst the postwar panic surrounding the defeat in 1945.  Japanese encounters with 
Koreans performing a new subjectivity as the liberated in this post-empire historical conjuncture 
rekindled their “sense of guilt” over what they had done to Koreans during past decades, 
fomenting rumors about vengeful Koreans plotting against the Japanese.    
Furthermore, day-to-day encounters between Japanese and Koreans after the August 15 
of 1945 were also becoming increasingly infused with racial tensions and antagonisms.  For the 
Japanese, direct encounters with those Koreans expressing their unbridled joy on the streets and 
in public spaces often triggered a bitter sentiment.  One Japanese journalist who witnessed the 
days of exaltation in Korea after August 15 wrote that when he saw the mass of Koreans 
cheering “manse!” with the Korean national flag in their hands, their cheering “evoked 
something intense” in him.  With a sarcastic, condescending attitude toward the Koreans, he 
described the excitement of Koreans as follows:  
In some villages, people were just drunk with festival fever, merrily playing flutes 
and drums, without worrying about independence and reflecting on Japan 
sincerely.  … Once they wake up from the festival frenzy, gratitude toward Japan 
will well up within them.
82
     
 
Similarly, Miyazawa Nobuko, a Japanese woman who wrote about her days of 
“stupefaction” immediately after the Emperor’s announcement of defeat, remembered her 
encounter with now-liberated Koreans in Japan as a bitter experience.  In Nagoya City the day 
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after the Emperor’s radio broadcast, Miyazawa happened to encounter a group of Koreans 
waving to her from the trolley and shouting in Japanese, “dokuritsu [independence], dokuritu, 
banzai!”  To hear the word “dokuritsu,” she felt that her face “tightened with an instinctive 
feeling.”83  Miyata Setsuko also remembered her and her family’s encounter with Koreans 
demonstrating liberation in Japan as a loathsome experience – more disgusting than the fact of 
the U.S. defeat of Japan:         
It was one lazy summer afternoon shortly after August 15
th.  … A group of 
Koreans passed in front of my house, shouting something in the high-pitched tone 
of a foreign tongue.  [At the forefront, they raised a flag with the Korean national 
symbol painted over the symbol of the Rising-Sun of the Japanese national flag.]  
“Damn it! Korean bastards will try to occupy half of the Japanese territory.  
That’s why they painted half of the Rising-Sun black on flag,” said my neighbor 
as stood beside me and ground his teeth.  My mother, putting her hand on my 
shoulder, said with tears in her eyes, “Oh my! The Rising-Sun has become half 
black….”  I took it as a symbol of the invasion of Japan.  I was too ignorant to 
understand the feeling of Koreans rejoicing in liberation.  … My father bitterly 
spat out, “we lost the war, so now we are treated with contempt even by 
Koreans.”  This was also my real feeling.  It remained in my mind as a far more 
loathsome thing [iyana koto] than our defeat by the U.S [my emphasis].
84
 
 
In fact, such embittered emotion and hostile reaction toward Koreans performing a new 
subjectivity was not unique to Miyazawa’s and Miyata’s experiences, and it was a more socially 
shared sentiment.  In daily life, Japanese attitudes toward Koreans were, in the words of police 
intelligence reports, “becoming mean and cold”85 or “growing distrustful and hostile”86 after 
August 15.  Korean residents were very upset to find Japanese neighbors, sometimes even 
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neighbors they were getting along well with, no longer friendly and sometimes becoming more 
discriminatory.
87
  Some Japanese began to fling sarcastic remarks at Koreans, like, “You feel 
happy since Japan was defeated, don’t you?”88  One blamed Koreans for Japan’s defeat, hurling 
an invective at Koreans: “Because of you Koreans here, Japan was defeated.  Go back to Korea 
now!”89  Even a schoolchild spat out at a Korean classmate: “Since Koreans are given 
independence from the U.S. and Britain, you are our enemy.  Go back to Korea now!”90  
Furthermore, Koreans were becoming increasingly the target of slanders and the object of the 
frustration of defeat in everyday conversations among the Japanese populace, conversations in a 
movie theater, public bathhouse, and other public spaces.
91
  The police reported various 
malicious and seditious remarks on Koreans, such as, “Japan was defeated because of Korean 
spy activities,”92 “Koreans are counterfeiting 10 yen notes for their use, whose total amount is 
worth 2,000 million yen,”93 “We have to kill Koreans altogether.”94   
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In September, the Japanese government composed an internally circulated document 
assessing the current state of post-defeat society.  In the document, the government characterized 
the relationship between Japanese and Koreans in Japan as follows: 
News on the worsening of the security situation in Korea, particularly the news of 
Koreans’ unjust persecution of the Japanese, is being spread by Japanese 
returnees.  Also, all kinds of incendiary words and behaviors [furyō gendō] that 
Koreans [in Japan] express regarding Korean independence are provoking the 
Japanese.  A strict watch for possible confrontations and fighting between 
Japanese and Koreans is required [my emphasis].
95
                  
 
In the above characterization, the Japanese government codified Korean efforts to shape 
liberation in Korea as “unjust persecution of the Japanese” and portrayed exaltations of 
“independence” among Koreans in Japan as “all kinds of wicked words and behaviors.”  
However, the government clearly acknowledged what was “provoking” Japanese sentiments – 
the unendurable reality that the established power relations were falling apart and their colonized 
subjects were now speaking back to them.  The government was now anxious that day-to-day 
encounters between Japanese and Koreans in Japan were becoming infused with the racial 
tension that could escalate into direct “confrontations and fighting” between the two peoples, the 
former colonizers and colonized.  Moreover, as the government document indicated, the racial 
tension was also fed by what was going on in now-liberated colony, through the news that 
Japanese returnees from Korea disseminated in Japan.  In the next section, I illuminate 
repercussion of racial tensions between Japanese and Koreans, between the former metropole 
and colony.   
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Repatriation and Hostile Repercussions between the Decolonizing Metropole and Colony 
Since the post-quake mayhem of 1923, Koreans living in Japan had been harboring the 
fear that another social panic might drive the Japanese populace into a frenzy of racial 
victimization and a “Korean hunt” again.96  Japan’s defeat and the ensuing confusion among the 
Japanese populace rekindled their smoldering fear.  In their eyes, what came to the surface in 
post-defeat Japanese society, such as the increasing racial hostility toward Koreans and 
circulating malicious rumors of Korean atrocities, appeared as something that spelled another 
pandemonium like before.  Their traumatic memory of the post-quake mayhem of 1923 became, 
as zainichi Korean historian Cho Kyŏngdal points out, an urgent motivation that spurred many to 
rush back to Korea in the immediate aftermath of Japan’s defeat, joining with their joy over 
return to their family and their enthusiasm for participating in new nation-state building in 
Korea.
97
   
Kim Kyusu, whose family had been ostracized as an “enemy to the country” (kokuzoku)” 
in their village during the war, remembered that upon learning about Japan’s defeat, he and his 
family were so afraid of the possibility of mass violence, “the Japanese might do something to us 
if we remained here,” that they decided to escape from the village immediately and to leave 
Japan as soon as possible.
98
  Kim Chongjae (Kin Shōzai) also remembered that there was 
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growing fear among the Koreans living in Japan that “Koreans would be massacred by the 
Japanese.”99  In November 1945, after U.S./Allied occupation forces landed Japan, one young 
Korean man sent a letter to Douglas MacArthur of the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers 
(SCAP) and asked him to protect Koreans from possible Japanese mass assaults.  He wrote: 
I would like to ask you to prevent the Japanese from committing such a barbarous 
behavior [yaban kōi] like the massacre of Koreans in the aftermath of the Great 
Kantō Earthquake.  The current massive exodus of Korean nationals is actually 
happening out of fear of it [my emphasis].
100
       
 
Holding concerns similar to the young Korean man who wrote to MacArthur, the 
majority of Koreans in Japan was in a rush to leave and run away from the metropole of the 
dying empire, if not always necessarily out of fear, to return to their families, home, and now-
liberated homeland during the days immediately after August 15.  Some prepared a ship using 
whatever money they could pool together and sailed back to Korea at their own risk, while many 
simply rushed to the ports in hopes of catching a repatriation ship which the Japanese 
government had arranged to take them to Korea.  When the Japanese government started the 
repatriation program in September, initially there were only two ships going back and forth 
between northwestern Japan and southern Korea (Pusan), moving in turn the Japanese settlers 
and military personnel from Korea to Japan, and the Koreans desiring repatriation from Japan to 
Korea.
101
  The cities of Shimonoseki and Hakata in northwestern Japan, the location of the major 
ports to Korea, were soon flooded by the large crowds of Koreans waiting for their ships for days 
on end, often without shelter and in abject conditions.  The Yomiuri Hōchi newspaper reported 
on September 14 that Koreans from all over Japan were pouring into Shimonoseki City and that 
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currently almost thirty thousand Koreans were waiting for repatriation.  Some four thousand 
Koreans were staying in a makeshift shelter in front of the Shimonoseki train station, and ten 
thousand and several hundreds were simply living at the train station, inside and outside – many 
were getting sick, and some had died.
102
 
 Those who were fortunate enough to return earlier to Korea, particularly those 
conscripted workers who repatriated first, spread stories in Korea about the miserable state of 
conditions in which Koreans had to wait for repatriation in Shimonoseki and Hakata.  Soon, 
multiple voluntary relief associations in Korea started relief efforts, like sending a rescue ship to 
Shimonoseki and bring back those suffering from illness to Korea.
103
  A newspaper in Korea also 
reported on their plight and called for popular support and sympathy for fellow Korean 
“brethren” (tongp’o) in Japan, while accusing the Japanese government of being irresponsible.104  
One voluntary relief association leader in South Kyŏngsang Province even sent a telegram to the 
mayor of Fukuoka City in mid-December and condemned the mayor for not showing “any 
kindness with respect to food and lodging” to the mass of Koreans waiting for the repatriation 
ships:   
They are miserable beyond description.  Here, we are taking all possible measures 
to help Japanese being evacuated from Korea with regard to their lodging and 
food.  Comparing our efforts with yours, we greatly regret that your situation is so 
bad.  If such conditions continue there, it will be a matter of grave influence on 
the Japanese being evacuated from this province.  Therefore, we request you to 
correct this situation.
105
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 As the volunteer relief association leader advised with an implicit warning in mid-
December, how the Japanese were treating and had previously treated Koreans in Japan indeed 
had been becoming “a matter of grave influence on the Japanese” in Korea since September, 
when the repatriation of Korean conscripted workers started.  The massive return of Koreans 
from Japan, which amounted to 788,979 by the end of December,
106
 began to inflame further the 
already-growing racial tension between Koreans and Japanese settlers remaining in Korea. 
 
 Initially, like those in metropolitan Japan, over 800,000 Japanese settlers in colonial 
Korea were taken by surprise at the moment of the Emperor’s announcement.107  The ensuing 
upheaval of liberation in Korea plunged many Japanese settlers into a state of great fear and 
confusion.  Faced with an uncertain future in Japan’s now-liberated colony and the looming 
shadow of Soviet troops advancing from the north border, a number of Japanese settlers simply 
hurried to prepare an escape from the colony.  Some rushed to the bank to take their all savings 
or dumped all their property for cash, and some, particularly those who had fled from the Soviet 
troops’ arrival, hastened their way to the ports of Inch’ŏn and Pusan where they could take a ship 
back to Japan. 
Japanese settlers living in the northeast of North Hamgyŏng Province along the border 
with the Soviet Union had already evacuated the area before August 15, after the Soviet troops 
launched air strikes and crossed the border on August 9.  Simultaneously, the Japanese living in 
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the Japanese puppet state “Manchukuo,” the northeastern region of China along the border with 
the Soviet Union and the Korean peninsula, also had already started to evacuate cities such as 
Xinging (Changchun) and Mukden (Shenyang) after the Soviet attack, fleeing into the 
northwestern provinces of colonial Korea.  Those who had escaped from Japan’s Manchuria 
region amounted to as many as almost 40,000 in South P’yŏng’an Province and 20,000 in North 
P’yŏng’an Province during that August.108  Some of those evacuees and colonial settlers in the 
north were able to escape to the south before the Soviet troops blocked their exit beyond the 38
th
 
parallel by late August, the line that had become the dividing line between the U.S. and Soviet 
military occupations of Korea.  Many among those over 60,000 evacuees and some 290,000 
colonial settlers in the north side of the 38
th
 parallel were not able to leave the Soviet-occupied 
north and had to survive there for months or for more than a year under miserable conditions.
109
  
Their property was confiscated in many cases, and they were kicked out of their homes and had 
to encamp in makeshift shelters with little food and care.  Unlike those in the south, Japanese 
colonial settlers in the north ended up facing numerous sufferings and tragedies.  Many died 
from hunger, disease outbreaks, and the cold of the freezing winter while waiting for official 
repatriation or during their secret exodus to the south.
110
   
For Japanese settlers living in the south as well as in the north, Japan’s defeat and the 
ensuing collapse of the empire spelled out the bleak reality that they would have to lose 
everything they had obtained in the colonial world, not only material prosperity but also their 
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superordinate position in their everyday life.  As Japanese settlers who had repatriated from 
Sinŭiju in North P’yŏng’an Province wrote in early 1947, Japanese defeat “changed all of the 
Japanese overseas into the mass of totally helpless people” in an instant.111  Kotani Masujirō who 
had repatriated from Inch’ŏn in Kyŏnggi Province remembered that after August 15, the 
“inversion of Japanese and Korean positionality [ichi no tentō]” started and Japanese residents 
had to worry about the “safety of their life and property” and possible “assaults and persecution 
by Koreans.”112  Even Japanese children looked like having lost their superordinate position on 
the streets of the crumbling colonial world.  Yashima Shigeru observed that “Japanese children 
totally cowered” because “Korean children started to have an attitude and hurled rocks at 
Japanese children” on the streets.113  
Indeed, defeat shattered what Albert Memmi called “colonial privilege” itself – “Even the 
poorest colonizer thought himself to be – and actually was – superior to the colonized.”114  Tokō 
Yoshimasa, a second-generation colonial settler who had repatriated from Kwaksan in North 
P’yŏng’an Province in July 1946, recounted that his experience of the inverted colonial world 
marked an “opportunity” to reflect on his colonial privilege.  In Kwaksan after Japan’s surrender, 
the new local Korean authorities gathered Japanese settlers and started to use them as manpower.  
One day, Tokō, who was a student, was ordered to work for street cleaning with other Japanese 
settlers.  The Korean supervisor, sitting on a carriage that carried trash cans, would jut his chin 
out and simply command, “Hey!” and they would have to pick up trash and horse dung, under 
the gaze of a crowd of curious Korean children.  For Tokō, who had been born in Korea “as a 
member of the conqueror people” (seifuku minzokusha) and had “unconsciously” felt superior to 
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Koreans of the “subjugated people,” it was an unendurable humiliation.  Yet, he tried to 
accustom himself to the inverted colonial world by discarding the idea of Japanese superiority 
and accepting the reality of the “defeated people” (haisen minzoku).115   
On the other hand, another Japanese settler approached the postcolonial inversion 
differently, with a strong feeling of hatred toward Koreans.  Tōno Tomizō later recounted and 
described the state of the inverted colonial world with a tone of disgust and condescension as 
follows: 
To put it simply, honorable Japanese [Nihonjin sama] became Korean bastards 
[Chōsenjin yarō], and Koreans bastards became honorable Japanese.  It looked 
like Koreans were busy trying to become Japanese.  Although it was extremely 
disgusting to see those whom we had looked down become superior [ue ni naru], 
I had no choice but to contain myself.  I had no sympathy with Korean nation-
building.  I just hated Koreans.  I thought that much more outrageous riots would 
happen.  But, there were no such things as riots.
116
       
 
While the postcolonial inversion was accompanied by some personal vengeance and 
sporadic harassment against Japanese colonial settlers, it was a less violent transition than 
expected – as Tōno recalled, there were no such things as “riots.”117  This was for the most part 
because of Korean leaders’ efforts to contain mass violence and reprisals against Japanese 
colonizers.  From the very beginning of the liberation, Korean political leaders called on the 
populace for “self-restraint” and warned against any “rash actions,” particularly rashness toward 
the Japanese.
118
  On August 16, An Chaehong, one of the core political leaders of the CPKI 
(Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence), delivered a historic speech on the 
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declaration of Korean liberation and the establishment of the CPKI through a radio broadcast.  In 
his speech, An referred to the fate of colonizers and stressed the importance of “autonomy and 
mutual concession” (chaju hoyang)119 in the relationship between two nations, Koreans and 
Japanese, at this “critical crossroads.”  At the same time, he made a strong appeal to the Korean 
populace “not to provoke the sentiment of Japanese residents,” calling their attention to the fate 
of Korean brethren in Japan.  Upon concluding his speech, An requested: 
Ladies and gentlemen, I believe that all wise [Korean] nationals will fully 
understand that when we think about our five million [sic] Korean brethren living 
a hard life in Japan together with Japanese nationals, we need to totally guarantee 
the property and safety of a million and some hundred thousand [sic] Japanese 
residents living Korea.  I sincerely ask for all your great caution.
120
        
 
Japanese settlers in Korea had to be defended from personal reprisals for the sake of 
Korean brethren in Japan, and the ch’iandae (peace-preservation corps), a new alternative police 
force, played an active role for that.  On August 16, a Japanese man named Morishita Keiji 
encountered growing Korean mass demonstrations on the streets of Sŏnch’ŏn in North P’yŏng’an 
Province and witnessed ch’iandae youths practicing An’s words and trying to prevent possible 
mass violence against the Japanese.  Morishita wrote that “there seemed little danger of violent 
assaults on the Japanese” since ch’iandae leaders disseminated warnings on the ground, such as: 
“Those who commit an assault on the Japanese will be punished severely,” “You should consider 
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what will happen to the fate of some million Korean brethren in Japan if you commit an assault 
on the Japanese.”121   
Yet ironically, the return of those “brethren” from Japan per se began to rekindle 
smoldering resentment among the Korean populace toward the Japanese, and the “self-restraint” 
that Korean leaders requested of the populace soon boiled over into aggressive antagonism, if not 
mass violent reprisals.  Stories told by the Korean returnees about the plight of their brethren 
waiting for repatriation ships at the ports of Shimonoseki and Hakata in Japan sometimes 
exploded into stories about Japanese atrocities against Koreans, like the persecution of Koreans 
all over Japan.
122
  Those rumors spread immediately to such an extent that they started to stir up 
the Korean populace while frightening both the Japanese settlers and the moribund colonial 
government.  On September 4, an anxious Japanese colonial government official issued a 
statement through a radio broadcast and denied the rumors of any sufferings of Koreans in Japan, 
in the hope of appeasing the enraged now-liberated colonial subjects.
123
   
In mid- to late September, Koreans learned about what would later be called the 
“Ukishima-maru incident” of August 24, where the Ukishima-maru vessel carrying some thirty-
seven hundred Koreans exploded when it touched a sea mine embedded in the Bay of Maizuru in 
northern Kyoto Prefecture.
124
  The Japanese government initially covered up the accident, but the 
accounts told by the survivors of the tragic event soon spread among the Korean populace in 
Korea, inciting hostility toward the Japanese.  According to the recorded accounts of some 
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Japanese colonial settlers, in North Kyŏngsang Province “public safety” for the Japanese became 
the “worst ever” when the news of the Ukishima-maru incident reached the province, as some 
Koreans started to cry out, “Avenge the Japanese atrocity!”125  In Ch’ŏngju City in North 
Ch’ungch’ŏng Province, Saitō Takeo, a member of a local Japanese association, participated in a 
memorial service that Koreans held for the victims of the Ukishima-maru incident when the 
news reached the city in late September.  Rumor had it that after the memorial service, the 
Koreans would begin killing the Japanese in the area.
126
 
Simultaneously, the massive return of Korean workers who had been conscripted to 
Japan as forced labor during wartime inflamed volatile racial tensions between the defeated 
colonizers and now-liberated colonized, particularly those in the southern and mid-southern 
provinces of Korea to where the great majority of Koreans from Japan returned.
127
  As Korean 
conscripted workers returned back from coalmines and munitions factories in Japan, they started 
to demand compensation from the local Japanese colonial officials and local municipal offices 
that had sent them, often by force or by deceit, to the perilous worksites of Japanese wartime 
industries.  In mid-September, for instance, about a thousand Koreans besieged the Kunsan 
municipal office in North Chŏlla Province and accused Japanese Mayor Inoue of having 
deceived them when his municipal office mobilized Korean workers to Japan during the war – 
they had been promised high income and good treatment.  Complaining that they had been paid 
little, treated cruelly, and provided no travel allowance when they repatriated, those Korean 
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returnees demanded the total of 5,400,000 yen as compensation for the 1,803 workers 
conscripted in Kunsan, including those who had become disabled and dead in Japan.  They 
insisted that if the municipal office did not have the money, the Japanese residents would have to 
pay in lieu.
128
   
Together with the influx of Korean forcibly conscripted workers returning from Japan, 
the U.S. takeover of the Japanese colonial government in early to mid-September also ended up 
feeding the hostile conditions surrounding the Japanese settlers remaining in Korea.  The U.S. 
disarmament of the Japanese military and police, both of which had been the pillar and symbol 
of coercive colonial rule, excited and encouraged some Koreans into more aggressive actions 
toward Japanese settlers.  In Seoul, some radicals started to take over Japanese-owned companies 
and factories by kicking out Japanese managers, seized Japanese residences and settle the 
homeless and overseas returnees there, and distributed leaflets that called for the immediate 
“expulsion of the Japanese.”129  A U.S. State Department official in Seoul reported in mid-
September that “the hatred of Koreans for the Japanese” was “unbelievably bitter” although it 
was unlikely that they would resort to violence in the presence of U.S. occupation troops.  In his 
words, south Korea was becoming like “a powder keg ready to explode at the application of a 
spark” because Koreans were disappointed that the “sweeping out of the Japanese,” as well as 
the “immediate independence” they had expected to obtain soon after the arrival of U.S. troops, 
“did not eventuate.”130   
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This upsurge of racial hostility among the Korean populace in September marked a 
disillusioning moment for the Japanese settlers who were determined to remain in Korea rather 
than returning to their war-torn homeland like many others.  Initially, the An Chaehong’s speech 
calling for protecting Japanese life and property reassured anxious Japanese settlers,
131
 and 
Korean leaders’ efforts to contain mass violence unintentionally resulted in some Japanese 
settlers’ clinging to their colonial privilege.  Particularly, for those who had lived and developed 
their privileged life in the colony through many years, it was not easy to give away their 
“success” all at once.   
In Pusan, for instance, when the Japanese governor of South Kyŏngsang Province set a 
plan for the immediate repatriation of Japanese residents in the region soon after Japan’s defeat, 
some wealthy and successful Japanese settlers denounced the governor as a “coward” 
(yowagoshi).  They demanded that the governor instead “take active action to encourage 
[Japanese settlers] to remain by establishing a consulate, organizing residents and building 
Japanese schools.”132  In Seoul, Tanaka Masayoshi, a professor of Keijō Imperial University, 
wrote in his diary in late August that as public safety came to be stabilized, “the Japanese 
became reluctant to go back to Japan.”   He observed: 
As the Japanese gradually became calm down, they suddenly started to talk tough.  
It can be said that since Koreans are maintaining relatively gentle [otonashii] 
attitudes, those Japanese now have a delusion that they can continue their life like 
before without any concern.
133
     
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Koreans expressed surprise when the difference was pointed out to them.  Hence the Koreans did not understand 
why they were not given complete independence soon after the arrival of American troops.  There is great 
disappointment that the immediate independence and sweeping out of the Japanese did not eventuate.”     
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In major colonial cities where the Japanese police and army still protected amidst dying 
colonial rule, many Japanese settlers, particularly those among over 160,000 living in Seoul,
134
 
were determined to remain in their now-liberated colony, holding an optimistic view about their 
future.  Shortly after August 15, some Japanese colonial entrepreneurs and intellectuals in Seoul 
immediately started to organize a Japanese mutual aid association that would work for those who 
wished to live in Korea as well as those who planned to return to Japan.  This Japanese 
association, named “Keijō Naichijin Sewakai” (later “Keijō Nihonjin Sewakai”), declared in its 
manifesto that the association would also aim to work for a “new Korea” by cooperating and 
making “full contributions to its [Korea’s] glorious development.”135  Hozumi Shinrokurō, a 
Japanese former colonial government official and a colonial entrepreneur who took the lead in 
organizing the Japanese association, remembered that initially many in the association shared an 
optimistic view on the fate of Japanese settlers, the view in his words, “We will not be kicked out 
[of Korea] all together if we make great efforts.”136   
In tandem with the formation of the Japanese association, moreover, Japanese residents in 
Seoul started to prepare for their new life without colonial privilege by learning the Korean 
language, the language that they had never had to feel necessary in their colonial life before.  
When the newly formed Japanese association announced its new Korean language course for 
charge, the course became oversubscribed even before it started on September 12.  At the 
beginning of the first class, a Japanese association official gave a brief speech to students ranging 
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“from a second-year junior high school student to an old bald man” and encouraged them to 
“learn Korean and make a new cooperation for a new Korea.”137        
Yet, their hope for a “new cooperation for a new Korea” soon turned out to be just a 
fiction amidst the upsurge of the hostility among Koreans toward the Japanese during September.  
Moreover, the news of a U.S. occupation plan to repatriate all Japanese in Korea, as well as the 
news of the plight of Japanese brethren in north Korea under Soviet military occupation, also 
shattered such hope completely.
138
  Having lost their privileged colonial life, property, and their 
last hope of working for their former colony, those Japanese settlers in the end decided to leave 
Korea, carrying only sorrow, despair, resentment and nostalgia back to Japan like the other 
settlers.   
 
Their strong emotions of misery, wretchedness and resentment that Japanese colonial 
settlers had carried with them from Korea often added fuel to the already-growing hostility 
among the Japanese populace toward Koreans remaining in Japan.  Stories told by the Japanese 
returnees about the misery of their fate in the now-liberated colony soon spread out through 
media reports and daily conversations.  Moreover, stories of their experiences of Korean 
liberation were often narrated and represented in ways that would strike terror in the hearts of 
Japanese people.  For instance, a former Japanese navy civilian employee in Korea who had 
repatriated to Japan in mid-September talked to the local police and described the event of 
Korean liberation as a “riot” in the following manner: 
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Since August 16, [Korean] armed peace-preserving corps began to spring up in 
Keijō [Seoul].  In September, they escalated street warfare with the Japanese 
police.  Although Japanese soldiers took part in the police and stood guard, the 
situation was wretched because they had no guns.  The peace-preserving corps 
also caused riots and disturbed the peace in southern parts of Korea temporarily.  
But, after the U.S. troops came and cracked down on them, the situation has 
become completely calm.  The Japanese are relying on U.S. soldiers without any 
worry [my emphasis].
139
       
      
Indeed, one particular story that spread among the Japanese populace was the rumor of 
“Korean riots” in Korea, which coalesced with similar circulating rumors of Korean atrocities 
across Japan, embodying the fear that “Koreans would take revenge” upon the Japanese.  In early 
September, for instance, the Tottori Prefecture police reported a circulating rumor that said, 
“Riots broke out in Korea and the Japanese are being persecuted.”140  On November 10, a news 
article about Korean and Chinese atrocities against the Japanese in former Japan’s Manchuria 
area and north Korea appeared in major national newspaper Asahi Shimbun.  The news article, 
based on a report made by Japanese settlers who had repatriated from collapsed “Manchukuo,” 
portrayed the current state of Manchuria and north Korea as “the world of the darkness” by 
detailing stories about the killing, abducting, robbing and raping of the Japanese.
141
  Kawakami 
Masayoshi, a colonial settler who had been the dean of a Korean women’s school and had 
repatriated to Japan in November after his thirty-two year life in colonial Korea, wrote a letter 
about “Korean violence” and the plight of the Japanese in liberated Korea.  His letter appeared 
both in Asahi Shimbun and a National Diet discussion in December.
142
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Sometimes, Koreans in Japan became the direct target of vengeful Japanese returnees 
giving vent to their misery, wretchedness and resentment they had repressed and carried from 
Korea.  Matsumoto Itsu, a former imperial soldier who had been demobilized in Korea and 
repatriated to Japan in late October 1945, witnessed such a moment among Japanese returnees 
during his repatriation from Seoul to the port of Hakata.  In Seoul soon after Japan’s surrender, 
when he and other Japanese disarmed soldiers were marching on the streets with armed Koreans 
surrounding them, they saw a group of Korean female students standing in line on the street who 
started to throw rocks at them, not strongly, but with mocking smiles.  Bearing the humiliation, 
he and other Japanese soldiers grumbled with one voice, “Just you wait!” “If we have a war next 
time, I will take one shot at you below the stomach!”  Soon, he and other Japanese demobilized 
soldiers were sent to Pusan for repatriation to Japan, and their repatriation ship disembarked at 
the port of Hakata in late October.  Matsumoto recounted that a group of those demobilized 
soldiers, as soon as they set foot on the ground, immediately began “smashing” the makeshift 
shelters of the Koreans waiting for the repatriation ships, and even “kicking” people in the 
waiting crowd.  Matsumoto tried to stop their fury, telling them to think about the Japanese still 
remaining in Korea: “Look.  There are lots of Japanese still in Korea.  My wife and children, too.  
If you rough up these Koreans, they will do the same toward those Japanese once they return to 
Korea.”143   
One worried Korean college student at the University of Tokyo voiced concern over the 
growing antagonistic attitude of Japanese returnees toward Koreans in Japan and its 
consequences for the relationship between the two peoples.  In his letter published in Asahi 
Shimbun Osaka Edition on January 15, 1946, the Korean student named Mun Honggap wrote 
that the Japanese returnees’ “antipathy and resentment” toward Koreans in Japan had now 
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“become blatant and appeared on the surface.”  Some Japanese returnees were even spreading a 
“distorted view on the reality of Korea” and thus causing “thorough estrangement” between the 
two peoples.  Mun understood that the wrath of the Japanese returnees who had “suffered from 
persecution” in Korea would “not easily calm down.”  However, he called for “calm reflections” 
on what Japan had done to Korea during the past thirty-six years of colonial oppression.  In his 
view, it was the Korean “nation’s pent-up frustration of humiliation” that had exploded at 
liberation and become something uncontrollable by individual efforts of self-restraint, which, 
Mun emphasized, the Japanese had to understand.
144
  
Most probably, it was not easy at all for many Japanese returnees to make “calm 
reflections” on what colonialism had meant to the colonized or to “understand” their own 
doomed colonial life and privilege upon decolonization.  Or, perhaps they firmly believed in 
their own “self-justification” and “self-affirmation” – two elements that Memmi characterized as 
the way through which colonizers legitimized their domination and freed themselves from the 
“fear” besetting them as the “controlling minority.”145  A former local colonial government 
official, Okanobu Kyōsuke, recounted that he “could not understand at all” why Koreans had 
been “that much exultant” over Japan’s defeat.  Having believed that the Japanese rule of Korea 
was for the “peace and happiness of thirty million Korean people,” he was shocked to hear 
Koreans celebrating liberation as “victory in the war” and claiming themselves as “victorious 
nationals.”  He was also enraged to see a leaflet written and scattered by “The Headquarters for 
Mopping up Japs [Woenom]” on the street of Seoul in late October 1945, which demanded in a 
threatening and insulting tone that Japanese settlers still remaining in Korea must evacuate their 
houses and workplaces and leave the country immediately.  More importantly, what enraged him 
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far more after his return to Japan in late 1946 was, in his words, the “insolence” (nosabari kata) 
of Koreans in Japan.  Okanobu wrote how he felt after he repatriated from Korea as follows: 
[Upon returning to Japan,] I was only hoping to indulge myself peacefully with 
the heartwarming love of my parents in my beloved homeland.  I was only 
looking forward to being relieved from appalling persecution by Koreans.  But, 
once I returned, what the hell?  The way your [Korean] fellows are behaving is so 
outrageous that it looks as if Koreans are the main actors in our homeland Japan.  
The word disgusted [shakuni sawaru] is too light to express how I feel.
146
          
 
 The significance of this excerpt from Okanobu’s memoir extends beyond simply the way 
he presented his encounter with Koreans in Japan as something far more than “disgusting” about 
his experience of defeat and repatriation from Korea.  His memoir presents and imagines the 
presence of the Koreans in Japan as something like the national enemy that the new Japanese 
nation would have to confront for the sake of its own resurgence.  As his concluding remarks, 
Okanobu wrote:  
We do not at all demand the military.  As very clearly articulated in the 
Constitution, we sincerely wish to be a pacifist nation [heiwa kokka].  However, if 
they [Koreans in Japan] are storming in droves, come on over anytime.  We will 
also band together, arm ourselves with fire hoses, spades, hoes and whatever we 
have if necessary, and beat them off.  Unless every single Japanese national gains 
such backbone, it would be impossible to achieve the reconstruction of homeland 
Japan [sokoku Nihon] even if we overcome inflation and restore production.  Nay, 
I believe that [without such backbone] it would be even impossible to overcome 
inflation and restore production.
147
        
 
Given that his memoir was written in November 1947, a moment when the new Japanese 
constitution had just been put into effect six months previously and Japanese society was still in 
the throes of economic malaise, it is of great importance to understand what this passage of his 
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memoir indicates.  Here, one can clearly see the logic and imagination in which violence against 
the Korean minority in Japan became associated with the birth of the post-empire Japanese 
nation-state.  Okanobu, a former local colonial government official who had repatriated to Japan 
with his colonial dream betrayed, became extremely disgusted with having to witness not only 
Koreans “behaving outrageously” even in Japan but also the Japanese “being helpless” in their 
own homeland.  With rather an emotional tone, he emphasized the “backbone” needed by the 
Japanese to “beat off” Koreans in Japan, the determination that he believed was indispensable for 
a successful national resurgence.  Even though Japan was defeated and disarmed completely, for 
him the nation still could (and should) “band together” to beat off Koreans “storming in droves” 
– otherwise, how could “we” even reconstruct “homeland Japan” from the ashes?  In other words, 
the reconstruction of the new “pacifist nation” had to be founded on the nation’s collective 
determination to subdue Koreans in Japan.  
In fact, violence targeting the now-liberated Koreans was a pervasive phenomenon on the 
ground.  On August 27, 1945, for instance, three Koreans who welcomed U.S. troops were killed 
in Chiba Prefecture by the Japanese police; on November 11, a family of six Koreans in Kyoto 
was killed by a Japanese discharged soldier back from the Korean peninsula;
148
  on November 26, 
a sixteen-year-old Korean was stabbed by a Japanese youth in Chiba Prefecture;
149
  on March 29 
in 1946, a Korean man on a train in Toyama Prefecture was stabbed to death by the Japanese 
police with a sword.
150
  In April 1946, one Korean man in Yamaguchi Prefecture was beaten by 
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a Japanese resident for the simple reason that his hometown was in Soviet-occupied north Korea 
where “Koreans mistreat[ed] the Japanese.”151   
Those incidents scratch only the surface of reported violent incidents.  According to a 
news article published in April 1947 by a Korean-run newspaper in Japan, 84 cases of police and 
popular racial aggression were reported to a Korean human rights association since the date of 
liberation – August 15, 1945 – the total number of the dead and injured amounted to 1223.152  In 
short, everyday violence targeting Koreans in Japan became an integral part of the reimagining 
and rebuilding of a new Japanese nation out of the ashes of “multi-ethnic” empire.   
 
Conclusion 
If the U.S./Allied occupation of Japan resulted in the peaceful embracing of defeat on the 
part of Japanese people, their peaceful embracing of defeat was only enabled by the reassertion 
of their racial superiority over Japan’s formerly colonized subjects.  Racial superiority was 
reaffirmed through everyday acts of violence targeting the Korean minority in Japan, which 
became a pervasive phenomenon after Japan’s defeat.  Although the newly established Japanese 
constitution declared the renouncement of “war” and “the threat or use of force as means of 
settling international disputes,” the practice of racial aggression inscribed within Japanese 
colonialism never ended on the ground.  The disarmed “pacifist” Japan was indeed borne out of 
the hostility and racial violence that Japanese people enacted against now-liberated Koreans in 
Japan. 
As I examined in this chapter, for the Japanese people faced with defeat in World War II, 
what was at stake in the immediate postwar years was the continued validity of their imperialist 
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racial ideology – the ideology of the purity and supremacy of the “Yamato Race.”  Experiencing 
defeat in the “race war” against global white supremacy, as well as defeat by Chinese anti-
imperial resistance, made Japanese people extremely anxious about their future racial 
hierarchical status vis-à-vis others, particularly those whom they had treated as an “inferior” race 
during imperial expansion.  Their deeply-entrenched ideas about Japanese superiority over their 
“Oriental others” dramatically transformed into anxiety, which sparked a strong fear of possible 
racial subordination to Koreans and Chinese.  Such fear among the Japanese populace was often 
sharper than the fear of subordination to their racial enemy – the Americans – on their soil.  
In the light of their long colonial relations with Koreans – especially their brutal 
massacres of over 6000 Koreans in 1923 – the Japanese had good reason to be afraid of possible 
subordination to and reprisals from now-liberated Koreans.  As Japanese writer Takami Jun 
understood, what triggered the frenzied killing of Koreans in the chaotic aftermath of the Great 
Kantō Earthquake was Japanese people’s “sense of guilt” underlying their fear that “Koreans 
would take revenge” upon them.  Importantly, even under the imperial wartime propaganda of 
Naisen-ittai, “Japan and Korea as One Body,” the fear of reprisals never disappeared from the 
Japanese popular imaginary of Koreans.  Although the Japanese empire and media spread the 
image of Koreans as Japanese “brethren,” people were apparently still haunted by fear and 
distrust.  For instance, a Japanese secret police report from early to mid-1945 noted the mounting 
Japanese “paranoia” about the presence of Koreans amidst the devastation of war and described 
it as follows:    
 […] among the Japanese [naichijin], some associate [U.S.] air raids with the 
problem of Koreans at the time of the Great Kantō Earthquake and imagine that 
Koreans are all working as foreign spies.  Their association of the air raids with 
  
75 
 
the Korean problem at the time of the Great Kantō Earthquake is developing into 
paranoia, which, in turn, is also stirring up and upsetting Koreans.
153
  
 
This smoldering fear and distrust of Koreans rose to the surface in the wake of Japan’s 
defeat, and coalesced with the anxiety over the possible inversion of the imperial racial 
hierarchical order.  The Japanese began witnessing Koreans performing a new subjectivity with 
an assertive posture of defiance.  Their encounters with Koreans demonstrating liberation on 
Japanese soil rekindled their long-smoldering fear and also evoked a bitter resentment toward 
Korean independence.  As a result, everyday, on-the-ground encounters between Japanese and 
Koreans in Japan after Japan’s defeat became increasingly infused with racial tension and 
hostility.  Moreover, such tension and hostility between decolonizing metropolitan and colonial 
societies were fanned by the increasing antagonism resulting from the Japanese and Korean 
repatriations.  Korean colonial conscripted workers in Japan brought over to Korea their 
immediate memories of the harsh treatment they had experienced in metropolitan society, and 
they often ended up avenging themselves on the Japanese colonial settlers remaining in now-
liberated Korea.  On the other hand, the forcible repatriation of Japanese colonial settlers from 
Korea to Japan fueled the spread of stories about their doomed fate in the inverted colonial world, 
which in turn fueled Japanese hostility toward Koreans, fomenting the racial violence targeting 
the Korean minority in Japan. 
In this sense, the violence was not simply the act of the Japanese reasserting their racial 
superiority over liberated Koreans.  The violence enacted was also the manifestation of both fear 
and hatred rekindled by decolonization.  As Memmi emphasizes, fear always accompanies 
hostile action.  Those who fear others have to take preemptive aggression in order to flee from 
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their own fear of others.
154
  Or, as Frantz Fanon explains, “hatred is not a given; it is a struggle to 
acquire hatred.”  I argue that violence is an integral part of this “struggle” for “acquiring” and 
“embodying” hatred, through which one conquers one’s own fear and “acknowledged guilt 
complexes.”155  Japanese everyday violence toward Koreans manifested Japanese’s determined 
struggle to acquire hatred, clashing with their fear and sense of guilt and, perhaps, humiliation of 
defeat as well.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Racializing the Postwar Crisis: 
 Democratization and the Remaking of the “Korean Problem” in Japan 
  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Looking back on the immediate post-war period, we were then faced with what looked very much like revolutionary 
conditions.  […] my first Cabinet was formed at a moment when our headquarters were literally surrounded by a 
red-flag-waving mob.  
—Yoshida Shigeru, Kaisō jūnen1 
 
Today prejudice is mounting against the more than half-million Koreans remaining in Japan.  Fanned by rumors, 
newspaper attacks, and Diet speeches, long-smouldering hatreds have been inflamed against these former subject-
people of the Japanese. 
—David Conde, “The Korean Minority in Japan”2 
  
In February 1947, David Conde, a Reuters correspondent in Tokyo and former staff 
member of the Civil Information and Education Section of SCAP (Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers), reported on the “inflamed” anti-Korean sentiments in U.S./Allied-occupied 
Japan.  His five-page short report, titled “The Korean Minority in Japan,” briefly documented the 
“widespread and bitter attacks” by the Japanese media and politicians targeting Koreans since 
mid-1946.  In the following passage, Conde succinctly summarized how the Koreans (and 
Taiwanese) living in Japan had emerged as a target of public blame for social problems: 
After the political demonstrations of April and May 1946, in which Koreans 
participated, and the installation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers of the Yoshida Cabinet, newspapers began to refer to black-marketeers as 
“third-party nationals” or “non-Japanese”; by June this had become “Formosans 
or Koreans.”  Except for the extreme leftist press, there seemed to be an obvious 
attempt to identify only non-Japanese with “yami” as the black market is called.  
Coincidental with American pressure on all radical elements in southern Korea in 
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July, a nation-wide anti-Korean campaign in Japan emerged into the open.  [my 
emphasis]
3
 
 
 The time when “a nation-wide anti-Korean campaign in Japan emerged into the open” 
was also the period during which former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru remembered as 
witnessing “revolutionary conditions” in postwar Japanese society.  The initial U.S./Allied-led 
project of democratic revolution spurred a rising tide of revolution from below in the form of 
radical labor and social movements, a tide triggered by the proclamation of the so-called 
“Japanese Bill of Rights,” General MacArthur’s directive for the “Removal of Restrictions on 
Political, Civil and Religious Liberties” issued on October 4, 1945.  As Yoshida would later 
recall in his memoir, in the spring of 1946, the waving “red flags” – a symbol of workers’ 
solidarity rather than the Communist Party itself – literally began to fill the streets.  In mid-May 
1946, when appointed as the new prime minister to form a new conservative cabinet, Yoshida 
had to face some 250,000 hungry, starving demonstrators who had gathered in the symbolic 
plaza in front of the Imperial Palace and demanded immediate food distribution and a Socialist- 
and Communist-led “democratic people’s government.”  This event would later be called the 
“Food May Day” demonstration of May 19, and under the pressure of the sea of “a red-flag-
waving mob” as he remembered, Yoshida, failing to appoint his new minister, almost gave up 
forming a new cabinet.   
General Douglas MacArthur, who had initiated the “promotion of democratic forces” in 
post-defeat Japan according to Washington’s directive for the occupation, was no longer tolerant 
when faced with this sea of “a red-flag-waving mob” filling the streets.  On the day following the 
“Food May Day” demonstration, MacArthur immediately issued a statement condemning the 
demonstrations as “excesses by disorderly minorities” and silenced continuing protests against 
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Yoshida’s formation of a new conservative cabinet.  MacArthur also encouraged Yoshida and 
promised him additional U.S. food relief to avert the ongoing food crisis.  Yoshida rose again 
and could finally launch his cabinet on May 22.  Soon, Prime Minister Yoshida issued the 
infamous “Proclamation on the Preservation of Social Order” on June 13 and pushed forward its 
adversarial posture toward the rising tide of revolution from below, or “revolutionary conditions” 
in his words.  Simultaneously, the Yoshida administration also issued another proclamation on 
the same day, a proclamation on the current food crisis that appealed to “all Japanese nationals” 
to share the limited food with each other out of “deep love for our brethren” (fukai dōhō ai) in 
order to overcome “this greatest national crisis in [Japanese] history” (yūshi irai saidai no kono 
minzokuteki kiki).  The food crisis proclamation also urged all political parties and people, 
regardless “whether public or private and urban or rural,” to unite together for a “national 
campaign” (kokumin undō) to manage the food crisis.4  Those two proclamations manifested 
Yoshida’s determination for crisis management, the management of food scarcity and 
“revolutionary conditions.”   
It was in the midst of this crisis management that what Reuters correspondent David 
Conde called “a nation-wide anti-Korean campaign in Japan” emerged.  In this chapter, I 
examine how the “anti-Korean campaign” took shape and developed in relation to Yoshida 
administration’s crisis management and discuss what this race-baiting campaign meant to the 
critical moment of the so-called “postwar crisis” in Japan after defeat in World War II.  As I 
argue below, the “Food May Day” demonstration of May 19, 1946, or the “revolutionary 
conditions” that Yoshida witnessed in the sea of “a red-flag-waving mob,” manifested the crisis 
of the legitimacy of Japanese “old guard” elites like Yoshida, that is, guardians of the Emperor-
centered imperial “national polity” (kokutai) and the conglomerate(zaibatsu)-dominated 
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capitalist economy.  Moreover, this political crisis of the old guard was inextricably combined 
with the crisis of the Japanese capitalist economy at a deeper structural level.  Unlike the widely 
held view, the “postwar crisis” in Japan was a crisis that encompassed more than the sudden 
collapse of the wartime economy and the downfall of old guard’s political and ideological 
legitimacy.  In short, as I demonstrate below, it was indeed the “crisis of hegemony” in a 
Gramscian sense, in terms of both the political and structural conditions for the accumulation of 
capital.  Then, what did the emergence of the “nation-wide anti-Korean campaign” mean to this 
postwar crisis? 
During the new National Diet session that started on June 20, 1946 – the session during 
which heated debates over the drafting of the new Japanese “pacifist,” “democratic” constitution 
started – lawmakers and bureaucrats of the newly formed Yoshida administration spearheaded 
race-baiting speeches.  In the Diet discussions, the ruling party politicians began to portray the 
ongoing social crisis as something associated with the presence of over a half million now-
liberated colonial subjects in Japanese society.
5
  Those ruling party politicians tried to frame 
social problems differently from the opposition leaders, who often pointed to the structural 
problems of Japanese capitalism and its capitalist regime.  In other words, “race” emerged in 
public discourse and became the central signifier of social problems.  This chapter unravels how 
the Yoshida administration orchestrated the racialization of social problems in its crisis 
management, through its attempt to frame and appropriate the meaning of the ongoing social 
crisis. 
                                                 
5
 According to the record of the U.S./Allied occupation authorities, the estimated number of Korean and Taiwanese 
former colonial subjects living in Japan was respectively 529,907 and 10,994 in October 1947.  There were also 
18,938 Chinese from mainland China.  The total of the Korean, Taiwanese and Chinese population in Japan 
corresponded to approximately 0.7 percent of the Japanese population in 1947.  However, the number of the Korean 
population is estimated higher than 529,907, given that Korean “illegal” migration to Japan was a pervasive 
phenomenon at that time.  For those statistics, see SCAP, History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of 
Japan, 1945-1951: Treatment of Foreign Nationals (microfilm from Scholarly Resources, Inc, Reel 11), appendix 1. 
  
81 
 
“Racism” as ideology and practice operates in different ways and in different forms 
within (and for) the capitalist system, and thus, as Stuart Hall has precisely articulated as the 
“premise of historical specificity,” one must start “from the concrete historical ‘work’ which 
racism accomplishes under specific historical conditions.”6  This chapter discusses how “race-
making” operated in the post-empire historical conjuncture in Japan, taking the form of the 
ideological reformulation of the “Korean problem” at the critical moment of the crisis of 
hegemony.   
On the ground, the ideological reformulation of the “Korean problem” provided a 
Japanese individual with the meaning with which to interpret one’s own suffering and hardships 
(or material conditions) in the war-torn country.  As molded in official parlance, the racialized 
view of the ongoing social crisis soon permeated into popular parlance through the media and 
police and intersected with popular sentiments toward Koreans – sentiments of the mounting 
racial fear and hostility stirred up through day-to-day encounters with Koreans performing their 
liberation in Japanese soil.
7
  Through an examination of letters and petitions sent from ordinary 
Japanese people to MacArthur concerning the “Korean problem,” this chapter also pays close 
attention to how the state ideological reformulation of the “Korean problem” came to frame 
everyday consciousness and popular understandings of the postwar social crisis.    
  
The Opening of a Pandora’s Box for the Old Guard  
On September 22, 1945, three weeks after the Japanese government signed the official 
surrender papers, the U.S. government publicized an important blueprint for U.S./Allied control 
of Japan, titled “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan.”  Two days later, the 
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translated Japanese full text soon appeared in Japanese newspapers, and it became the first 
published text that detailed occupation policy principle through which the Japanese populace 
could understand what U.S./Allied occupation would mean to them.   
In the blueprint for the control of Japan, Washington outlined the overall goals of 
occupation policy, such as “disarmament and demilitarization,” “resumption of peaceful 
economic activity,” and “promotion of democratic forces.”  Washington defined that the 
“ultimate objectives” of occupation were the establishment of a “peaceful and responsible 
government” that would not “again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and 
security of the world.”  However, this objective was not meant to “impose upon Japan any form 
of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.”  In the blueprint, 
Washington frequently referred to its “encouragement” of the Japanese people to form 
“democratic” organizations, although it simultaneously declared to utilize, but not to support, 
“the existing form of government in Japan,” including “the Emperor,” for the efficient control of 
Japan.  Moreover, in the same text, Washington also indicated that there was the possibility of 
overturning the existing form of government via “the use of force by the Japanese people”:       
Changes in the form of government initiated by the Japanese people or 
government in the direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies 
are to be permitted and favored.  In the event that the effectuation of such changes 
involves the use of force by the Japanese people or government against persons 
opposed to thereto, the Supreme Commander should intervene only where 
necessary to ensure the security of his forces and attainment of all other objectives 
of the occupation.
8
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In this passage, Washington clearly deemed permissible what one can call a “revolution from 
below,” the popular subversion of the existing “feudal and authoritarian” government of Japan, 
unless the revolution directed its “force” against the occupation.    
Two weeks after Washington’s announcement of the occupation policy principle 
encouraging the “promotion of democratic forces,” SCAP issued a civil liberties directive on 
October 4, a directive for the “Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious 
Liberties” (SCAPIN-93).9  The civil liberties directive, heralded by SCAP itself as the “Magna 
Carta for Japan,”10 was intended to enforce the legal-governmental disarmament of the 
repressive Japanese state – the state like, to paraphrase Marx, a “fearsome paretic body” that had 
been trapping Japanese society like a net and choking it at every pore.
11
  The directive ordered 
the Japanese government to abolish “all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations” 
restricting “freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly and of speech, including the unrestricted 
discussion of the Emperor, the Imperial Institution and the Imperial Japanese Government.”  
Together with legal-governmental devices including the “Peace Preservation Law,” the directive 
also mandated the abolishment of infamous social regulation apparatuses of the imperial state, 
such as the Special Higher Police (Tokkō Keisatsu, or “thought police”) of the Home Ministry 
and all other secret police organs.  More importantly, the Japanese government was required to 
immediately release all political prisoners by October 10, including Japanese and Korean 
Communists and Korean nationalists.     
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Behind SCAP’s proclamation of civil liberties directive, there was mounting criticism in 
the United States of SCAP’s reliance on the Japanese old guards and its neglect of Japanese 
“anti-fascist leaders” who were still in prison.  American journalist Andrew Roth, who was an 
influential figure among SCAP officials,
12
 wrote an article, titled “The Prisoners We Forgot,” in 
The Nation and called for attention to the “anti-fascist” political prisoners still behind bars – “the 
thousands of Japanese democrats, liberals, and leftists who had dared to fight the ruling clique 
and its ruthless police.”  Roth lamented that “[t]he American program for Japan, as made public 
by President Truman on September 22, called for the freeing of political prisoners, but as yet 
nothing [had] been done,” and he emphasized the importance of the political prisoners’ role in 
“eliminating the roots of Japanese aggression” by forming “an anti-fascist coalition.”13  News of 
the death of well-known Japanese philosopher Miki Kiyoshi in the Tokyo Detention House on 
September 26 – six weeks after the war ended – also drew attention to the issue of Japanese 
political prisoners and jolted SCAP into taking investigative action.
14
  In the eyes of SCAP 
officials, the postwar Japanese government appeared both indifferent to and inadequate for the 
task of legal-governmental disarmament of the Japanese imperial state.  The newly formed 
Higashikuni administration was firmly determined to make any effort needed for “preserving the 
national polity” (kokutai goji) and refused to stop arresting and imprisoning those who advocated 
the removal of Emperor Hirohito and abolishment of the emperor system.
15
  When SCAP issued 
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the civil liberties directive, the Higashikuni administration attempted in vain to resist it and then 
resigned the next day, on October 5.
16
 
 The release of “anti-fascist” political prisoners in October 1945 marked the dawn of the 
“promotion of democratic forces” that Washington had made a crucial part of its agenda for the 
occupation.  The release of core Communist leaders such as Tokuda Kyūichi and Shiga Yoshio 
spurred the resurgence of the Japanese Communist Party.  Indeed, the combination of the release 
of “anti-fascist” prisoners and SCAP’s civil liberties directive triggered the emergence of radical 
social movements in postwar Japan. 
On October 10, 1945, Communist political prisoners, including Korean Communist 
leader Kim Ch’ŏnhae and nationalist leader Yi Kanghun as well as Tokuda and Shiga, were 
released from Fuchū Prison in Tokyo, and a crowd of some four hundred people, mostly Koreans, 
welcomed them at the gate waving red flags in the rain.
17
  The crowd and the released 
communist prisoners then moved to an assembly hall in downtown Tokyo, nearby the vicinity of 
SCAP’s General Headquarters, and held a mass rally that was called the “People’s Welcome 
Rally for the Release of Freedom Fighters.”  Two to three thousand men and women jammed the 
rally hall that was decorated with both red flags and flags with the Korean national symbol, and 
over half of the participants were Koreans.  People filled the rally hall with banners and leaflets 
that announced their demands: “We Want Work!” “We Want Food!” “Punish All War 
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Criminals!” “Establish the People’s Republic Government!” and “Long Live Democracy!”18  In 
one of a series of impassioned speeches, a Japanese lawyer declared that one of the rally’s 
purposes was “to show all Japan that it [was] now possible to have freedom of speech and 
assembly.”  A correspondent for Pacific Star and Stripes, who witnessed the excitement 
generated by the rally, portrayed the rally as epoch-making moment:  
The climax, breaking all precedents in recent Japanese political history, was a 
demand from the platform of the overthrow of Imperial rule on the basis that 
establishment of a democratic system would otherwise be impossible to achieve.
19
    
   
“Democratic forces” were emerging from factories and worksites as well.  As wartime 
police-supervised labor organizations such as Sanpō (Patriotic Industrial Association) and Rōhō 
(Patriotic Labor Association) dissolved themselves in the face of U.S./Allied occupation, 
Japanese workers began to form new labor unions independent of direct state control.
20
  In some 
cases, the company itself or the political left initiated unionization by taking over and 
remobilizing an existing Sanpō unit at a workshop.  Benefitting from the prior experience of 
labor mobilization under “total war,” workers’ unionization flourished almost exponentially.  
According to the statistics of the Japanese Labor Ministry, while there existed only two labor 
unions in late September 1945, the number of unions soon increased to 509 within three months 
by December and the number of union members amounted to 380,677.  By June 1946, the 
number of unions and union members rapidly increased to 12,006 and 3,679,971, marking a 31 
percent in the unionization rate.
21
  Accordingly, the upsurge of labor disputes followed 
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widespread unionization.  During the first six months in 1946, the number of labor disputes, 
including strikes, slow-down, lock-outs and “production control,” amounted to 486 cases and a 
total of 276,242 workers were involved.
22
               
Together with their previous wartime experience and SCAP’s “democratic revolution 
from above,” Japanese workers’ unionization also benefitted from Chinese and Korean workers’ 
initiatives on organizing uprisings in the days immediately after the war.  Before SCAP issued 
the civil liberties directive or directly ordered the Japanese government to encourage labor 
unionization on October 11,
23
 Korean and Chinese coalminers had already stood up for their 
rights and dignity and had initiated a series of labor disputes. Their uprisings marked the dawn of 
the postwar labor movement in Japan.
24
 
In the aftermath of Japan’s defeat, Korean and Chinese coalminers, who had been 
suffering and resisting slave-like treatment,
25
 soon started to organize themselves and take 
aggressive action, sometimes using violence, toward their companies.  In late September, 
Chinese miners in Hokkaidō, led by miners who were also Chinese Communist Party members 
started to become active and demand better treatment.  In the Mitsubishi and Mitsui Bibai mines, 
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 Statistics Bureau of the Prime Minister’s Office and Executive Office of the Statistics Commission, Japan 
Statistical Year-Book, 1949 (Tokyo: Nihon Statistical Association, 1949), pp.730-731. 
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 The new prime minister, Shidehara Kijūrō, met MacArthur soon after forming a new cabinet and received a brief 
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 On a historical assessment of the significance of the Korean and Chinese miners’ uprising in the historiography of 
the postwar Japanese labor movement, see Matsunaga Yōichi, “Sengo Nihon rōdō undōshi kijutsu ni okeru zainichi 
Chōsenjin rōdōsha zō,” Zainichi Chōsenjin shi kenkyū 1 (December 1977).   
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 According to a government report, the appalling working conditions in coalmines caused deaths for one out of 
every four Chinese miners (Nihon Tankō Rōdō Kumiai, ed., Tanrō jūnenshi [Tokyo: Rōdō Junpōsha, 1964], p.47).  
Also, Pak Kyŏngsik’s classic work vividly documented the slave-like treatment of Korean conscripted workers at 
the sites of Japan’s wartime industries (Pak Kyŏngsik, Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō no kiroku [Tokyo: Miraisha, 1965]).  
The number of Chinese and Korean coalminers totaled to 133,102 (Koreans 124,025, Chinese 9,077), approximately 
33 percent of the coalminers in Japan in June 1945.  Chinese coalminers were primarily prisoners of war captured in 
North China, and Korean miners were mostly conscripts sent from Korea through wartime colonial labor 
conscription during World War II.  There were also 9,719 Caucasian prisoners working in the coalmines.  On the 
number of coalminers, see Tanrō jūnenshi, p.51. 
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Chinese miners “liberated” their labor camps with the support of Allied prisoners and demanded 
that their companies supply more clothes.  In the Ōūbari mine, Chinese miners, inspired by 
organizers from the Mitsui Bibai mine, took action to demand fair wages and started negotiating 
with their company.  There were also some violent “incidents” like the miners’ takeover of the 
company’s warehouse and bloody clashes between Korean or Chinese miners and the company 
and the police.  The Korean and Chinese miners’ defiance spread immediately, causing similar 
incidents in 40 to 50 coalmines.
26
         
 The major strikes and unionization took place among Korean miners in the Hokutan 
Yūbari mine in Hokkaidō and Jōban mines in eastern Honshū.  After Japan’s surrender, coalmine 
companies continued to keep Korean miners working, although they stopped using Chinese and 
Allied POWs according to the Japanese government’s directives.27  In the Hokutan Yūbari mine, 
most of the some 7000 Koreans miners continued to work and maintained high attendance 
compared to Korean miners working in other coalmines.  On October 5, however, leaflets 
instigating a general strike and hailing Korean independence started to circulate among Korean 
miners, and they suddenly launched a general strike on October 8.
28
  Ironically, a company’s 
labor management official had to encourage those Korean miners to form a labor union to 
negotiate with the company, hoping to end the strike and keep them working.  Korean miners 
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 It is said that the total number of Korean and Chinese miners who were involved in those “incidents” amounted to 
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management official of the Hokutan Yūbari mine and recorded the process of the Korean strike and its aftermath.  
Also, on Korean strikes at the Hokutan Yūbari mine, see Tanrō jūnenshi, pp.56-59; Totsuka Hideo, “Nihon 
teikokushugi no hōkai to ‘inyū Chōsenjin’ rōdōsha,” Sumiya Mikio, ed., Nihon rōshi kankei shiron (Tokyo: Tōkyō 
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held a mass meeting called the “Korean People Rally” (Chōsen Minshū Taikai) on the following 
day, and at the meeting, some 4000 participants decided collectively what their demands were – 
demands such as the recognition of the Korean labor union, better treatment, more food, eight-
hour workday, and repatriation to Korea by December 1945.  The company accepted most of 
their demands.  Importantly, the dissolution of the Japanese imperial state apparatuses that SCAP 
just initiated apparently had an immediate ripple effect on the further emboldening of those 
Korean colonial labor conscripts.  One company’s labor management official understood the 
Korean strike as inspired by the news on the abolishment of the Tokkō Keisatsu (Special Higher 
Police), as well as by the delay of a repatriation process.
29
 
On the same day of the general strike at the Hokutan Yūbari mine, a group of 821 Korean 
miners in the Jōban mines also refused to resume working until the company set up a schedule 
for their repatriation to Korea.
30
  The strike spread immediately.  A few hundred of those Korean 
miners soon stormed to adjacent coalmine worksites and instigated other Korean miners to refuse 
to work.
31
  A company’s labor management official tried in vain to convince the Korean miners 
that the Japanese government would be scheduling Korean repatriation soon.  He then decided to 
take the representatives of Korean miners to the Tokyo headquarters of a newly formed nation-
wide Korean association, the Korean League in Japan, to come up with a solution.  At the office 
of the Korean League, the company’s labor management official met with zainichi Korean leader 
Kim Tuyong and asked for help with the matter, not realizing that Kim was a prominent leftist 
leader affiliated with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) as well.  Soon, Kim Tuyong and one 
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of the JCP leaders Imamura Hideo – who was just released from prison by SCAP’s civil liberties 
directive – visited the Jōban mines.  Much to the company’s dismay, Kim and Imamura started to 
work on the unionization of the Korean miners and their further collective bargaining for better 
treatment.  Workers’ politicization was also attempted simultaneously.  In their speeches and 
leaflets, Kim and Imamura called for solidarity between Japanese and Korean workers, stating: 
The enemy is the emperor system.  Koreans and Japanese are both the same 
victims.  Japanese people, please understand and support Korean struggles.  [my 
emphasis]
32
 
    
Whether or not Japanese workers actually did “understand and support” those Korean 
workers’ struggles in general is unclear, although some historical accounts written by labor 
unions themselves praise the workers’ humanity and internationalism.33  It is true that on the one 
hand, as some Japanese scholars emphasize, Korean workers’ struggles “inspired” Japanese 
workers to take action for unionization and strikes later, or inspired them to shake off the so-
called post-defeat collective “kyodatsu” (exhaustion and despair) condition.34  Yet, on the other 
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1976), p.32.  Ashio Dōzan rōdō undōshi also says: “In any cases, it is true that the tendency of unionization [among 
Japanese workers] was triggered by Chinese and Korean disputes” (Ashio Dōzan Rōdō Kumiai, Ashio Dōzan rōdō 
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hand, historically the formation of class-based solidarity between Japanese and Korean workers 
had never been very successful in labor movements in Japan since the 1920s, and Japanese 
workers had often showed antagonistic or indifferent attitudes toward Korean strikes.
35
  In other 
words, popular racism had been hardly overcome previously despite labor activists’ strenuous 
calls for “proletarian internationalism” (“Working Men of All Countries, Unite!”36), nor had it 
easily evaporated along with the collapse of the Japanese empire.  During the Korean strikes at 
the Hokutan Yūbari mine and Jōban mines, the formation of active solidarity between Japanese 
and Korean workers appeared unlikely, to say nothing of political solidarity against the emperor 
system.  In the case of the Jōban mines strikes, most of the Japanese workers remained 
unsympathetic toward Korean struggles, although there were a few who showed their support by 
offering a place to stay to the Korean workers.  Moreover, there was even a growing sentiment 
among Japanese workers to form a counter-organization with the support of the company against 
Korean uprisings.
37
  Racism was still working on the ground at the critical moment of Japan’s 
post-empire conjuncture.    
In addition, Korean workers themselves showed little interest in collaborating with 
Japanese workers or simply could not accept Communist leaders’ notion that “Koreans and 
Japanese [were] both the same victims” of the emperor system.  As mentioned above, the Korean 
miners’ primary concern was immediate repatriation to Korea.  They stood up and refused to 
work anymore under abject and perilous conditions, demanding for their safe return to Korea.  
Some Korean miners stood up and raided the company’s warehouse out of hunger; some stood 
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up and assaulted the local police and company’s supervisors out of revenge, and their targets 
included fellow Korean translators and assistants.
38
  If those Korean strikes and uprisings 
“inspired” Japanese workers, it was because Korean struggles demonstrated to them that 
company and police forces were no longer a formidable leviathan like before.   
 
The “Postwar Crisis” and Its Implications 
 Rapid unionization and the rise of “democratic forces” on the shop floor soon developed 
into certain radicalized forms of labor movements.  Workers devised a radical tactic called 
“seisan kanri” (production control) and seized the operation of mines, factories and offices until 
the management met their demands.  The use of production control as a tactic spread rapidly by 
mid-1946.  In January, 13 out of 74 disputes took the form of production control and 29,029 
workers participated; in February, 20 (out of 81) and 15, 806; in March, 39 (out of 103) and 
20,651; in April, 53 (out of 109) and 34,815; in May, 56 (out of 132) and 38,847; and in June, 44 
(out of 104) and 18,056.
39
  Once the government condemned production control as unlawful and 
warned of interfering in the disputes,
40
 workers began to take to the streets and join a swelling 
mass call against the “reactionary” government, setting the stage for the political crisis in May. 
  Production control was, from the viewpoint of workers and the public, a rational dispute 
tactic in the middle of the economic crisis of the war-torn country.  Instead of launching a strike 
and a shutdown that would not help to solve production shortages and skyrocketing inflation – 
which was partly escalated by big business’ sabotage and speculation41 – workers chose to take 
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40
 Asahi Shimbun, February 2, 1946. 
41
 The Japanese government under the Shidehara administration (October 1945-April 1946) poured a huge amount 
of cash subsides into big business with the hope of stimulating production.  Yet, in the middle of skyrocketing 
inflation, big business responded not so much with the expected productive investment but with large-scale 
  
93 
 
over and maintain the operation of production without the manager’s presence.42  In many cases, 
worker’s control of operations actually increased production and gained public support, 
demonstrating that it was the owners and managers, not the workers, who were sabotaging the 
economic recovery.  Moreover, in a few radical cases, workers and unions went as far as to take 
over management as well, and they also successfully obtained outside cooperation to keep 
production going despite the company’s attempts to sabotage the workers’ control.43  These cases 
demonstrated the loss of immediate capitalist control over the production process.  Most 
importantly, workers’ production control contained more radical implications for the labor 
movement.  Labeled the “infringement of ownership” by the hostile Japanese government,44 
production control indeed was on the verge of making a critical departure from the fundamental 
principle of the capitalist economy – that is, private property – if workers were determined to 
question capitalist legality.  In other words, production control had the revolutionary potential for 
the emergence of nascent “soviets” and workers’ seizure of the “means of production” from 
                                                                                                                                                             
speculation in raw materials by hoarding and reselling them on black market.  Moore, Japanese Workers and the 
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capitalists, although workers – and JCP leaders – simply regarded it as a temporary “dispute 
tactic” rather than as a possible path to proletarian socialist revolution.45 
 Workers’ struggles also began to take on a more radical political character in early 1946, 
converging with urban dwellers’ uprisings for food.  Workers took to the streets and formed a 
rising tide of anti-government forces under the leadership of the left.  On April 7, several tens of 
thousands of workers, including those in the production control struggle, joined a mass rally 
called the “People’s Rally for the Overthrow of the Shidehara Cabinet” (Shidehara Naikaku 
Datō Jinmin Taikai), which was organized by a newly formed leftist (Communist- and Socialist 
left-led) popular front, “The Democratic People’s League” (Minshu Jinmin Renmei).  Some 
seventy thousand participants in the rally – workers, farmers, intellectuals, teachers, urban 
dwellers, and twenty thousand Koreans – raised their voices and denounced the government’s 
suppression of workers’ production control and its incompetence in solving skyrocketing 
inflation and failing food rationing.  One placard stated: “The Ally of the Rich, Enemy of the 
People.  Down with the Shidehara Cabinet!”46    
On May 1, hundreds of thousands workers took to the streets and celebrated the first 
postwar May Day.  Rallies were organized all over the country and had more than 1.25 million 
participants.
47
  In Tokyo, despite the falling rain, some half a million men, women, and children 
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crowded into the plaza outside the Imperial Palace, carrying union’s red flags and various 
placards with statement such as “Equal wages for men and women for equal labor!” “DDT for 
corrupted union leaders [darakan]!” and “Let us eat enough to be able to work!”48  The 
participants adopted a resolution that expressed their opposition to the “conservative reactionary 
government” and the government’s suppression of production control.  The resolution also called 
for the “Socialist Party-led democratic people’s government” and the popular control of food 
rationing.
49
  Practically bursting with sheer joy and excitement, one union worker told a news 
reporter the following:  
Fifty thousand workers and peasants demonstrated their great power of solidarity.  
This power is exactly what is the driving force for the completion of democratic 
revolution and the restoration of industry.  May Day [rallies] before had always 
accompanied quarrels and scuffles, but today’s May Day [rally] was in an open 
and well-ordered manner […].  Working people became aware of their own 
power.
50
 
 
 What drove the “working people” to unify with the “great power of solidarity” and 
participate in the historical tide of “democratic revolution” was their mounting frustration over 
the government’s incompetence in dealing with the ongoing economic crisis.51  Inflationary 
government policy and big business’ speculative hoarding of essential raw materials and 
commodities exacerbated the war-torn economy and brought on an unprecedented surge in the 
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prices of daily subsistence goods, which was severely diminishing the workers’ real wages.52  
Also, the government’ new currency and finance controls limited the amount of disposable cash 
available, and workers could only receive 500 yen in cash at their disposal from their monthly 
salary, which was barely enough to feed their household.
53
  But, the most pressing crisis was the 
scarcity of food and the ineffective government food rationing that was causing literal starvation 
in urban areas.
54
  The severance of food supplies from former colonies, the disastrous harvest of 
rice in 1945 – the most disastrous since 1910 – and the massive return of the overseas Japanese 
settlers and military and civilian personnel exacerbated the food scarcity that had already been a 
critical issue during the war even before the defeat.
55
  The government collection and rationing 
of food was far from successful in providing bare subsistence for the whole population.  As a 
result, the vast majority of people, especially city dwellers, routinely scoured the countryside to 
buy, barter, and steal food from local farmers, or had to heavily rely on the black market to 
obtain basic foodstuffs even at absurdly inflated prices.
56
  As historian John W. Dower succinctly 
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describes in his Embracing Defeat, hunger and scarcity “defined each passing day” and “served 
as a stimulus to grass-roots political activism.”57 
On May 12, one thousand and some hundred residents and union members in the 
Setagaya ward of Tokyo held a “Give Us Rice” demonstration that became the inspiration for the 
massive “Food May Day” demonstration of May 19.  Hunger and scarcity drove people to take 
desperate and daring action.  In the “Give Us Rice” rally of Setagaya, in which Communist 
leader Nozaka Sanzō unexpectedly appeared and raised his voice for establishing a “people’s 
government,” participants resolved to present the “voice of people” (jinmin no koe) directly to 
Emperor Hirohito, having being stirred up by the organizer’s call for action: “We are starving 
this much, but what on the earth is Emperor eating?” “Let the emperor hear our voice.  Let’s all 
go to the Imperial Palace together!”58  Soon, a group of 113 participants including men, women, 
and children moved and crowded into the gate of the Imperial Palace, some carrying red flags.  
Security guards succumbed to the force of the crowd driven by curiosity and hunger, people who 
were determined to meet and beg the emperor for mercy, for some food, and the crowd 
succeeded in entering the palace and inspecting the kitchen of the Imperial Household Ministry.  
One female participant remembered the demonstration: 
Although I did not understand the logic of the demonstration, I [participated] out 
of single concern that something was not right.  I was also curious about what the 
life in the Imperial Palace was like and wanted to see it if possible.  (…) [sic] It 
seemed that many of us followed the demonstration to the Imperial Palace simply 
with the desperate hope that the Emperor would give us something.
59
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The inspection of the Emperor’s kitchen was a small victory for the curious and desperate 
crowd who took the bold, unprecedented action, believing that “the Emperor would give [them] 
something.”  However, the demonstration did not manifest a political or ideological challenge to 
the established “emperor system” itself, although the entry of the crowd and some red flags into 
the Imperial Palace perhaps appeared to many as disrespect for the emperor and the profanation 
of sacred space.
60
  Ironically, Communist organizers of the demonstration framed the protest 
against government food policy as an appeal to Emperor Hirohito, despite their official 
(Communist Party) stance against the emperor system.
61
  Many of Setagaya residents 
participated in the demonstration into the Imperial Palace, believing that Emperor Hirohito 
would show compassion for their hardship and act on their behalf – perhaps for them, Emperor 
Hirohito was still a “benevolent monarch” even after his renunciation of divinity.62  Such a 
popular direct appeal to the emperor also appeared in the “Food May Day” rally one week later, 
the largest popular rally since the beginning of the occupation. 
On May 19, some 250,000 demonstrators – men, women and school children with 
teachers, as well as Koreans
63
 – gathered and raised their voices protesting against the old guard 
regime and demanded the food rations that had been delayed for days.
64
  In this Food May Day 
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rally, participants and leftist leaders including Socialists and Communists made resolutions and 
sent them to the emperor as a formal “memorial to the throne” (jōsōbun), which began with the 
traditional language of address, “Dear Your Imperial Majesty, Japanese Highest Authority and 
Holder of Sovereign Power.”65  In the middle of the radical upsurge of democratic revolution 
from below, even the revolutionary forces held the Emperor as the “Japanese highest authority 
and holder of sovereign power” to solve the current food crisis. 
However, despite the ambiguity over the emperor system manifested in the act of 
appealing to the emperor, the Food May Day rally also revealed that emperor worship had been 
teetering precariously at the same time.  In the rally, a handmade placard one Communist 
employee of a precision tool company was carrying for the demonstration was a sensational 
overt mockery of the emperor in public space – an incident which would later be called the 
“placard incident.”  The placard showed a message written in colloquial language in the form of 
a formal address by the emperor:   
Imperial Edict (Hirohito says) 
The national polity has been preserved. 
I am eating my fill. 
You people, starve and die. 
Imperial Sign and Seal.
66
 
  
Although the other side of the placard manifested an ambiguity with an appeal addressed to the 
emperor similarly as the leftist leaders had done,
67
 the mock imperial edict was, as Dower 
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precisely acknowledges, “an indication, presumably, of healthy iconoclasm after decades of 
emperor-centered thought control.”68   
In addition to the shocking public iconoclasm, the Food May Day rally also marked the 
most important political crisis facing conservative elites ever since they had regained power from 
militarist factions after the surrender.  When Prime Minister Shidehara resigned on April 22 in 
the face of an unexpected attack from an anti-Shidehara political and popular front (“Joint 
Committee for Toppling the Shidehara Cabinet”), the Liberal Party sought to lead a new cabinet 
based on a grand coalition of conservatives (the Liberal Party and Progressive Party) and 
Socialists, excluding the Communist Party.  Yet, the Socialist Party decided, after heated 
disputes between the left and right factions,
69
 not to join the conservative-led coalition 
government, being pressured and encouraged by rising popular voices to establish a Socialist 
Party-led democratic people’s government in coalition with the Communist Party.  As a result, as 
the formation of another conservative government appeared to take place, more people took to 
the streets.  On May 19, when Yoshida Shigeru – selected the new prime minister three days 
previously – was making a desperate effort to form a new cabinet, some 250,000 demonstrators 
gathered in front of the Imperial Palace for the Food May Day rally.  Soon, over 70,000 of these 
participants, including Communist and labor union leaders, also staged a mass demonstration 
before the prime minister’s residence and continued a “sit-down strike,” calling for Yoshida’s 
resignation from the position of new prime minister.
70
  Yoshida on that day, failing to appoint his 
new minister over the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, a position he considered to be the 
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most important one given the ongoing food crisis, almost gave up on making a new cabinet and 
nearly surrendered to oppositional pressure from below.
71
 
This political crisis, linked with and facilitated by the deepening crisis of the war-torn 
economy, in fact reflected the crisis of the legitimacy of the old guard – or, it was the “crisis of 
hegemony” in the Gramscian sense.  The “hegemony” of the old guard – understood here as the 
ideological domination of the “ruling bloc” (dominant social groups) based on popular “consent” 
– was in the throes of a serious challenge presented by a growing “revolution from below” since 
early 1946.  The ideological leverage of the old guard and even of the existing emperor system, 
which the old guard made determined efforts to preserve along with Emperor Hirohito, was 
apparently starting to fall apart in the midst of the imperial collapse and subsequent foreign 
occupation and its democratic reforms.  Surveys of public opinion often showed that a large 
proportion of the populace was not eager to keep the existing emperor system, although these 
surveys also indicated that Emperor Hirohito was still securing broad popular consent, whether 
active or passive.
72
  More importantly, the sacred mantle that the old guard had woven for the 
emperor system over the past decades started to unravel drastically after the surrender, and the 
fading ideological aura prepared the conditions for the overt iconoclastic demonstration in the 
Food May Day rally.    
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 Indeed, it is important to note that a tendency toward iconoclasm among the populace, 
which had partly already appeared during the war in the form of what anthropologist James Scott 
has termed the “hidden transcript,”73 or in the form of rumors and graffiti, was coming out more 
into the open since the surrender.
74
  Acts of insolent mocking and gossiping about Emperor 
Hirohito were becoming a wide-spread phenomena on the ground, and people sometimes went so 
far as to make disparaging critical remarks about the Emperor and emperor system in their daily 
conversations.
75
  For instance, a shoemaker, Ogawa Fujii, was reported to the thought police 
(Tokkō Keisatsu) in September 1945 for suspected lese-majesty.  According to the intelligence 
report, while Ogawa was chatting with a Korean barber who was cutting his hair, he started to 
blame bitterly the Emperor and emperor system for Japan’s defeat in front of several other 
customers.  The intelligence report vividly documented their conversation that became the cause 
for his arrest on charges of lese-majesty: 
Pak Hagi [Korean barber]: “I was called to a Nagano conscript office for labor 
conscription in September last year [1944].  There, I saw twenty to thirty 
other people, but only I was conscripted there in Nagano.” 
Suspect [Ogawa Fujii]: “It’s ridiculous they called as many as twenty to thirty 
people but conscripted only one.” 
Pak Hagi: “Those who secretly negotiated [with the chief of the conscript office] 
by bringing stuff like rice and money all succeeded in escaping [labor 
conscript].  The chief of the conscript office milked the labor conscript 
for all it was worth.  I was conscripted to work at a coalmine and had to 
suffer hardship.”    
Suspect: “How could they do that!” 
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Pak Hagi: “It was common in Furuichi [in Osaka], too, and there was only one 
guy [conscripted].  This guy was [working] at the same place as me and 
always complained about this.  But, I endured it believing it was for the 
sake of winning [the war].”   
Suspect: “Because they did such unfair things, that’s why [Japan] lost the war.  
People [kokumin] will have to suffer from reparations for some twenty 
years as a result of the defeat, and this is such a ridiculous thing for the 
people.” 
             […]           
“In the first place, the Japanese system is bad.  Because there is such a 
thing like the Emperor [tennō heika], this [defeat] happened.  Instead, it 
would be better just to shoot him to death with a gun.  [my emphasis]
76
        
 
Mocking, disparaging, and criticizing the emperor in daily conversations and in public – 
all these sporadic iconoclastic behaviors reflected (and also facilitated) the dwindling of the 
ideological leverage of the old, existing emperor system.  Coalescing with the rising revolution 
from below, each of these actions contributed to the overall crisis of hegemony.  Furthermore, 
hegemony itself was also falling apart at the deeper structural level of capitalist society in Japan 
– at a level different from the normative legitimization of the existing ruling bloc’s domination.77  
In other words, the foundation of the capitalist economy itself, that is, the production of 
commodities on the basis of wage labor in the Marxist sense, was facing serious dysfunction 
after the defeat.  This was not only manifested in the fact that big business had retreated from 
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production and instead had sought speculation by hoarding raw materials and commodities in the 
middle of skyrocketing inflation, but it was also reflected in the state of labor.  What would 
happen if a large proportion of the population suddenly refused a disciplined, productive 
subjectivity in a capitalist society?  What would happen if the large “unemployed” population (or 
“a surplus population of workers,” in the words of Marx) refused to go back to work – a 
population that had to be “ready for exploitation by capital” in the circuit of capitalist 
accumulation?
78
   
That was what took place in the wake of defeat in the “total war,” amidst the exhaustion 
of wartime total mobilization.  Together with the post-defeat popular psychological conditions 
often characterized as “kyodatsu” (exhaustion and despair) and “taihai” (decadence),79 or joy 
over the “liberation of the body” from wartime regulation,80 the collapse of the work ethic 
became a prevailing social phenomenon in popular life.  Indeed, a large proportion of the jobless 
population apparently did not feel compelled to sell one’s labor power as a commodity out of 
urgent necessity.  One newspaper article, titled “Having Fun in the Black-Market Business, Not 
Rushing for Employment,” reported that according to statistics of October 1945, the number of 
people seeking a job (25,913, male 21,218 and female 4,695) only amounted to 70 percent of 
recruits being sought (37,000, male 27,092 and female 9908), and only 6,240 (male 4,988 and 
female 1,252) actually attained a job.  The newspaper also reported that the majority of the 
approximately 600,000 (temporarily) “unemployed” population were “drawn in by the lure of 
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yami [black-market and underworld business]” and “working in the yami world as a street vendor 
and a broker.”81   
Similarly, according to a government survey of unemployment encompassing a 12-month 
period starting from May 1946, the number of people seeking a job always fell short of the 
number of recruits being sought – job seekers only filled 68 percent of the available jab 
vacancies.  The survey conducted in the fall of 1946 also showed that among 400,000 jobless 
people surveyed, only some 230,000 expressed the desire to obtain a job.
82
  A government 
economic paper published by the Economic Stabilization Board in 1947 described this 
phenomenon as an “unhealthy state,” because it was a “state in which being jobless [was] not 
perceived as jobless” since “with insufficient economic regulation under inflation, it [was] 
possible to make a living without a steady job and even often possible to have more 
advantageous conditions in making a living than those with a steady job.”83  This was because of 
the growing underground yami economy – the black market.  The black market was becoming 
the actual economy in the everyday life of the war-torn country. 
One Japanese leading social policy analyst, Ōkōuchi Kazuo, described this phenomenon 
of popular life as “becoming lumpen” (furōka).84  In his essay published in February 1946, 
Ōkōuchi called attention to “the decadence of the economic ethic” (keizai dōgi no taihai) and 
“the complete lack of a sense of stability in life” that he saw characterizing the current “national 
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way of living” (kokumin seikatsu).  According to Ōkōuchi, the lack of discipline and the 
demoralization of labor were spreading throughout working life.  In particular, the majority of 
the estimated 4.77 million jobless people, composed mostly of demobilized military and labor 
conscripts, were not feeling compelled to work, and were depending on their temporary 
retirement allowance or black-market transactions.
85
  Those who were jobless had not only lost 
jobs and their “material base” (buttekina ashiba) suddenly as a result of the collapse of the 
wartime economy, but had also lost “the base of morale” (seishintekina ashiba) as a result of the 
collapse of the wartime collective objective.  Ōkōuchi observed that they were not an 
“unemployed” population in an ordinary sense because of their lack of will to work – they were 
not taking joblessness as a serious and urgent issue and had become “lumpen-like beings” 
(furōteki sonzai).86   
 
The so-called “postwar crisis” took form within multiple dimensions in Japan during the 
first nine months after the defeat and subsequent U.S./Allied occupation of Japan.  What Yoshida 
Shigeru termed as “revolutionary conditions” in his memoir emerged as a political crisis in early 
1946, and this political crisis, which crystallized in the “Food May Day” demonstration in May, 
embodied the crisis of the old guard’s legitimacy.  The political crisis manifested the disjuncture 
between state and society, the reality that the balance of political forces in the Diet in which two 
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conservative parties predominated did not represent the rising “revolution from below” on the 
ground.
87
  At the same time, the “postwar crisis” was also deepening at the structural level of the 
capitalist economy.  The legitimization of capitalist social relations was teetering on a 
precipitous brink as workers’ seizure of the capital’s means of production (“production control”) 
spread throughout shop floors.  Outside of these production sites, the majority of “a surplus 
population of workers” refused to return to the production process, and chose a living based on 
the growing black-market economy, turning into non-productive “lumpen-like beings.” 
The Yoshida administration emerged in the middle of this multi-dimensional crisis (or 
“organic crisis” in the Gramscian sense).  Soon, the Yoshida administration began to develop its 
strategy for crisis management by framing the presence of Koreans as the “problem” in Japanese 
society. 
  
The Old Guard Strikes Back 
 General Douglas MacArthur was the figure who staved off the crisis facing the 
conservative political forces who had been caught in the grip of the rising popular protests.  On 
the following day after the “Food May Day” rally, when some demonstrators were still 
continuing their “sit-down strike” in front of the prime minister’s residence, MacArthur suddenly 
issued a statement condemning the demonstrations as “excesses by disorderly minorities.”  This 
statement, warning the Japanese people that occupation forces would “take the necessary steps to 
control and remedy such a deplorable situation,” had an enormous impact and immediately 
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silenced ongoing demonstrations.
88
  The “sit-down strikers” in front of the prime minister’s 
residence began to scatter as soon as words of the statement reached the prime minister’s 
residence.  All other demonstrations scheduled for that day and the rest of the week were 
cancelled.
89
  After the statement, on the following day, MacArthur summoned Yoshida, who had 
almost given up on forming a new cabinet, and promised Yoshida additional U.S. food relief to 
avert increasing starvation throughout the population.
90
  The next day, on May 22, Yoshida 
successfully formed a new cabinet. 
Newly appointed Prime Minister Yoshida was strongly encouraged by MacArthur’s 
warning against “demonstrations and disorders by mass mobs,” which betrayed the initial 
Washington directive (“United Stated Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan”) that stipulated 
“[c]hanges in the form of government initiated by the Japanese people” as permissible and 
favorable.  For Yoshida, who believed that a “pro-communist” group within SCAP had been 
fostering Communist “radical activities,” MacArthur’s post-“Food May Day” warning shot – 
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along with U.S. State Department Official George Atcheson’s anti-communist speech in the 
Allied Council
91
 – appeared perhaps to open an opportunity to “rectify the excess” that had been 
made by so-called the “New Dealers” in SCAP, or, as Yoshida called them, “idealists” 
(kannenha or rinenha).
92
   
At the first press conference held two days after his formation of a new cabinet, Yoshida 
made clear his disapproval of radicalized labor movements, specifically workers’ seizure of 
control over enterprises called “production control,” which had been supported by SCAP, 
particularly by the Labor Division in the Economic and Scientific Section (ESS).
93
  In the press 
conference, Yoshida stated, “Production control is the most unfavorable thing.  […]  The 
                                                 
91
 At the fourth meeting of the Allied Council for Japan held on May 15, 1946, Chairman George Atcheson (U.S. 
State Department Political Adviser to SCAP) claimed in front of Soviet and other representatives: “I do not need to 
tell you that the United States does not favor Communism either in the United States or in Japan […].”  These anti-
communist remarks were made during his speech concerning a Japanese petition presented to SCAP after the May 
Day rally, which he asserted “was not written in idiomatic Japanese, but gave the [SCAP] translators a rather clear 
impression that originally it had been drawn up in a foreign language and then translated into Japanese for 
presentation.”  Gayn noted in his diary that “[i]t was the first official charge that the Russians were behind the unrest 
in Japan, and that the protests supposedly emanating from the Japanese people were actually drafted by Russian 
agents, and then translated into Japanese” (Gayn, Japan Diary, p.218; Atcheson’s speech was cited from Division of 
Special Records, Foreign Office, Japanese Government, ed., Documents concerning the Allied Occupation and 
Control of Japan, Volume II, pp.2-3).  Yoshida also understood Atcheson’s speech as “the first anti-communist 
declaration SCAP officially made” (Yoshida, Kaisō jūnen, vol.2, p.264).       
92
 In his memoir, Yoshida insists that there was a “pro-communist” faction among SCAP officials, especially in 
Government Section (GS), who seized influence over occupation policy and caused “excess” (yukisugi) in reforms.  
Yoshida admits that he did not have a good relationship with GS officials such as Brigadier General Courtney 
Whitney and Colonel Charles Kades.  Instead, Yoshida found his counterparts in the anti-Soviet ideologues within 
SCAP’s military bureaucracy, such as Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, commander of the Eight Army, 
and Major General Charles A. Willoughby, chief of the Intelligence Section, General Military Staff (G-2), whom 
MacArthur dubbed “my lovable fascist.”  As Dower argues in his in-depth study of Yoshida Shigeru, Yoshida (and 
his colleagues) “recognized the potency of the ‘Soviet menace’ and ‘Red subversives’ arguments from the outset, 
and enlisted the support of SCAP’s fanatic anti-communists against its ‘New Dealers,’” which ended with “greater 
eventual success” (Yoshida, Kaisō jūnen, vol.1, chapter 4, vol.2, p.260; John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: 
Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954 [Cambridge, Massachusetts: Council on East Asian 
Studies, Harvard University, 1979], p.295).                
93
 When the Shidehara administration issued a statement on February 1 warning that the government would police 
workers’ production control, the ESS Labor Division immediately showed its support for workers on the following 
day and opposed Japanese government’s interference in labor disputes.  See Asahi Shimbun, February 3, 1946.  On 
SCAP’s stance on workers’ production control, see Takemae Eiji, Sengo rōdō kaikaku: GHQ rōdō seisakushi 
(Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1982), pp.87-91; Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan: The American 
Occupation as New Deal (New York: Free Press, 1987), pp.218-228; Takemae, The Allied Occupation of Japan, 
p.313.      
  
110 
 
government has to take appropriate measures concerning this.”94  On June 13, the Yoshida 
administration released an official statement, titled “Proclamation on the Preservation of Social 
Order,” that condemned the “recent mass movements” and “production control” as threats to the 
“construction of a democratic Japan,” which required more than anything else “the preservation 
of social order” and “the increase of production.”  On the same day, the Home Ministry issued a 
directive permitting the “policing of mass movements” to local governors.95       
 On the ground, the Japanese government was determined to crack down on the rising 
“democratic forces” that Washington had initially encouraged, and embarked on its own 
offensive immediately after Yoshida’s pre-emptive statement.  On June 14, the Japanese police 
arrested the suspect of the so-called “placard incident,” Communist worker Matsushima 
Matsutarō who had carried a handmade placard mocking Emperor Hirohito at the “Food May 
Day” demonstration.  The Japanese government decided to prosecute Matsushima for the crime 
of “lese-majesty,” the crime of desecrating the Emperor, in attempt to curb further challenge to 
the dignity of the imperial sovereign.
96
 
On June 21, the Japanese police conducted a raid on a labor protest at the Yomiuri 
newspaper company and arrested fifty-six Yomiuri workers and union leaders, who were 
protecting six editorial staff from “unlawful firing.”97  This incident marked the first 
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government’s use of the police to crush a labor dispute during the Occupation.98  More 
importantly, the police raid was in fact condoned by anti-communist U.S. military officials in 
SCAP – if not the Labor Division of the ESS – such as Major General Charles A. Willoughby 
and Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, with whom Yoshida had forged a close 
relationship in opposition to the “idealist” reformers in SCAP.99  In other words, Yoshida’s 
offensive and “rectification of the excess” was taking shape through two key elements: first, the 
increased involvement of the U.S. hawkish warriors who were advancing the quintessential “cold 
war” binary politics already in early 1946; second, the utilization of the discordance and 
escalating tensions within SCAP over the limits of democratization and “revolution from below” 
in Japan.
100
 
 Along with its “preservation of social order” through the use of force, the Yoshida 
administration also embarked on the ideological reconstruction of social order and national 
integration, following Emperor Hirohito’s initiative in late May.  On May 24, in the wake of the 
“Food May Day” demonstration, Emperor Hirohito, for the second time, spoke to his people 
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directly through a radio broadcast and expressed his deep pain and concern over the current food 
scarcity.  Emperor Hirohito sprinkled his paternalistic speech with phrases inspiring both moral 
and national sentiment, appealing to his people to “live in the beautiful [uruwashii] tradition of 
the family state,” that is, “to share whatever little food they have with each other, strengthen 
themselves in order to bear the pain together, and help each other as brethren.”101  The Yoshida 
administration echoed the same appeal to Japanese national sentiment and morality.  On the 
same day as the “Proclamation on the Preservation of Social Order,” the Yoshida administration 
also issued a statement asking people to act out of “deep love for our brethren” to manage the 
deepening food crisis – a statement that framed national cohesion as the solution for the “greatest 
national crisis in [Japanese] history” (yūshi irai saidai no kono minzokuteki kiki).102   
Similarly, in the National Diet, Yoshida was poised to articulate his moralistic view of 
the current “social disorder” and to defend his statement on the “preservation of social order” 
against his critics.  On June 21, Yoshida delivered his first speech as Prime Minister in the House 
of the Representatives session held in the wake of the formation of the new Cabinet.  In his 
speech, Yoshida again targeted the recent popular movements and reiterated his condemnation of 
them. He asserted that the “symptom of social disorder” was coming to the surface, stemming 
from the destructive behavior of those who were “conflating freedom with self-indulgence and 
regarding self-indulgence as ‘democracy.’”  Yoshida framed social disorder as a moral issue.  He 
maintained, “The symptom of social disorder that is appearing now is, in short, the product of 
decadence in national morality [kokumin dōgi no taihai].”103   
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Yoshida’s critics in the House immediately challenged his moralistic view and framed the 
“symptom of social disorder” differently, pointing instead to the structural problem of Japanese 
capitalism and capitalist regime.  Opposition lawmaker Kita Katsutarō of the Cooperative 
Democratic Party, for instance, stressed that the current chaotic state of Japan was nothing but 
the product of the “impasse of capitalism” – “people are not working hard, thoughts [shisō] are 
in disorder, and superfluous capital is not being utilized.”  Socialist Party lawmaker Katō Kanjū 
opposed Yoshida’s preservation of “capitalist” social order and contended that it was the 
“capitalist social order” that had given rise to “imperialism” and the “tyranny of financial 
capital,” which resulted in the current circumstances of Japan.104  Socialist Party leader 
Katayama Tetsu argued for a full-scale transition toward “socialist democracy” in order to get 
through the crisis and social disorder.
105
  Also, Communist leader Tokuda Kyūichi harshly 
criticized Yoshida for attributing social disorder to “decadence in national morality.”  Tokuda 
pointed to the extreme hardship in popular life under the current chaotic economy and asserted 
that the reason people were generally engaging in black-market transactions was not because of 
their decadence but because of the deepening food crisis caused by the corrupt “bureaucratic 
apparatus of the emperor system.”106    
What was at stake in this early discussion during the new House session was indeed the 
definition of the current social crisis.  Opposition party leaders – not only Socialists and 
Communists but also Cooperative Democrats – argued that the major social problems were 
inevitable products of capitalist development and thus they problematized capitalism itself.  On 
the other hand, Yoshida and his old liberal colleagues, who were determined to take the task of 
economic reconstruction along capitalist lines – the lines modeled on the zaibatsu-dominated 
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capitalist economy of 1920s
107
 – consistently refused to associate the current social crisis with 
capitalism.  Instead, Yoshida and his colleagues simply framed social disorder and problems as a 
temporary phenomenon caused by the shock of defeat, which included “decadence in national 
morality.”108  Interestingly, when Yoshida’s critics presented the current social disorder as the 
product of the “impasse of capitalism,” it apparently touched a nerve in Yoshida.  In his response, 
Yoshida bluntly retorted that the government was making all possible efforts to get through the 
current crisis realistically without dwelling on “isms” – “I consider it extremely annoying to 
discuss an issue on isms like the impasse of capitalism.”109   
What this retort revealed was actually Yoshida’s ideological offensive.  It was an attempt 
to frame and appropriate the meaning of the current social crisis in a depoliticized way – 
depoliticized in the sense that social disorder was a moral issue, an issue of “decadence in 
national morality” rather than that of political economy.  Soon, another ideological offensive 
emerged in the Diet in the following months – this time, in the form of a racialization of social 
problems.     
   
Making the “Korean Problem” 
 The first three months during the new Diet session that started on June 20 – the session 
during which heated debates over the drafting of the new Japanese “democratic” constitution 
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started – marked a sudden influx of racial bashing by conservative ruling party lawmakers and 
government ministers.  Their speeches and discussions soon came to frame the Koreans and the 
Taiwanese as the cause of the current social crisis in Japan.  Lawmakers emphasized over and 
over how Koreans and Taiwanese were spreading economic and social malaise in Japanese 
society, and thereby framed social problems as a racial issue. 
 Racial bashing by lawmakers first emerged in a discussion over the policing of 
underground “concealed and hoarded goods” (intoku busshi) and their diversion to the black 
market, which had been a sensitive issues since men of position and privilege (such as military 
officials, bureaucrats, politicians and big business capitalists) were involved and making profits 
through the black-market business.
110
  In the House on July 2, one Socialist Party lawmaker, 
Taman Hirofumi, questioned the insufficient government policing of hoarded-goods, indicating 
that “officials in the judiciary and bureaucrats” were doing something “wrong.”  The floor went 
into an uproar all at once.  Some lawmakers shouted, “Don’t say unnecessary things!” “Take it 
back!”  Taman could barely continue his speech until the Speaker quieted them down.  Taman 
continued: “As you all know well about the state of the policing of those concealed and hoarded 
goods, it is the reality that the policing has not been thorough due to the collusion between 
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bureaucrats and the rural wealthy and others.”111  The Justice Minister of the Yoshida 
administration who was present in the House denied any wrongdoings conducted by bureaucrats. 
 On the following day, twenty-seven lawmakers (fifteen from the conservative ruling 
parties) formed a subcommittee to discuss a law against the improper gaining and hoarding of 
goods.  At the initial meeting of the subcommittee, chairman Nakano Torakichi of the ruling 
Liberal Party called members’ attention to the significance of this issue, and made certain 
striking implications: “For the sake of those concealed and hoarded goods, a considerable 
number of fellows of certain nationals [bōkoku to bōkoku no mono] are still in Japan.  They are 
living a more affluent life than us Japanese brethren by collecting those goods cunningly and 
then diverting them [to the black market]” (my emphasis).112   
No more references to those “fellows of certain nationals” were made until the Home 
Minister attended the subcommittee meeting on July 5.  During the discussion with the Home 
Minister, lawmaker Hara Susumu of the Liberal Party suddenly started to talk about “Koreans,” 
about whom, in his own words, “we have been most deeply concerned” since the end of the war.  
With a knowing, assured attitude, Hara made the following blunt statement: “I am sure that 
Koreans are engaging in the concealing of goods and other yami [underworld and black-market] 
activities in the largest scale.”  He complained that Koreans were acting as if they had a certain 
privilege after Korean independence and their behavior was touching a nerve in Japanese 
society.
113
   
The Home Minister simply agreed with Hara’s statements.  Echoing lawmaker Hara’s 
accusation of Koreans for yami activities, Home Minister Ōmura Seiichi made a further assertion 
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that Koreans’ “outrageous” behaviors drove Japanese nationals into a state of desperation and he 
recommended the following action: “I believe that it is absolutely necessary to police and stamp 
out such lawlessness of Koreans in reinvigorating the spirit of Japanese nationals [kokumin no 
eiki].”114  Another lawmaker also referred to the lawlessness of the Chinese and Taiwanese.  At 
the end of the discussion, subcommittee chairman Nakano also targeted Koreans and Taiwanese, 
claiming, “It is troublesome if Koreans and Taiwanese do not leave [Japan] soon.  Otherwise, 
yami will become rampant, and it very much matters to the concealing and hoarding of goods”; 
“We must expel Koreans and Taiwanese as soon as possible.  They are the root of yami.”115  
There was no contest against his statement or others’ attribution of social problems to Koreans 
and Taiwanese in the subcommittee.  When chairman Nakano reported the summary of the 
subcommittee’s discussion briefly in the House general assembly on July 9, he emphasized the 
significance of “enhancing national morality,” highlighting it as the conclusion made by all the 
subcommittee members.  Nakano also directed the floor’s attention to an issue concerning 
Koreans specifically, “the policing of Koreans’ and others’ hoarded-goods.”116  In those 
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discussions, Koreans became the target of political blame for social disorder and social problems, 
and this was just the beginning.   
Moreover, it was not only Japanese lawmakers and government officials who started to 
cast blame openly on Koreans for the ongoing social crisis.  The Japanese major national media 
also contributed.  In mid-1946, the media was no longer hesitant about openly criticizing and 
expressing negative views about Koreans, which was very unlike the pre-defeat, “total war” 
period.  During wartime, when Japanese imperialism started to make a political and ideological 
shift in its racial policy toward the further “Japanization” of Korean colonial subjects – or an 
“inclusionary form of racism”117 – the media and government avoided using terms and 
expressions that would indicate “racial” distinction or discrimination between Japanese and 
Koreans.  Under the wartime imperial regime of total mobilization, the media and metropole and 
colonial governments pushed ideological propaganda, “Japan and Korea as One Body” (naisen 
ittai), and refrained, if not completely, from portraying and calling Koreans in a negative and 
contemptuous way like “senjin.”  Instead, the media began to frame Koreans as “brethren” (dōhō) 
by calling them “hantō dōhō” (peninsular brethren) and “hantōjin” (Peninsulars) and publicized 
episodes that highlighted and exaggerated the patriotism of Koreans during the last years of the 
war.
118
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One major national newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, once had played a leading role in 
disseminating racial propaganda for “Japan and Korea as One Body” during wartime.  
Immediately after the war, it had still portrayed Koreans in Japan as “brethren” in its article of 
August 26, which praised a voluntary (allegedly) “donation” from some five hundred Korean 
coal miners in Hokkaidōto to the families of Japanese military members killed in the war.119  Yet, 
within a year after the war, Asahi suddenly published a sensational, race-baiting editorial 
concerning Koreans remaining in Japan on July 13, 1946 – almost at the same time as some 
Japanese lawmakers were presenting the presence of Koreans as a problem at the site of political 
discussion.  The editorial was titled “Regarding the Dealing with Koreans.”  Sprinkled with very 
blunt and rather patronizing phrases, the editorial bitterly criticized Koreans for undermining 
government efforts to ease the current chaotic state of the Japanese economy.  It said: 
We appreciate the fact that Korea under Japanese rule made numerous of 
sacrifices for our military augmentation and Koreans living in naichi [Japan] 
provided enormous manpower for munitions production.  However, frankly 
speaking, Korean living habits [seikatsu buri] after the war have often stirred 
Japanese sentiment unnecessarily.  For example, some Koreans are deeply 
engaging in the black market and disturbing the flow of goods and prices.  It is 
undeniable that Koreans, standing outside government regulation and rushing 
simply into the protection of their livelihood, are having a bad influence on 
government food policy and price control.  Even if the number of Koreans living 
in Japan might decrease, it is hard to deny that their life will still have the same 
influence on the employment of government policy.
120
 
   
The editorial presented “Korean living habits” as a problem for the whole of Japanese 
society and an obstacle to government efforts to stabilize popular everyday life.  This logic 
underlying the attribution of “Korean living habits” to social dysfunction, that is, the racialized 
view of social problems, was indeed reminiscent of the way in which the prewar Japanese 
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government framed the pauperization of Korean urban day workers during the 1920s and 1930s 
as the “Korean problem,” a problem supposedly derived from the inferior nature of the Korean 
“race.”121  As Japan historian Ken C. Kawashima has demonstrated, in their official surveys and 
intelligence reports, the Japanese police and bureaucrats often reduced the social problems 
experienced by Korean workers to “a problem of being Korean itself, to problems of Koreans” 
and “racialized or ethnicized” social problems like the pauperization of Korean workers.122  In 
short, what the Asahi editorial of July 13 and its representation of “Korean living habits” 
signified was the ideological reformulation of the “Korean problem” in a new historical 
conjuncture.  In this time, in the middle of the “postwar crisis,” the Japanese government and 
major media began to racialize pervasive general social problems themselves as the “Korean 
problem,” framing social problems experienced by the entire population in general as something 
related to the presence of the Korean minority in Japan.  The July of 1946 marked a harbinger of 
the making of the “Korean problem” in the public sphere, through the media and lawmakers. 
Korean leaders sensed from the Asahi’s editorial something more than a bluntly worded 
criticism – they did not take it at face value.  It seemed to them that the worded attack from one 
of major Japanese national newspapers was a portent of organized race-baiting, and leaders 
immediately reacted to the editorial.  In Asahi Shimbun the next day, a letter sent from a rightist 
zainichi Korean association, The Youth League for the Promotion of Korean Nation Building or 
Kensei, appeared in the section of Koe, the Letters to the Editor section.  In a letter titled “The 
Stance of Koreans,” Kensei not only lashed back at the editorial’s misrepresentation of Koreans 
but also questioned the following condescending phrase in the editorial: “We appreciate the fact 
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that Korea under Japanese rule made numerous of sacrifices for our military augmentation and 
Koreans living in naichi [Japan] provided enormous manpower for munitions production.”  
Kensei countered, “[Are you saying] we voluntarily cooperated with Japan for its war of 
aggression by sacrificing ourselves and providing manpower for you? […] It’s completely the 
opposite.  We have no reason to be appreciated.”  Moreover, Kensei also problematized an 
ulterior motive behind the editorial: “here, we ask you what your real intention in publishing that 
editorial is.  We have deep concern about the effects the editorial will bring about.”123   
Similarly, a letter sent from the Korean League Osaka branch also appeared in the Koe 
section of Asahi Shimbun Osaka Edition on July 19.  The letter expressed a markedly blunter and 
harsher criticism.  The Osaka Korean League bitterly accused the editorial of exaggerating some 
Koreans’ misbehavior and unfairly attributing current social problems and “social unrest” to 
“Korean living habits.” The Osaka Korean League also condemned the hypocritical attitude of 
Asahi – the press that had used to “speak for friendship between China, Japan and Korea” during 
the war for the so-called “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” was now attempting to incite 
antagonism between Japanese and Koreans.  It seemed obvious to Korean League leaders that 
the editorial contained an ulterior political motive, and thus they made the following assertion in 
the letter: “Behind this editorial, we can see both an ongoing nefarious plot to prepare another 
oppression of Koreans and a ploy by the rump of militarists [gunbatsu no zantō] who dream of 
the restoration of Japanese militarism.”124  Asahi Shimbun never responded to this sharp criticism.  
Next day, it simply printed a news article on an incident, titled “Two Groups of Japanese-Korean 
[nissenjin] Muggers,” as if justifying the editorial’s depiction of Koreans as troublemakers.125    
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Korean leaders’ concern over a portent of more adverse things to come turned out to be 
valid soon enough.  Inside the National Diet, lawmakers and government officials were also no 
longer hesitant about voicing their revulsion against former colonial subjects remaining in Japan, 
and some began to hurl racial invectives in their political speeches.  Like those lawmakers who 
had earlier put the blame of hoarded-goods on Koreans, one lawmaker of the House of Lords 
raised his voice and claimed, “Who is seizing Japanese commerce?  Frankly speaking, Chinese 
and Koreans are running rampant and have seized the most of Japanese commerce.”126  One 
ruling party (Liberal Party) lawmaker also made a similar assertion: “According to a rumor, in 
July an enormous amount of Japanese new currency, ten-something billion of fifty billion new 
yen, is being horded by the non-Japanese, that is, yami merchants.”127  Moreover, one opposition 
party (Cooperative Democratic Party) lawmaker complained that the government was not 
policing Koreans and Chinese closely enough and thus the Japanese people were suffering.  He 
lamented, “The overseas Chinese once took over regions in Southeast Asia.  I am concerned 
about the danger of the economic colonization of Japan” (my emphasis).128 
One sensational race-baiting speech came from one of the Liberal Party leaders, Ōno 
Banboku, in the wake of a shocking incident of a gunfight between the Japanese police and a 
group of Taiwanese on July 19 (the so-called “Shibuya incident”).  In the House general 
assembly on July 23, Ōno posed an “urgent question on the preservation of domestic security.”  
He delivered a fear-mongering speech on the current social disorder and pointed an accusing 
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finger at “non-Japanese” Koreans and Taiwanese, which was accompanied by applause from 
other lawmakers: 
[….]  An evil trend, such as the emergence of a black market harmful to the 
public interest, violence on the train, fare evasion, tax-unpaid business that 
disturbs the tax system, the opening of a store without permission, the violation of 
the regulations in the financial world, violent threatening and so on, has already 
flowed from large cities to small cities and has gradually begun to appeared in 
villages.  Such a trend has infiltrated into the minds of good people, and those 
who do evil have been gradually and constantly increasing in number.  What we 
find extremely regrettable is that it is mainly the non-Japanese who are involved 
in such tragic destruction of the social order (applause).  [….]  I cannot help but 
have the impression that such acts of the destruction of the social order by the 
non-Japanese look as if tigers and wolves intruded into the peaceful pasture 
(applause).  [my emphasis]
129
     
 
“Peaceful” Japanese society was said to be the victim of social malaise brought by the 
predatory “non-Japanese” within.  Ōno’s speech portrayed the Japanese people in terms of 
“victimhood” – they were the victims of “non-Japanese” Koreans and Taiwanese who were 
doing “evil” and making the “destruction of the social order.”  In other words, what Ōno’s 
speech demonstrated was another mode of self-victimization that was simultaneously taking 
shape through the post-defeat making of the collective memory of the popular tragic wartime 
experience – the Japanese people as the victim of the “militarist” government’s perpetration of 
the war.
130
  On the one hand, self-victimization was taking place, in the words of Japan scholar 
Lisa Yoneyama, in “the transformation of the official characterization of nationhood from a 
militant empire to a peace-loving democratic nation,” which was often represented as “a change 
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from a country of masculine prowess to feminized innocence.”131  At the same time, as Ōno’s 
speech epitomized, self-victimization was also operating in the changing relationship with 
former colonial subjects, a relationship that reflected the collapse of the Japanese dominant 
position over them.  Importantly, these processes of self-victimization were inextricably 
intertwined with the amnesia of the Japanese empire, which entailed both the silencing of 
Japanese past imperial and colonial perpetration and the dehistoricizing of the origins and 
presence of Koreans and Taiwanese in Japan.  Both processes were the two sides of the same 
coin of self-victimization. 
Furthermore, in the National Diet, “peaceful” Japanese society was said to be not only the 
victim of social malaise brought on by the Koreans and Taiwanese within Japan, but also the 
victim of Korean intrusion from without.  In the very same breath, Japanese politicians, while 
charging what they called the “non-Japanese” for fomenting a hotbed of social diseases, 
attributed in the very same breath the spread of literal diseases of cholera and typhus to the 
Koreans who sailed over from the Korean peninsula to sneak into the Japanese border.  In the 
House general assembly on August 17, ruling party (Progressive Party) lawmaker Shiikuma 
Saburō presented a terror-inspiring image of Koreans along with the racialized view of the 
spread of disease throughout Japan: 
[R]ecently, the number of those people, especially Koreans, who had previously 
returned to their home countries and now try to smuggle themselves back into 
Japan in a sort of organized group is increasing day by day.  It is said that the 
number has indeed reached some tens of thousands in the Kyūshū and San’in 
areas.  Moreover, it is said that they carry lethal weapons, form gangs, and 
demonstrate astonishing viciousness by taking advantage of the disempowerment 
of the [Japanese] police, and are posing an indescribable threat to residential life 
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there (applause).  This is not all yet.  Another frightening fact is that many of 
them are carrying diseases such as cholera, typhus, and dysentery, such diseases 
have been spread in naichi [Japan], causing a large number of sufferers all over 
naichi.
132
        
  
Shiikuma’s speech was indeed a racial incendiary.  Following the above account intended 
to instill fear in the audience, his speech took on a shrill emotional tone as Shiikuma expressed 
his frustration with now-liberated colonial subjects in Japan: 
Unfortunately, we are defeated nationals [haisen kokumin], but it is extremely 
shocking for us that those Koreans who had been living as our brethren, under our 
law and order until the last moment of the end of war suddenly changed their 
attitude and are acting as if they were victorious nationals [atakamo senshō 
kokumin no gotoku], pasting on railway coaches “Reserved” without any 
authorization, insulting and oppressing Japanese passengers, and otherwise 
committing every kind of viciousness with unspeakable violent behavior 
(applause).  Ladies and gentlemen, for us who are completely exhausted from the 
pains of defeat, such unspeakable actions of these Koreans and Taiwanese just 
make the blood boil in our entire body (applause).  [my emphasis]
133
 
         
Shiikuma also echoed every kind of accusation other lawmakers had previously made, making 
assertions such as: “it is said that one third of the Japanese new currency of over fifty billion yen 
is likely in their hands”; “these impudent, recalcitrant Koreans [futei naru Chōsenjin] are actually 
the main source of black-market transactions in Japan, and their influence on current Japanese 
commerce, life and society is staggering.”134  The phrase “futei naru Chōsenjin” was indeed 
reminiscent of “futei senjin” (impudent, recalcitrant Koreans) in prewar imperial official parlance. 
 Together with Japanese lawmakers and government officials, SCAP also took an active 
role in reinforcing such terror-inspiring images of Koreans.  The day after Shiikuma’s speech, 
SCAP issued a press release that referred to the Korean “menace” as if it endorsed Shiikuma’s 
racial bashing.  The press release said:    
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It is estimated that some five thousand Koreans, landed at night, have been 
rounded up and returned (to their homeland).  The influx of Koreans is a menace 
to the health of the Occupation and the Japanese nation as a whole.  It is feared 
that some of those coming will spread cholera and typhus [….] Some Koreans 
came to Japan to operate in the black market.  Others, who recently were 
repatriated from Japan, collect household goods and valuables which they had to 
leave behind them when they were sent back to Korea.  [my emphasis]
135
 
 
These sudden public outpourings of racial bashing took place during the first three 
months after the new conservative administration emerged in late May 1946 – during which the 
Yoshida administration embarked on the “rectification of the excess” and launched its physical 
and ideological offensive against the rising “democratic forces.”  What this phenomenon 
reflected was partly the released pressures of mounting frustration among the Japanese 
politicians – the frustration of being powerless as “defeated nationals” under foreign occupation.  
One Liberal Party lawmaker, for instance, lamented the state of the Japanese mind and attitude of 
the so-called “fourth-rate nation” (yontōkoku) – as Japan was initially called by MacArthur136: 
Recently, as Japan allegedly descended to a fourth-rate nation, the mind of 
Japanese people has become pretty timid.  Somehow, the police [...] have also 
become timid.  On the other hand, it looks as if people like Koreans and 
Taiwanese suddenly became first-rate nationals.  I feel it is very regrettable that 
the police take it [alleged fourth-rate nation status of Japan] too seriously and 
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sometimes even cannot police closely the serious lawbreaking actions those 
Koreans and Taiwanese make.
137
             
 
Indeed, the public outpourings of racial bashing stemmed from Japanese politicians’ 
frustration of not fully being able to exercise sovereignty and control over former colonial 
subjects who were acting, in the words of Shiikuma, “as if they were victorious nationals.”  In 
their speeches, lawmakers usually associated Korean and Taiwanese “problems” with the new 
“democratic police” that was born out of SCAP’s dissolution of the imperial police system.  The 
Japanese conservative elites viewed the new Japanese police force as severely weakened and 
thus an example of the “excess” of democratic reform pushed forward by SCAP.  With one voice, 
lawmakers repeatedly grumbled that the police was not strong and capable enough to subdue the 
“unruliness” of Koreans and Taiwanese.  One lawmaker complained, “there is actually no 
control over third-country nationals, that is, Koreans and Taiwanese, or, to put it differently, 
because the police have no control over them, those guys are inclined to bully the Japanese all 
the more.”138  Ruling parties’ lawmakers Ōno and Shiikuma both expressed their frustration 
more articulately by making exactly the same statements, “the democratization of the police is 
not the same as the disempowerment of the police [keisatsu no muryokuka].”139  Apparently, 
implied in Ōno and Shiikuma’s voicing of their frustration was their criticism of radical police 
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reform, the reform that “New Dealers” within SCAP were pushing forward.  Given the escalating 
internal conflict within SCAP over the radical police reform and Yoshida administration’s close 
tie with critics of the “New Dealers,”140  Ōno and Shiikuma appeared as if they were appealing to 
increasingly critical voices within SCAP against its radical reforms.     
It is important to note that these public practices of racial bashing did not simply 
developed out of lawmakers’ own frustration and racial prejudice against the now-liberated 
colonial subjects.  The racial bashing also took shape within the frames of certain political 
intention on the part of the newly formed Yoshida administration.  Reuters correspondent David 
Conde and one major zainichi Korean newspaper reported that it was Home Ministry bureaucrats 
who had prepared and written Shiikuma’s incendiary speech and that the representatives of both 
ruling and opposition parties (not including the Communist Party) had taken a look at the draft of 
the speech in advance and expressed their approval.
141
  Also, government ministers often 
endorsed and reinforced lawmakers’ racialized view of social problems in responding to 
questions in the House.
142
  These indicated that the upsurge of racial bashing in the National Diet 
was initiated, to a large degree, as an orchestrated campaign by the Yoshida administration in the 
throes of crisis management.  
                                                 
140
 For an in-depth analysis of the internal conflict between GS and G-2 Military Intelligence officials over police 
reform, particularly over the issue of the decentralization of the Japanese police system during 1947, see Aldous, 
The Police in Occupation Japan, chapter 7.  According to Aldous, the Japanese government’s plan for police reform 
announced in July 1946, “Tentative Reform Measures for the Police System” (which in fact underestimated the need 
for reform), took shape under the direction or guidance of the Public Safety Division (PSD) in the Civil Intelligence 
Section of G-2.  He argues that “[t]he close resemblance that government’s plan for police reorganization bore to the 
various complementary reports written or guided by PSD during 1946 certainly suggests a cosy working relationship 
between the two parties” (155).    
141
 Conde, “The Korean Minority in Japan,” p.43; Haebang Sinmun, November 20, 1946. 
142
 For instance, in his response to Ōno’s speech of “urgent question on the preservation of domestic security.” 
Home Minister Ōmura said as follows: “As all you know, among the so-called liberated people remaining in Japan, 
those who are delinquent have dismissed our laws as the law of the defeated country out of resentment over 
[Japan’s] past treatment, and also have held a sense of superiority as if they were victorious nationals.  They have 
committed lawless actions in groups, such as by making unreasonable requests, organizing mob violence, 
perpetrating various crimes, disturbing economic regulation, and committing fare evasion, and thus have frightened 
society and people” (Japanese Imperial Diet Records, House of the Representatives, 90th Assembly, Plenary Session, 
July 23, 1946). 
  
129 
 
 In other words, what the public outpourings of racial bashing signified was another 
ideological offensive launched by the Yoshida administration in its attempt to frame and 
appropriate the meaning of the current social crisis.  In official parlance, Koreans and Taiwanese 
became a hotbed of social and physical “diseases” and the root of the “yami” (black-market and 
underworld) economy that was causing all agony to Japanese society and constituting a 
“menace” to the Japanese nation.  In short, the common grammar underlying those public 
condemnations of Koreans and Taiwanese was the racialization of social problems.  “Race” – 
along with “national morality” – emerged and was framed as an ideological solution for the crisis 
of the Japanese capitalist economy, or the “organic crisis” of capitalist regime in Japan.  Here, 
racism as ideology and practice was reformulated and articulated with capitalism at this critical 
historical conjuncture.
143
      
 
Korean Struggles over the Meaning of the Social Crisis   
The upsurge of racial bashing in the Diet stoked up great anger and anxiety among 
Koreans and sparked off vehement protests.  On September 1, 1946, an event held in Tokyo by 
Korean residents for the commemoration of the Great Kanto Earthquake and the post-quake 
massacre of Koreans transformed to become an occasion for expressing a collective protest to 
Shiikuma’s speech.  During the event, participants decided to issue a protest and send their 
delegates to the Speaker of the House to demand an official apology in the name of the House.
144
  
Similarly, the Korean League publicly problematized Shiikuma’s “insulting remarks” as well as 
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similar remarks made by other Japanese politicians.  One zainichi Korean newspaper reported 
that both the Korean League headquarters and local branches respectively issued strong protests 
not only to Shiikuma but also to “reactionary government” ministers who also delivered 
“demagogic” speeches in the Diet.145  In its protest against Shiikuma’s speech, the Korean 
League accused Shiikuma for attempting to incite antagonism between Korean and Japanese 
peoples – an attempt that was reminiscent of “post-quake [Great Kanto Earthquake] demagogic 
rumors.”146 
At the same time, the Korean League also emphasized friendship and cooperation 
between Japanese “people” (minshū) and Koreans.  In its following statement, the Korean 
League made an earnest appeal to Japanese people:  
We do not consider this [Shiikuma’s speech] as the true voice of Japanese people.  
We are sure that it is no doubt the sign of a malicious plot by remnants of 
reactionary militarists [handō gunbatsu] who have deceived and oppressed 
Japanese people [minshū] and have also exploited and massacred Chinese and 
Koreans.   
We sincerely trust the Japanese people.  We would like to relieve the national 
[minzokuteki] antagonism between China, Japan, and Korea, which is already 
growing into a crisis, by exposing totally the specious plot and destroying the 
estrangement policy that remnants of militarists are even now continuing.
147
          
 
Moreover, the Korean League also launched a protest campaign on the ground.  On 
October 7, the Korean League organized a massive protest rally in front of the Imperial Palace, a 
rally named “People’s Rally for the Protection of the Rights for Korean Livelihood,” where, it 
was reported 5600 Koreans gathered and demonstrated against Shiikuma’s speech and Yoshida 
                                                 
145
 Haebang Sinmun, September 30, 1946.  
146
 In the chaotic aftermath of the Great Kantō Earthquake on September 1, 1923, groundless rumors of riots and 
organized crimes by Koreans spread all over Japan with the endorsement of the police authorities and triggered the 
“mass killing” of over 6000 Koreans around the Tokyo metropolitan area, all committed by the mob and (self-
organized) vigilante groups as well as the police. 
147
 Korean League in Japan, “Statement: Comments on the Speech Made by Shiikuma Saburō” (September 27, 
1946), Folder: Chōsenjin kankei [uncataloged documents], Ohara Institute for Social Research, Hosei University, 
Tokyo, Japan.   
  
131 
 
administration’s racial oppression that had been escalating because of aggressive police activities 
on the ground.
148
  The Korean League soon established the “Committee of the Protection of the 
Rights for Korean Livelihood” and the committee’s local branches all over Japan in order to 
embark on all-out “struggles” on the ground.  On December 20, the Committee and the Korean 
League organized another much larger protest rally in front of the Imperial Palace, in which 
thirty to forty thousand Koreans participated and raised their voices against the government’s 
racial oppression.  
Korean League activists were determined to take more aggressive action against what 
they called “reactionary” political forces and organized counter-demonstrations at the sites of the 
political rallies of Shiikuma’s Progressive Party and Ōno’s Liberal Party.  On November 1, the 
SCAP intelligence corps briefly reported that “meetings of the Progressive Party in Tokyo, 
Osaka, Nagoya, and Mito [had] been disrupted by Koreans in the audience who obstruct[ed] the 
delivery of speeches and create[d] disturbances among the spectators.”  In Mito City, a rally of 
the Progressive Party where Party President Shidehara Kijūrō appeared was, according to the 
intelligence report, “thrown into confusion by the Koreans to the extent that it became necessary 
to call out both the Japanese police and the American Military Police to restore order.”149     
A Korean newspaper published by Korean League activists reported on those on-the-spot 
Korean struggles more vividly.  In Shizuoka City, a group of some forty Korean League activists 
crowded into a public hall where a Progressive Party’s local rally was held, and sat in the 
audience to be watchdog to the party’s address.  The group was poised to jump in and intervene 
in a rally speech.  Hearing a speaker say, “Japan was deprived of its colonies such as Korea, 
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Manchuria, and Taiwan,” they immediately raised their voice, “Deprived?”150  In Miyagi 
Prefecture, participants in a Korean League local branch’s gathering – reportedly two thousand 
member participants – decided to form a negotiation committee to make a direct protest against 
the Progressive Party.  The committee delegates were immediately sent to the local political rally 
of the Progressive Party in Sendai City, and demanded a meeting with the party president.  Their 
request refused, the committee delegates tenaciously demanded to present their protest in the 
rally in front of all participants, and made certain implications in order to put pressure on the 
Progressive Party officials: “The mass of two thousand is watching behind us, and if you don’t 
accept even this kind of request, we don’t know what will happen.”  The Progressive Party 
succumbed.  The committee delegates took the stage and successfully presented the “will of two 
thousand people” against Shiikuma’s speech at the rally of his Progressive Party, where not a 
single participant was expecting Koreans to take the stage.
151
   
Korean activism was vigorous and successful enough to go toe-to-toe with both of the 
ruling conservative parties and obtain their official apology for Ōno’s and Shiikuma’s race-
baiting speeches.  In Gifu Prefecture, local Korean League leaders and the Korean youth 
crowded into the local rally of the Liberal Party where the lawmaker Ōno appeared.  They 
demanded to meet with Ōno and two other party representatives.  The two party representatives 
soon disappeared, and Ōno also tried in vain to run away.  Besieged by a group of determined 
Koreans, Ōno succumbed and promised to issue an official apology in a local newspaper.152  
Similarly, the headquarters of the Korean League also pushed hard.  Korean League 
representatives visited the headquarters of the Progressive Party and persuaded the party leaders 
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to issue a public apology to Koreans – the apology was soon aired nationwide through a radio 
broadcast.
153
        
All of these small victories had deep political significance.  For Koreans living in Japan 
who were deprived of rights to have either representation or their voices in the political arena, 
these everyday protests constituted an important ideological struggle in the sphere of civil 
society – demonstrations in front of a symbolical site (the Imperial Palace), protests at the sites 
of ideological propagandizing (political rallies) by oppositional conservative forces, and 
demands for an official apology and correction of the misrepresentation of Koreans via media 
(newspaper and radio broadcast).  Moreover, Koreans’ ideological struggle against racial bashing 
was not only centered on protest against and the correction of Japanese politicians’ 
misrepresentation of Koreans.  It was also a struggle over the meaning and definition of the 
current social crisis.  In other words, it was also a struggle against the racialized view of the 
nature of social problems.   
For instance, in its critique of the Asahi editorial titled “Regarding the Dealing with 
Koreans,” zainichi Korean rightist newspaper Shin Chōsen Shimbun presented a historicized 
counter-view against Asahi’s attempt to associate the growing black-market economy with 
“Korean living habits.”  While stressing the fact that the majority of black-marketeers were the 
Japanese “proletariat” (musan kaikyū), the newspaper critique also contended as follows:         
While it [the Asahi editorial] asserts that Korean black-marketeers are disturbing 
the flow of goods and prices and having a bad influence on government policy, 
the black market, born as a deformed child out of the capitalist economic system, 
is in the first place the product of the wartime Japanese economy at a dead end.
154
      
 
                                                 
153
 Haebang Sinmun, November 15, 1946.   
154
 Shin Chōsen Shimbun, August 30, 1946.   
  
134 
 
The critique framed the social malaise of the growing black market as the result of “the 
discordance of the current Japanese economic system or the [food] distribution system” and 
argued that the black market was not a matter to be solved by strict policing.  Thus, in its view, 
the Asahi editorial “ignored the fundamental problem,” and Asahi was simply incorrect and 
guilty of “rather arousing mutual antagonism” between Koreans and Japanese.  The critique 
concluded: “It is no less imprudent to accuse petty Korean problems without paying attention to 
the unsolvable fundamental problem” (my emphasis).155 
The “unsolvable fundamental problem” the zainichi Korean rightist newspaper criticized 
Asahi for ignoring did not appear to be “unsolvable” in the eye of zainichi Korean Communist 
and Korean League leader Kim Tuyong.  In a Haebang Sinmun’s editorial titled “Expose a Plot 
by the Reactionary Japanese Government,” Kim articulated a “class”-based counter-view against 
Asahi’s and Japanese politicians’ racialization of social problems.  Kim accused the surge in 
race-baiting as a “vicious plot” by the Japanese government who was the guardian of “capitalists 
and landlords.”  In his view, the Japanese government that had previously “only thought about 
exploiting people [jinmin] and puny nationals like us [Koreans]” was now scheming to “split up 
and cause friction between the peoples of Korea, China and Japan” by distracting Japanese 
attention from the nature of social problems associated with the “exploitation” of people.  Kim 
did not simply end his critique with the exposure of “a plot by reactionary forces.”  He called for 
a struggle to “establish the people’s republic government” by “smashing those [reactionary] 
forces.”  For Kim, to establish the people’s republic government – the government capable of 
“restoring production, solving unemployment, and bringing freedom and peace as well as a 
stable life” – was “the only way to eradicate social crimes.”156 
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Kim’s call for establishing the “people’s republic government” was resonant with voices 
of radicalized labor and popular movements on the ground.  Similarly, voices of Korean protests 
against the “reactionary Yoshida administration” were also more resonant with increasingly 
discontented, politicized voices against government social policies among Japanese workers and 
peasants.
157
  However, it did not necessarily mean that the counter-racialized view of social 
problems that Koreans repeatedly articulated was widely shared among the Japanese populace.  
Rather, despite Korean struggles against the Yoshida administration’s race-baiting offensive, the 
image of Koreans as a corrosive force within Japanese society spread through popular everyday 
life via the state ideological apparatus and the police, ultimately framing popular parlance about 
what the underlying problem was in postwar society.     
 
The “Korean Problem” as Common Sense   
There were certain material conditions for the dissemination and reproduction of racial 
bashing that politicians initially instigated in the Diet, and the radio was the most crucial material 
tool through which ordinary people could be exposed to Diet discussions at that time.  According 
to a radio yearbook published in 1948, 38.6 percent of Japanese households owned a radio in 
1946.
158
  The national broadcasting station (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai, or NHK) broadcasted every 
Diet discussion live on radio, whether in the general assembly or major and minor standing 
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committees, during July 1 to August 31 in 1946.  This was the period during which the debate on 
the new Japanese constitution started and also lawmakers’ racial bashing took place.  
Simultaneously, NHK also ran a political talk show called “From the National Diet Last Week” 
(senshū no Kokkai kara) and broadcasted live debates among political party leaders concerning 
the latest Diet discussions.
159
  Clearly, the radio became the central site of political ideological 
struggle and played the most significant role in disseminating the words of politicians.
160
   
The major national presses such as Asahi, Yomiuri, and Mainichi
161
 also published 
excerpts of race-baiting speeches made by lawmakers such as Ōno and Shiikuma.162  Moreover, 
these national newspapers started to print more news articles on violent and shocking incidents 
involving Koreans and Taiwanese perpetrators, such as “Two Groups of Japanese-Korean 
[nissenjin] Muggers” (Asahi Shimbun, Osaka edition, July 20, 1946), “Counterfeit New Yan-
Notes, Smuggled from Korea, Three Million Yan Scattered” (Mainichi Shimbun, July 18, 1946), 
and “Members of the Korean League in Japan Rampaged into a Branch Office” (Yomiuri 
Shimbun, July 21, 1946).
163
  Together with politicians’ racial bashing, major national 
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newspapers’ inflammatory news articles on Koreans wreaking havoc on Japanese society played 
a crucial role in inflaming anti-Korean sentiments among the populace. 
On the ground, the police often acted as the main official transmitter of the image of 
Koreans as potential criminals.  For instance, in October 1946, the Ueno police station 
distributed and displayed 720 anti-crime posters on the street walls all over the downtown Ueno 
area of Tokyo.  The poster was illustrated with the symbol of the Korean national flag as its 
central motif and with the figure of a robber with a knife pointing a Japanese woman.
164
  
Similarly, in November, the Meguro police station in Tokyo sent round a circular notice in a 
neighborhood in search of an unidentified mugger, which alerted: 
The suspect seems to be a Korean.  Each household should watch out and make 
sure to lock up.  [my emphasis]
165
            
 
In Hokkaidō, the Kushiro City Police suddenly summoned all thirty-six Koreans living in 
Kushiro City to the police station on November 10 for the “prevention and policing of Korean 
crimes.”  The police put these thirty-six Koreans all together in one room and told them that the 
police would take a photo and fingerprint of every one of them.  After a verbal fight and 
resistance from the Koreans, the police gave up on taking a photo in the end, but still insisted on 
taking a fingerprint.  A zainichi Korean newspaper reported that some “sensible” (kokoroaru) 
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Japanese residents were condemning such “discriminatory” police action for stirring up “bad 
feeling” among the Japanese against Koreans.166     
Although there might have been some “sensible” Japanese regarding official racial 
discrimination, the majority probably did not fall under this category.  In fact, the government 
and media’s racial bashing was sensational enough to incite Japanese people to make an appeal 
to MacArthur for the aggressive solution of the “Korean problem,” for a final resort to 
compulsory repatriation.  In letters and petitions sent from ordinary Japanese people to 
MacArthur concerning the “Korean problem,” many appealed to MacArthur to deport all 
Koreans immediately, and portrayed Koreans as “criminals,” “vicious people,” “black-
marketeers,” “the source of food shortage,” “troublemakers for the Japanese economy and public 
order,” “the obstacle to the construction of Japan” and so on.167   
More importantly, the image of Koreans as a corrosive force within Japanese society, an 
image that the lawmakers, government officials, media and police forged and disseminated 
during mid- and late 1946, immediately appeared in popular parlance as well.  For instance, in 
their daily private conversations, some Japanese echoed and reproduced the exact same rhetoric 
of racial bashing that politicians made in the National Diet, saying: 
Japan’s new yen economy is being thrown into disorder by Koreans.  They hold 
most of the cash in Japan and interfere with the Japanese Government’s attempt to 
check inflation. 
 
Another said: 
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They [Koreans] hold one-third of the new currency and control the majority of 
middle-class people in large cities in Japan…  If left alone, they will seize the 
entire Japanese economy.
168
 
 
Some even echoed the exact same phrase lawmaker Shiikuma uttered in expressing his 
frustration with Koreans acting, in his words, “as if they were victorious nationals” (atakamo 
senshō kokumin no gotoki).  One anonymous letter to MacArthur claimed, “It is really 
outrageous that those Koreans [senjin] challenge us as if they were victorious nationals 
disregarding their previous history.”169  Another anonymous letter complained, “[…] the fact that 
Koreans are swaggering around as if they were victorious nationals makes me feel that Japan is 
in an anarchic and lawless state” (my emphasis).170  Clearly, these letters manifested that the 
official racial bashing molded the grammar of popular parlance for narrating one’s view of 
Koreans, coalescing with mounting racial fear and hostility among the Japanese populace, which 
had been stirred up through their post-defeat everyday encounters with Koreans on the ground.
171
 
Similarly, the Japanese petitions to MacArthur concerning the “Korean problem” also 
indicated how strongly the media focus on violent incidents involving Koreans perpetrators 
fueled popular frustration and hostility toward Koreans in Japan.  One letter titled “Petition for 
the Policing of Koreans” stressed that “good Japanese people [were] severely suffering from 
recent Korean lawlessness,” pointing out that almost every robbery incident that appeared in 
newspapers was related to Koreans.
172
  In another letter, a man in Kyoto City named Yamashita 
Yoshio, who wrote to MacArthur in the name of “concerned Kyoto residents” (Kyōto yūshi 
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ichidō), made an earnest request for the deportation of “every single Korean.”  Yamashita, who 
had lived in Korea for years and had become homeless after repatriating to Japan, emphasized 
that he knew Koreans “very well” and claimed that Koreans were “traditionally the people 
[kokumin] of theft and falsehood.”  He pointed out, “In newspapers, countless criminals and 
perpetrators of heinous crimes such as violence, robbery and rape and those criminals have 
always been identified as ‘born-in-Korea’ [Chōsen umare].”  Yamashita was also determined to 
alert MacArthur to the “obstacle” to U.S./Allied occupation and went so far as to insist, 
“[Koreans] are destroying piece by piece all your kindness in your efforts to reconstruct Japan 
and save Japanese people”; “Otherwise [if Koreans are not deported], the ordinary Japanese will 
not be able engage in work without worry and will continue to suffer.”173    
Like Yamashita, those who made petitions to MacArthur asking for the policing and 
deportation of Koreans usually presented both themselves and the Japanese people in general as 
helpless victims of the Koreans, in the same manner that some lawmakers presented the issue in 
the Diet – the Japanese were victims who were suffering from a “non-Japanese” corrosive force 
within.  In almost every petition letter, Koreans became associated with the black-market 
economy, which had been the center of popular resentment and life-and-death concerns about 
survival and daily subsistence.  Thereby, Koreans appeared as a target of emotionally worded 
attacks and blame for current Japanese hardships.  Those who stigmatized Koreans as black-
marketeers simply believed that Koreans were “eating well” and making a quick and fat profit in 
the mushrooming black-market business by taking advantage of Japanese misery and the chaos 
of a war-torn country.  One anonymous letter to MacArthur complained that Koreans whose life 
before had been mostly “no better than tramps” (kojiki dōzen) were now enjoying “the lifestyle 
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of dressing well and eating well” (bii bishoku no seikatsu) through “big black-market business” 
(ōyami).174 
For instance, Maeda Zenjirō, a man living in Toyama Prefecture who had repatriated 
after Japan’s defeat from China with nothing, sent a letter to MacArthur and asked for measures 
to be taken against the “Korean problem” (Chōsenjin mondai).  In his letter, Maeda first revealed 
that he had been barely able to make a living since his return to Japan.  He described his current 
life as “wretched” (hisan na mono) like other returnees, and started to blame Koreans for 
“throwing the Japanese economy into disorder,” “disturbing law and order,” “committing 
robbery and pickpocketing in groups,” and “buying up food and other essential goods.”  Maeda 
claimed that amidst the current severe food shortage and mass starvation across the country, 
“hundreds of thousands of Koreans” were “eating their fill” (bishoku hōshoku shite) even though 
they had “no stable job.”  Maeda also did not hesitate to present his racist view more directly, 
insisting, “Indeed, the Korean race consists mostly of degenerates [akka shita mono].”  In 
addition, he even went so far as to warn MacArthur, using menacing rhetoric: “Our seventy 
million brethren will not just stand by and watch” you do nothing about the “vice of Koreans.”175 
As seen in Maeda’s and others’ letters, the publicly-forged representation of Koreans – 
the representation strongly associated with social malaise and social disorder – not only 
intersected with one’s hardship and desperate circumstances in day-to-day living, but also 
framed one’s misery and hunger as something related to the presence of Korean “racial others.”  
Given that food was always a major topic in daily popular parlance and, as Dower succinctly 
describes, “[f]ood-fixed activities and stories mesmerized the public,”176 the image of Koreans 
“eating their fill” and “buying up food” no doubt outraged the hungry and starving Japanese 
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populace more than anything else.  In this sense, what MacArthur articulated in his speech at the 
U.S. Congress concerning U.S. food aid for occupied Japan turned out to be correct: “Starvation 
[…] renders a people an easy prey to any ideology, however evil, which bears with it life-
sustaining food.”177  Although MacArthur was probably never concerned about Japanese 
starvation in relation to racial hostility toward Koreans, starvation apparently rendered Japanese 
people an easy prey to the ideology of racism.     
The ideology and practice of racism, specifically the official racialization of social 
problems and social disorder at this historical moment, indeed provided an individual with a 
powerful meaning with which to interpret one’s hardship.  One letter sent to MacArthur from a 
Japanese woman living in Beppu City, Ōita Prefecture demonstrated how the official parlance 
and racial bashing framed the individual’s understanding of her own “experience.”178  
In her letter, Iwasaki Tsuyako first expressed her gratitude to MacArthur for the new 
Japanese constitution that had granted women equal rights the same as men.
179
  She also 
appreciated the democratic reform of the police, but at the same time showed her deep concern 
about the reality that the new democratized police were not being capable of handling rampant 
petty crimes and growing social disorder.  Iwasaki wrote that her house had been burglarized and 
her sewing machine had been stolen – the sewing machine that had been the indispensable, sole 
means of livelihood for her family for twenty years.  The burglar was not yet identified, and the 
ineffectual police were only able to show their sympathy for her plight but could not help her 
more materially and immediately regarding her stolen sewing machine, the one item she needed 
the most for survival.  In the depths of despair, Iwasaki confessed that she was even “feeling the 
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strong temptation of vice” at the mere thought of her family’s subsistence.  But, rather than 
allowing herself to totally succumb to despair, she took her misfortune as something to learn 
from for the future prevention of similar crimes in society, and made a request and suggestion to 
MacArthur.  Iwasaki suggested that SCAP implement an ordinance that would require owners to 
report the serial number of their sewing machines to the local police, in the hope that people 
could recognize stolen property.  
 Her letter did not end with this offered suggestion.  In the next page immediately after 
she wrote about her idea of a preventive measure against sewing machine theft, she continued: 
I cannot afford to buy a ten thousand yen sewing machine.  At the thought of 
livelihood ahead, I am even struck with a sense of resentment [urameshii] at the 
new constitution.   
In particular, criminals are Koreans [hantōjin].  Koreans in Beppu City are 
mostly involved in black-marketing [yami no shōbai], stealing and mugging, and 
doing whatever they want.  They are living in a boarding house and spreading 
vicious thoughts and false rumors [aku shisō ya dema o tobashiteiru]. 
The Japanese were defeated in the war.  We cannot blame anyone even if 
we face all kinds of wretchedness.  Thinking about your numerous acts of 
kindness with all our heart, we are making determined efforts by encouraging and 
telling ourselves that Japan has only just begun [Nihon wa korekara da], in the 
hope that we can show you our appreciation as much as possible.  [my emphasis]     
 
Iwasaki concluded her six page long letter with her appeal for the “policing of Koreans” along 
with for the measures to find stolen property.       
 In her letter, one can see the abrupt shift in the mode of her narration and a leap in her 
logic.  Her telling of her desperate circumstances and her resentment of social disorder suddenly 
turned into racial accusation.  Her tone and language changed.  She asserted, “In particular, 
criminals are Koreans.”  Her words, “They are […] spreading vicious thoughts and false rumors” 
– especially the phrase “vicious thoughts” (aku shisō) – sounded like the official parlance, the 
words the police often used.  She interpreted her hardship via the meaning and representation 
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politically attached to the social phenomenon of crimes (“criminals are Koreans”) and 
understood her agonizing “experience” as something associated with the presence of Koreans.  In 
short, one can see in her letter how the discursive power (as the product of power struggles) of 
racism was operating to frame her “experience.”  Her letter demonstrated how the ideological 
racialization of social problems from the state and “ruling bloc” (dominant social groups) had 
converged with the everyday “common sense” framework with which she understood her own 
individual circumstances.  The racial specter of the Koreans in Japan had now become a “lived 
experience” for her.      
 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed how “race” was reformulated in postwar Japanese political 
discourse and became the central signifier for the so-called “postwar crisis” in U.S./Allied-
occupied Japan.  As I demonstrated above, what the “postwar crisis” essentially manifested was 
the “crisis of hegemony” in a Gramscian sense, in terms of both the political and structural 
conditions.  The Japanese old guard, the guardians of the Emperor-centered imperial “national 
polity” and the conglomerate(zaitatsu)-dominated capitalist economy, faced serious challenges 
from the rising democratic forces spurred by the radical democratization project that SCAP had 
initiated.  Radicalized workers not only took to the streets to challenge the legitimacy of the old 
guard government but also launched movements for “production control” on the shop floors.  
Although workers and the Japanese Communist Party used the seizure of control over the 
production process as a temporary labor dispute tactic, I argue that the workers’ takeover of the 
“means of production” from capitalists had the revolutionary potential for a possible path to 
nascent “soviets.”  Simultaneously, the ideological leverage wielded by the old guard and 
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existing emperor system was increasingly weakening on the ground, as people started to practice 
iconoclasm by mocking, disparaging and criticizing the emperor in public.  The event of the so-
called “Food May Day” demonstration in May 1946 became a showcase of spreading popular 
iconoclasm.  The event also marked a critical moment of the rise in popular challenges against 
the legitimacy of the old guard. 
This political crisis was closely linked with and facilitated by the deepening crisis of the 
war-torn economy.  Capitalist hegemony was also falling apart at a deeper structural level, a 
level different from the normative, ideological legitimization of the existing old guard’s 
domination.  On the one hand, the legitimization of capitalist social relations was teetering on a 
precipitous brink as the workers’ seizure of the capital’s means of production (“production 
control”) spread throughout shop floors.  Outside of these production sites, the majority of “a 
surplus population of workers” refused to return to the production process, and chose a living 
based on the growing black-market economy, essentially turning into non-productive “lumpen-
like beings.”  In other words, the population that had to be ready for exploitation by capital in the 
circuit of capitalist accumulation was not functioning in that way.   
It was in the middle of this “organic crisis” that the racialization of social disorder and 
fragmentation took shape in the form of the ideological reformulation of the “Korean problem.”  
The Japanese government and media started to racialize the ongoing social crisis by associating 
the presence of the Korean minority with food scarcity, skyrocketing inflation and the rampant 
black-market economy.  The government’s and media’s making of the “Korean problem” 
intersected with the mounting popular fear and hatred of the Korean minority on the ground.  
The racialized view of social problems provided the Japanese individual with a powerful 
meaning with which to interpret one’s ongoing hardship and hunger.  People started to attribute 
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their sufferings to the “Korean problem,” and some even believed themselves to be victimized by 
the liberated Korean minority in Japan.  Like the Japanese politicians presenting the Japanese 
nation victimized by the presence of Koreans (and Taiwanese) swaggering “as if they were 
victorious nationals,” people also framed their own “self-victimization” vis-à-vis their formerly 
colonized subjects in Japan. 
The first two years of U.S./Allied occupation, which I examined in this chapter, marked a 
period of the significant political and social transformations in Japan, such as the new 
constitution, the purge of militarist leaders, the dissolution of zaibatsu conglomerates, the 
establishment of land reform, women’s suffrage and so on.  Scholars often hail this early 
formation of “postwar Japan” as a moment of radical democratization from above, as opposed to 
the later serious setback in SCAP’s democratic reforms (such as the purge of Communists and 
the termination of the purge of ultra-rightist), which scholars characterize as the unfortunate 
product of the beginning of the cold war.  Yet, as discussed above, a setback or nascent 
reactionary turn in SCAP occupation policy (such as MacArthur’s attack on rising grassroots 
movements and his involvement in the Yomiuri’s “red purge”) was already taking shape during 
the early period of the occupation at the same time with the ongoing democratic reforms of 
Japanese society.  More importantly, the nascent reactionary turn and the ensuing Yoshida 
administration’s counteroffensive against rising democratic forces developed in tandem with 
race-baiting, the making of the “Korean problem.”  The origins of the setback in democratic 
revolution in occupied Japan were also deeply intertwined with the reformulation of racism in 
political discourse. 
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PART II 
The Cold War Comes to U.S./Allied-Occupied Japan, 1948-1950 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Liberation Betrayed: 
Zainichi Korean Search for Self-Determination and the Cold War 
 
 
 
Introduction 
You will treat Formosan-Chinese and Koreans as liberated peoples in so far as military security permits.  They are 
not included in the term “Japanese” as used in this directive but they have been Japanese subjects and may be treated 
by you, in case of necessity, as enemy nationals.   
—U.S. Army Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan” (November 1, 1945)1  
 
The large Korean group in Japan, which is for the most part unassimilable in Japan and the source of dangerous 
friction with the Japanese, constitutes a strong element of instability in the Far East and the cause of unfavorable 
propaganda directed against the United States as the principal occupying power in Japan. 
— SCAP Diplomatic Section, “Staff Study concerning Koreans in Japan” (August 16, 1948)2 
 
The solution of the Korean minority problem in Japan does not lie ultimately with the occupation or with the new 
government in South Korea.  It is part of a larger picture, the so-called “cold-war” between the Western democracies 
and the USSR.    
— U.S. Army Forces Pacific, Civil Intelligence Section, “Periodical Summary,” 32 (September 15, 1948)3 
 
 
 On November 3, 1945, Washington sent General Douglas MacArthur the first concrete 
directive for the U.S. military occupation of Japan, titled “Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive 
                                                 
1
 “Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and 
Control of Japan” (November 1, 1945) in Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, Japanese Government, ed., 
Documents concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, Volume I: Basic Documents (January 1949), 
pp.129-131.  (Henceforth Documents concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, Volume I.) 
2
 “Staff Study concerning Koreans in Japan” (August 16, 1948), Reel 15, Records of the U.S. Department of State 
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Japan, 1945-1949 (microfilm from Scholarly Resources Inc). 
3
 United States Army Forces Pacific, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Civil Intelligence Section, 
“Periodical Summary,” 32 (September 15, 1948), SAP-12, reprinted in Kawashima Takane, Senryōgun chian chōhō 
geppō (Tokyo: Gendaishiryō Shuppan, 2006), vol.9, p.449.  (Henceforth, Civil Intelligence Secion, “Periodical 
Summary,” SCCG.)  
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to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan.”  In the 
directive, Washington clarified the basic policies which Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers (SCAP) would follow, and the polices ranged from political, economic and financial 
reforms to the treatment of prisoners of war and displaced persons.  Among these very concrete 
directives was specific instructions regarding the treatment of Korean and Taiwanese subjects in 
Japan.  For their treatment, Washington commanded SCAP to “treat Formosan-Chinese and 
Koreans as liberated peoples in so far as military security [would] permit” (my emphasis).  At 
the same time, Washington continued: 
[Formosan-Chinese and Koreans] are not included in the term “Japanese” as used 
in this directive but they have been Japanese subjects and may be treated by you, 
in case of necessity, as enemy nationals.  [my emphasis]
4
 
 
This ambiguity in Washington’s definition of formerly colonized subjects in Japan – 
“liberated people” and “enemy nationals” – came from the split between legal and political 
concerns that U.S. policy-planners had while drafting occupation policy toward Koreans in Japan.  
As Japanese and Korean historians have discussed, policy-planners in Washington regarded 
Koreans in Japan as “Japanese nationals” in a legal sense.5  Washington had no intention to 
challenge or nullify their legal status of Japanese nationality that the Japanese empire had 
implemented through the “annexation” of Korea.  However, U.S. policy-makers also considered 
that Koreans in Japan should not be treated the same as Japanese “enemy nationals” for political 
                                                 
4
 “Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and 
Control of Japan” (November 1, 1945), in Documents concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, 
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5
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reasons, given that the Cairo Declaration of 1943 had condemned Japan’s “enslavement of the 
people of Korea” and promised Korean independence in the future.6   
In fact, Washington’s other directive prepared for the occupation of Korea presented 
Korea as a “liberated country.”  It stipulated that “[i]n conformity with the provisions of the 
Cairo Declaration your administration of civil affairs [would] be based upon the treatment of 
Korea as a liberated country to the maximum extent consistent with the security of your forces” 
(my emphasis).
7
  Washington extended this political concern for the treatment of Korea also to 
the status of Koreans living in Japan and created a new category of “liberated peoples” in its 
Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to SCAP.  As a result, the Korean colonial population in 
Japan was defined in the same breath as both “liberated people” and “enemy nationals” as the 
Japanese.       
This chapter demonstrates how the ambiguity in Washington’s definition of the status of 
Koreans in Japan developed into the primary locus of political struggles between Koreans, 
Japanese, and Occupation policy-makers over the meaning and scope of Korean liberation.  
Koreans in Japan understood liberation as autonomy from Japanese sovereignty and framed the 
status of “liberated people” as a space for self-determination on Japanese soil.  On the other hand, 
SCAP limited the scope of liberation to the “privilege of repatriation” with the objective of 
reducing the Korean colonial population in Japan as much as possible.  Americans in Korea tried 
to convince SCAP of the possible significant consequences of treating Koreans in Japan as 
“liberated people” for their own occupation policy there, as they found that the SCAP’s 
                                                 
6
 “The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due 
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7
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“unsympathetic handling” of Koreans in Japan was feeding “anti-American propaganda” in 
Korea.  Moreover, the Japanese government and police denied the Koreans’ “liberated people” 
status and strived to retain control over the formerly colonized Korean subjects.  Everyday 
encounters between the Japanese police and Koreans demonstrating their liberation in Japan 
often ended in violent clashes over the practice of sovereignty on both parts, the claim of 
authority over Korean bodies. 
Through an examination of those tensions, conflicts and discrepancies between the 
victors, vanquished and liberated over the status of Koreans in Japan, this chapter also 
demonstrates how zainichi Korean struggles for a space of self-determination became a 
flashpoint for the anxieties and ambitions of the early U.S. cold war project in East Asia.  By 
September 1948, U.S. Occupation policy-makers began not only to understand the presence of 
Koreans in Japan as “a strong element of instability in the Far East,” but also to associate the 
“solution of the Korean minority problem in Japan” with the cold war rivalry between “the 
Western democracies” and “the USSR.”  Indeed, the Korean school disputes in April 1948, 
where SCAP suppressed zainichi Korean protests for their rights to Korean education by painting 
the protests as “red riots,” marked a critical event that spelled out the process of the U.S. cold 
war politicization of the Korean minority problem in Japan.  This chapter analyzes the Korean 
school disputes of April 1948 as a critical convergence between U.S. global cold war and 
Japanese “postcolonial” politics in the locus of Korean liberation in Japan.  If, as cold war 
historian Odd Arne Westad has argued, U.S. and Soviet “Cold War interventionisms” in the 
Third World emerged as a “continuation of European colonial interventions,” I argue that U.S. 
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quasi-colonial cold war interventionism intersected with unending Japanese colonial 
interventions in the locus of Korean struggles for a space of self-determination in Japan.
8
   
 
Liberation as Repatriation 
Washington’s directive did not provide any clarification on what the status of “liberated 
peoples” would mean to occupation policy, and SCAP quickly defined the meaning of “liberated 
peoples” on its own terms as the officials faced the immediate challenge of reducing the large 
Korean population in Japan.  In order to give incentives to Koreans to return to their homeland as 
early as possible, SCAP immediately set up the time-limited “privilege of repatriation” that 
allowed Koreans to travel and transport a certain amount of their property to Korea at the 
Japanese government’s expense.9  The “privilege of repatriation” was also incorporated into the 
criminal justice system.  On February 19, 1946, SCAP announced that “[s]entences imposed by 
Japanese Criminal Courts on Koreans and other nationals of countries formerly under the 
domination of Japan” would be subject to “review and further action” by SCAP if the person 
could “furnish adequate proof of their intention to return to their homelands” (my emphasis).10   
 Importantly, the liberation of Korea became synonymous with the repatriation of Koreans 
in the context of the Occupation in Japan.  On the ground, the local Occupation authorities 
started opening the gates of Japanese prisons to release Korean petty criminals who had agreed 
to return to Korea in exchange for their release.  A U.S. military unit in Chiba Prefecture 
reported that unit officials visited “all prisons in Chiba Prefecture where Koreans were held” and 
interviewed 46 Korean petty criminals to determine “whether or not they desired to be 
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repatriated to Korea.”  All of them desired to return and were released for repatriation.11  Other 
local Occupation authorities released some 85 Koreans being held in prisons for minor offenses 
during February.
12
  A U.S. military unit in the Kyūshū area also reported on similar action and 
described it as the “practice of indiscriminately repatriating.”13  Later, SCAP diplomatic official 
William J. Sebald wrote to Washington in mid-1948 and admitted that “[t]he status of Koreans as 
‘liberated people’ ha[d] in practice of this Headquarter been virtually limited to encouraging and 
giving every opportunity to Koreans to return to Korea.”14 
Such opportunity of repatriation was also virtually limited to those who accepted 
returning to Korea with almost no means to survive once they arrived in Korea.  SCAP initially 
allowed each Korean repatriate only to carry no more than 1,000 Yen in currency as well as 
“clothing and personal possessions” that one could “carry at one time.”15  While those financial 
restrictions were supposedly aimed for anti-inflation and economic stability in Korea according 
to the Economic and Scientific Section of SCAP,
16
 the amount of 1,000 Yen could barely sustain 
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Korean repatriates in starting out their lives in Korea.  In February 1946, the U.S. Army XXIV 
Corps in Korea warned SCAP that due to the financial restrictions, “all persons returning from 
Japan to their homeland [would] soon become welfare cases” instead of “becoming the hope of 
Korea.”17  The financial restrictions also reduced the number of repatriates from Japan and even 
resulted in adding fuel to growing anti-U.S. sentiments in Korea.
18
  The XXIV Corps in Korea 
told SCAP that the “[e]vidence of unsympathetic handling of Koreans in Japan” had been used 
as “anti-American propaganda by certain Korean groups” in Korea “with considerable effect.”19 
Apparently, few U.S. officials in Japan understood how their “unsympathetic” attitudes to 
Koreans in Japan mattered to the U.S. occupation of Korea.  In his report on meetings with 
multiple U.S. officials in Japan, Captain Robert L. Beyer, the Chief of the Displaced Persons 
Office in United States Army Military Government in Korea, wrote that “[l]ittle or no thought 
had been given to the relationship between handling Koreans in Japan and public opinion in 
Korea toward the American occupation.”20  During mid- and late January 1946, Beyer visited the 
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central and local Occupation authorities in Japan and found “[a]lmost everywhere” that U.S. 
officers in charge of Korean repatriation were “either prejudiced against Koreans” or “indifferent 
to Korean problems.”21  Beyer even had the impression that some officers were treating Koreans 
as “unnecessary annoyances” who were simply “referred to” local Japanese government agencies.  
In a critical tone, he continued:  
No policy or instructions to lower military echelons was [sic] evident suggesting 
generous treatment to Koreans.  The officers and men I talked to in Japan almost 
without exception overlooked the fact that their policies and actions (or inaction 
and indifference) on Korean affairs in Japan had a direct influence on the 
American policies in Korea[.]
22
 
 
Beyer added that all U.S. officers in Japan “should be instructed to treat Koreans there as 
liberated people and in a generous spirit.”23 
 Beyer’s report indicated that there was the serious gap between Americans in Korea and 
Japan in understanding the political significance of the Korean problem in Japan at this early 
stage of occupations.  As the XXIV Corps in Korea told SCAP in February 1946, how 
Americans were treating Koreans in Japan mattered significantly to the XXIV Corps in 
“establishing American prestige in Korea.”24  For SCAP, however, the primary concern about 
Koreans in Japan was, as one SCAP official characterized, to “[g]et them out” of Japan25 – 
another SCAP official later admitted that Koreans were “not wanted in Japan.”26  SCAP only 
cared about the status of “liberated people” for the purpose of encouraging Koreans to return to 
Korea at the earliest possible time through the SCAP-organized mass repatriation program.  By 
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late 1946, this gap between the Occupations in Korea and Japan developed into a clear 
discrepancy over the meaning of the liberation of Korea. 
 
The Nationality of Koreans in Japan and the Meaning of Liberation 
In May 1946, SCAP decided to establish a new policy toward Koreans in Japan.  When 
SCAP policy-makers discovered that a large number of Koreans would not choose the “privilege 
of repatriation” that was to expire in mid-December, the so-called “confusion concerning 
citizenship status” of Koreans in Japan became a critical issue within SCAP.  For the treatment 
of the Koreans who would remain in Japan, the policy-makers agreed to clarify their status as 
follows: 
Those Koreans who voluntarily continue to reside in Japan and who are not 
accepting repatriation to Korea under existing procedure for repatriation should 
presumptively be considered for purposes of treatment, as retaining their 
Japanese nationality pending such time as a duly established Korean Government 
shall have accorded recognition to the individual concerned as a Korean national.  
[my emphasis]
27
 
 
The State Department also approved this new policy on May 31,
28
 but SCAP did not make it 
public until the term of “privilege of repatriation” came almost to an end in November.  On 
November 8, a SCAP spokesperson made a public announcement through the press and revealed 
the new policy as follows:   
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Korean nationals who refuse to be repatriated when their turn comes will retain 
their Japanese nationality, pending recognition by a duly established Korean 
government as Korean nationals.
29
 
 
The press report came as a complete surprise to U.S. officials in Korea, who had not been 
notified by SCAP of this new policy in advance.  On November 20, Colonel William F. Centner 
of United States Armed Forces in Korea sent a telegram to SCAP and emphasized that the new 
status of Koreans in Japan had “not [been] referred to this headquarters for consideration and 
comment prior to policy announcement.”  Centner argued that SCAP should regard Koreans in 
Japan as “friendly foreign nationals,” as in the case of “Koreans in [the] US,” until they could 
have a choice between “Korean or Japanese citizenship” at the time of the “establishment of a 
sovereign Korean State.”  In fact, the announcement made by SCAP that Koreans remaining in 
Japan would retain Japanese nationality stood in a clear contradiction to what Koreans had 
believed as liberation – Koreans were no longer Japanese imperial subjects.  Center stressed that 
the “[s]uccessful solution to this problem [would be] vital to occupation mission in Korea.”  If 
SCAP were not to revise the announced policy, he warned, “Korean leaders and groups inimical 
to American authorities in South Korea” would take advantage of the announcement to spread 
the view among Koreans that “Americans [had] betrayed them.”30 
The Occupation in Korea had good reason to worry that Koreans would understand the 
SCAP’s policy announcement as “American betrayal.”  In a sense, Occupation policies in Korea 
had been nothing but the denial of Korean liberation from the beginning.  As historian Bruce 
Cumings has discussed, during the first three months of occupation Americans in Korea 
overturned the indigenous “regime of liberation” created by left-leaning political leaders and 
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hundreds of self-governing local organizations.
31
  United States Army Military Government in 
Korea (USAMGIK) denied the legitimacy of the Korean People’s Republic and people’s 
committees that had replaced central and local colonial authorities before U.S. troops established 
full occupation in south Korea.  Instead, USAMGIK forged a new order by reviving colonial 
legal-governmental apparatus.  USAMGIK also retained Korean colonial bureaucrats and police 
officers, despite the Washington’s initial directive to purge “[c]riminal and ordinary police 
agencies” of those who had “collaborated with the Japanese.”32  This American-made new order 
soon proved to be the failure and betrayal of what the majority of Koreans had envisioned for 
liberation.  In the fall of 1946, popular discontent over the first year of the occupation burst into 
violent uprisings against the remnants of the colonial regime, triggered by an incident in Taegu 
City where one demonstrator was shot to death by the local Korean police on October 1.  During 
the months from October to December, crowds (mostly peasants) armed with clubs, hoes, rice-
cutting hooks and bamboo spears started to assault local police stations and municipal offices 
across southern provinces and killed more than two hundred police officers, if not Americans.
33
 
In this tumult of spreading local popular rebellions, the SCAP’s new policy 
announcement of early November brought and added another uproar to the Occupation in Korea.  
SCAP’s new policy was sensational enough to stir up further a sense of betrayal among many 
Koreans who had already become disillusioned with the promise of liberation under U.S. 
occupation.  On November 15, a Korean leftist newspaper, Tongnip Sinbo, published an editorial 
that launched a blistering criticism on the SCAP’s policy.  The editorial portrayed the new policy 
as the “humiliation” of Koreans because it would not only enforce the status of “defeated 
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nationals” on liberated Koreans in Japan but also render them “punishable” by laws of “defeated 
country Japan.”  Such treatment was absolutely “unacceptable,” and Tongnip Sinbo also 
lamented the abject reality of their brethren overseas, those returning from Japan and China to 
the “liberated” homeland with almost nothing.  Tongnip Sinbo questioned: “Is the ‘liberation’ 
that the Allied Powers declared several times and promised the world supposed to be this kind of 
‘liberation’ at all?”34  
Another newspaper, Chosŏn Ilbo, also criticized the SCAP’s new policy as a 
“contradiction to the initial purpose of liberation.”  In its editorial on November 15, Chosŏn Ilbo 
even went so far as to characterize it as “one of the most serious instances” that ignored “pride 
and national sentiments” of Koreans.35  Similarly, politicians from both leftist and rightist camps 
raised their voices about the American betrayal of liberation by lashing the SCAP’s policy with 
one, collective voice.  The rightist Headquarters for National Unification condemned it as a 
“contradiction to the initial purpose of Korean liberation promised by the Allied Powers,”36 and 
the leftist Democratic National Front accused it as the “virtual denial of [Korean] national 
independence promised by international society.”37  On November 19, the zainichi Korean 
League in Seoul, the Seoul branch of the Korean League in Japan, invited some forty 
representatives from both leftist and rightist political camps to one place to coordinate protests.  
The representatives agreed to organize a national campaign against the SCAP’s new policy, 
characterizing it as the “extension of Japanese domination of Korea.”38 
Faced with fierce opposition emerging from Koreans in both Korea and Japan, SCAP 
soon tried to appease their exasperated sentiments by denying the policy announcement to the 
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public.  On November 20, SCAP released a statement and emphasized that SCAP had treated 
Koreans in Japan as “liberated people” from the beginning of the occupation and would have “no 
intention of interfering in any way with the fundamental right of any person of any nationality.”  
Now, SCAP avoided providing any clarification on the legal status of Koreans remaining in 
Japan, and the statement only specified that Koreans “refusing repatriation and electing to 
remain” in Japan would be subject to “all appropriate local laws and regulations.”39  However, 
this announcement did not mean that SCAP had abandoned its previous decision to treat Koreans 
remaining in Japan as Japanese nationals once the privilege of repatriation would expire on 
December 15, 1946.  SCAP’s internal memorandum dated December 13 reconfirmed the 
previous policy approved within SCAP in May.
40
  Moreover, when the Occupation in Korea later 
planned to issue a press release in mid-1947 in order to clarify the legal status of Koreans in 
Japan as “nationals of Korea,” as nationals of a “liberated country,” the Legal Section of SCAP 
denied such status.  The Legal Section objected that “legally” Korea would still remain “a part of 
Japan” until a future international settlement and thus that: “Koreans are Japanese nationals until 
a peace treaty is signed.”41   
In fact, what was at stake in these controversies over the treatment of Koreans in Japan 
was not simply their nationality status but, more fundamentally, the meaning and scope of the 
liberation of Korea itself.  Their nationality status related directly to how to define Japan’s defeat 
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and Korea’s liberation, and these controversies revealed conflicting visions of liberation between 
not only U.S. Occupations in Japan and Korea but also between Americans and Korean political 
leaders.  While the Legal Section of SCAP – and the Japanese government as well – did not 
admit that Korean liberation was a “legally” settled fact, USAMGIK understood that the 
Japanese defeat and acceptance of terms of the Potsdam Declaration had “terminated the 
sovereign rights of Japan over certain parts of her empire, including Korea.”  A legal opinion 
presented by the Department of Justice in USAMGIK refuted the stance of the Legal Section and 
also claimed that “Koreans [had] ceased to owe allegiance to the Japanese Crown” as a result of 
the Japanese acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration.
42
  In a similar vein, Korean political leaders 
had no doubt that Koreans had become “legally” – let alone virtually – free from the Japanese 
nationality into which Japan had “forcibly incorporated Koreans for the past thirty-six years.”43 
For Korean political leaders, moreover, the meaning and scope of liberation extended 
beyond the legal and actual termination of the Japanese sovereignty or independence from Japan 
which the Allied Powers had promised in the two declarations of Cairo and Potsdam.  In its 
critique of the SCAP’s new policy of treating Koreans in Japan as Japanese nationals, the 
Tongnip No-Nong Dang, the Labor-Farmer Party for Independence, stressed that Korea had 
“restored its initial independence” as a result of liberation from Japanese “invasion.”  Liberation 
was not simply “separation” from Japan but the “restoration” of sovereignty deprived by the 
Japanese “annexation” of Korea in the early twentieth century.  The Tongnip No-Nong Dang 
understood that the annexation treaty of 1910, the “forced theft agreement” (kangdo munso) 
between Korea and Japan, became “null and void” (muhyo) on its own after liberation.  Thus, 
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SCAP’s recognition of the Japanese nationality of Koreans in Japan meant nothing but the 
“prolongation of [Japanese] theft.”44   
In other words, the controversies over the legal status of Koreans in Japan also brought to 
the surface long-enduring historical discrepancies over the legitimacy of the annexation treaty of 
1910 endorsed by the United States and the imperialist forces in the early twentieth century.  The 
legal status of Koreans in Japan represented a litmus test for the meaning and scope of the 
“liberation” that Americans and the Allied Powers had promised colonized Koreans in the Cairo 
Declaration – did the Allied denouncement of Japan’s “enslavement of the people of Korea” also 
extend to the judgment on and negation of the legitimacy of the annexation treaty, the original 
sin of Japanese colonial rule itself?  The problem of the legal status of Koreans in Japan became 
a controversial site where fundamental discrepancies over how to approach the original sin of 
Japanese colonial rule came into view.  
 
Korean Struggles over the Scope of Liberation in Japan  
 The SCAP’s initial policy of treating Koreans in Japan as a “liberated people” buoyed up 
the Koreans, who were reveling in the joy and excitement of Japan’s defeat and Korea’s 
liberation.  Although SCAP had no intention to extend the status of “liberated people” beyond 
the “privilege of repatriation,” such treatment prompted open demonstrations of pride by the 
Koreans who had been treated as “inferior race” during their lifetime by the Japanese majority.  
On March 23, 1946, a U.S. occupation military unit in Kyoto Prefecture reported that Koreans 
were “under the impression that they possessed special privileges” and were having “an 
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exaggerated sense of importance.”45  Koreans sometimes understood their new status not only as 
political emancipation but also as the reversal of the hierarchical racial status.  When scolded 
from a Japanese police officer, one Korean man bitterly spoke back to him, saying: “You fourth-
rate national! [yontō kokumin!]  We are first-rate nationals, and we won’t let you domineer us!”46  
Later, SCAP told Washington in mid-1948 that “the Allied statement that Koreans were to be 
treated as ‘liberated people’ [had been] interpreted by Koreans in Japan to mean their complete 
emancipation from Japanese control.”47 
Indeed, Koreans often demonstrated liberation through their open defiance of the 
authority of the Japanese police.  For them, the police were the most immediately recognizable 
(and notorious) agents of Japan’s leviathan-like state and state penetration into everyday life.  
Particularly during the war, the Japanese government established the nation-wide governmental 
apparatus aimed at the wartime mobilization and surveillance of Koreans in Japan, and put every 
single of them under the tight control of local police-supervised organs called “Kyōwakai” 
(Association for Harmonization).
48
  After Japan’s surrender, it was natural that many Koreans 
started to claim and experience their status as liberated people in their relation with the authority 
of the Japanese police.   
For instance, a U.S. military unit stationed in the Hakodate City of Hokkaidō reported on 
January 24, 1946 that there had been “numerous incidents of refusal of Koreans and Chinese to 
submit to Japanese police authorities” since Japan’s defeat.49  A U.S. military unit in Osaka 
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Prefecture also made a similar report on March 7, stating that the “[c]ontrol of Korean, Formosan 
and Chinese nationals living in the Osaka area posed a major problem in law enforcement.”50  
Sometimes, liberation was performed violently against the Japanese police.  The U.S. military 
unit in Hakodate City recorded the incident in which “such a show of defiance [had] culminated 
in a riot and bloodshed.”  On January 24, 1946, according to a unit report, the local Japanese 
police officers caught three Koreans on suspicion of black-market activities and interrogated 
them in a police station.  Shortly thereafter, some 50 or 60 Koreans stormed into the police 
station and “destroyed the interior and ¾ of the windows,” and also attacked another police 
station nearby.  Soon, Japanese residents organized themselves and started “beating up every 
Korean in sight.”  The report estimated that some four thousand Japanese had “either actively or 
passively engaged in the mob action.”51  More minor clashes between Korean and Japanese 
residents were also becoming a pervasive everyday phenomenon.      
Korean leaders demonstrated liberation differently through political empowerment.  After 
Japan’s surrender, local Koreans leaders immediately started to organize mutual assistance 
groups in order to protect Korean residents from possible Japanese reprisal and help those who 
wished to return to the liberated homeland.  In some cases, Korean leaders took advantage of 
local Korean residential organs formed through imperial wartime mobilization.
52
  In mid-October 
1945, various Korean mutual assistance groups that had mushroomed across Japan united into a 
single organization named “Korean League in Japan.”  The Korean League established its local 
branches in almost all prefectures and had a total of forty-seven branches across Japan by 
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January 1946.
53
  Until September 1949, when the Japanese government and SCAP ordered its 
dissolution, the Korean League was the predominant Korean organization that represented the 
Korean majority in Japan. 
 The Korean League launched multiple activities demonstrating what liberation looked 
like for Koreans in Japan.  Shortly after its inauguration, the central leadership of the Korean 
League called for the investigation of “pro-Japanese national traitors” among Korean leaders in 
Japan and made public the names of thirty-six individuals, making them the target of accusations 
and calls for a purge by Koreans.
54
  The Korean League also launched a campaign to demand 
compensation from Japanese industries for the exploitation of Korean conscripted workers and 
succeeded in obtaining the total of 340 settlements across Japan.
55
  Moreover, the Korean League 
dispatched delegates to the first prime national representative meeting in Korea, the General 
Convention of People’s Committees held in Seoul from November 20 to November 22.  The 
delegates met with national political leaders and made a request for the recognition of the Korean 
League as the official agency representing the Korean community in Japan, as the overseas 
agency of the future Korean government.
56
  Indeed, its local branch in Yamagata Prefecture even 
claimed the Korean League in Japan as the representative of the “Korean Provisional 
Government” (Chōsen Rinji Seifu) in Korea, even before such a recognized government 
existed.
57
 
Among its initial activities, the Korean League exercised its most crucial influence on the 
task for the repatriation of Koreans.  Until SCAP banned its involvement in May 1946, the 
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Korean League took the lead in the repatriation program on the ground, working to arrange 
domestic transportation and provide food and accommodations for those waiting for repatriation 
ships at local ports.  In fact, the Japanese government heavily relied on the Korean League in 
order to meet the daily quota of Korean repatriates that SCAP had stipulated.  The dilemma the 
Japanese government was facing was that Koreans did “not believe the instructions the Japanese 
Government [had] issued,” as a Japanese official lamented, but they were “apt to believe rumors 
issues by the League of Koreans.”  The government even “most earnestly asked for the League’s 
closer collaboration,”58 and such reliance on the Korean League further boosted its prestige 
among Koreans in Japan.  SCAP internal memorandum stated on June 14, 1946 that the Korean 
League had “enjoyed some degree of semi-legal status in the eyes of the Koreans in Japan due to 
its utilization by the Japanese in meeting repatriation quotas.”59 
What also made the Korean League appear to be “enjoying some degree of semi-legal 
status” was its vigilante activities.  In the aftermath of Japan’s defeat, local Korean leaders also 
organized vigilante groups out of fear of the possible Japanese victimization of Korean residents 
that had once happened during the post-quake mayhem of 1923.
60
  As zainichi Korean historian 
Chŏng Yŏnghwan has analyzed, self-formed local Korean vigilante groups were united and 
reorganized as the “Peace-Preservation Corps” of the Korean League under the slogan of 
“protecting the life and property of brethren in Japan.”  The Peace-Preservation Corps also 
played an active role in helping local Korean residents return to Korea and preventing Korean 
crimes and “delinquent behaviors” (furyō kōi).  Interestingly, the tasks of the Peace-Preservation 
                                                 
58
 General Liaison Office, Imperial Japanese Government to SCAP, “Repatriation of Koreans” (May 30, 1946), 
Folder: South Korea, General, Box 381, G-3, RG 331, NARA (G-3 00046, GHQ/SCAP Records, NDL). 
59
 Eighth Army to SCAP, [no title] (June 14, 1946), ibid. 
60
 On the fear of Japanese retaliation and racial hostility, see my chapter 1. 
  
166 
 
Corps included the training of the Korean youth in Japan to join the future national army in 
Korea.
61
   
As the Occupation authorities understood them as the “police squad,” the Korean Peace-
Preservation Corps exercised de facto police power in Korean communities.
62
  On June 22, 1946, 
a U.S. military unit in Kyoto Prefecture reported that a “Korean ‘vigilante’ committee” in the 
Nishi-Maizuru district was in charge of “maintaining order among Koreans in the district” and its 
cooperation with the Japanese police had been “satisfactory.”63  In Ibaraki Prefecture, the Peace-
Preservation Corps “arrested” the members of an opposition Korean rightist association for 
receiving illicit rations by fabricating the Korean League’s certification.  The members of the 
Peace-Preservation Corps found that the local branch of the rightist association hoarded a 
considerable amount of unlawfully obtained food and goods, including Japanese swords, and 
reported it to the local Occupation authorities.
64
  Similar policing activities were also reported in 
Hiroshima Prefecture.  According to a U.S. military intelligence report dated on September 15, 
1946, the Korean League had “succeeded in assuming considerable amount of police power” 
among Korean residents in the Hiroshima area, and Korean youth groups and “police groups” 
were “attempting to maintain peace and order” among Koreans.  Some offices of the Korean 
League even “took the responsibility of punishing” Korean residents who were “adjudged by the 
League to be guilty of crimes or misdemeanors.”  Four cases of “imprisonment” in offices of the 
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Korean League and five cases of “beatings administered by the members of the League” were 
reported to the local Occupation authorities.
65
   
The Peace-Preservation Corps even enforced its power in the policing of Japanese 
assaults on Koreans and pervasive skirmishes between both peoples.  For instance, when two 
Korean men were assaulted on the streets and injured seriously by a group of seven Japanese 
men armed with swords and clubs, the Korean Peace-Preservation Corps immediately found and 
“arrested” the group in cooperation with the Japanese police.66  In the case of a violent clash 
between Korean and Japanese residents in Ueno City of Mie Prefecture, the actions taken by the 
Peace-Preservation Corps were more aggressive and problematic.  According to a Japanese local 
newspaper, the members of the Peace-Preservation Corps arrested a group of seven Japanese 
men without the presence of the Japanese police and “interrogated” them in the office of the 
local Korean League by using “violence.”  The Japanese police demanded to handle the case, but 
the members of the Peace-Preservation Corps refused to release the group of Japanese offenders.  
The Japanese police took forceful measures and instead arrested the fourteen Koreans in charge 
of the arrest and confinement of the Japanese offenders.
67
 
In fact, the activities of the Peace-Preservation Corps were posing a significant challenge 
to the weakened Japanese police.  The Occupation’s democratic reform and thorough 
disarmament of the Japanese repressive state dismantled the police regimentation of social life 
and diminished police power drastically.  A number of Japanese police officers left their job in 
the wake of defeat, and the loss reached 24.8 percent in 1946, which reflected, in the view of 
SCAP, the “low morale attributed generally to economic difficulties and probable ‘loss of face’ 
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suffered as a result of the defeat and purges.”68  Faced with the bold defiance of now-liberated 
peoples in Japan, police officers often showed a “reluctance to arrest Koreans and Chinese 
offenders” because of the “fear of stirring up those minority groups.”69  Moreover, the two SCAP 
directives issued on the same day of February 19, 1946 resulted in confusing the Japanese police 
about their authority over the Korean population in Japan.  The directive of SCAPIN 756 titled 
“Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction” declared that the Japanese government would “have no 
authority to arrest United Nations Nationals” except for special circumstances, and another 
directive declared the “review of sentences imposed upon Koreans and certain other nationals.”70  
These directives created discouragement and confusion among Japanese police officers in their 
dealings with Koreans who had been claiming that they were “liberated people” and even 
sometimes as “United Nations nationals.”   
Amidst the confusion and the disgrace of defeat, the Japanese government was struggling 
to retain its full jurisdiction and control over the Korean population in Japan.  During late 
January and early February 1946, Japanese policy-makers discussed problems concerning 
Koreans in Japan and agreed on the need to enforce aggressive actions such as the “deportation 
of lawless elements” and the “disbandment of lawless organizations.”71  On February 23, the 
Central Liaison Office of the Japanese government sent SCAP a memorandum titled “Prevention 
of Disputes between Koreans and Japanese, and Control of Unlawful Acts by Koreans.”  In the 
memorandum, the Japanese government made a request for the SCAP’s authorization to launch 
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the countermeasures that the Japanese government had planned, to “deport Koreans committing 
illegal acts.”72  On March 13, the Central Liaison Office sent another memorandum emphasizing:  
Recently their [Korean] unlawful acts by force in organized groups have occurred 
successively, causing a great uneasiness among the Japanese people, and the 
antagonism and frictions between the Koreans and the Japanese may likely to lead 
to the occurrence of an untoward event.
73
   
 
The Japanese government “did not stop at reporting in detail upon every misdemeanor 
actually perpetrated by Koreans,”74 and such reports – often made by the local police with 
exaggeration – were successful enough to convince SCAP of the necessity of the Japanese 
subjugation of now-liberated Koreans.  On March 26, a SCAP spokesperson contended in a press 
interview that no Korean organizations were authorized to conduct police activities or arrest 
Japanese citizens.  The spokesperson warned that those who committed such activities would be 
“punished by the Japanese government.”75  On April 24, SCAP also ordered the Korean League 
to disband its Peace-Preservation Corps,
76
 and the Korean League decided to follow the order.
77
  
Moreover, SCAP officially endorsed Japanese jurisdiction over Koreans in Japan.  On April 30, 
SCAP announced that the Japanese government would have “full authority to control Koreans 
[committing] acts of violence.”78 
 The SCAP’s authorization of Japanese jurisdiction over Koreans also spelled out a further 
setback for the Korean practice of liberation in Japan.  Inside SCAP, policy-makers began to 
blame the Korean League for the decrease in the number of Koreans choosing to return to Korea.  
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On May 28, the local Occupation authorities in Osaka reported to the Headquarters of the Eighth 
Army concerning the Korean League’s “interference” in repatriation.  The report said that the 
Korean League “played a decisive role in the bogging down of the repatriation of Koreans from 
Osaka-fu.”79  According to the Occupation officials in Osaka, members of the Korean League 
posted a notice on the wall of a post office in Osaka in order to convey their message to local 
Korean residents concerning the ongoing repatriation program.  The Occupation in Osaka 
problematized the following message in the notice as “interference,” which simply stressed that 
repatriation was not compulsory: 
Fellow Korean Nationals – we are free to return to our homeland at any time….  
It appears that Korean residing in Japan tend of late to be compelled in various 
districts to be repatriated.  However, so far as the repatriation problem of the 
Koreans in concerned, the Allied Headquarters has no right to compel or force us 
to be repatriated.  The above statements mean that Koreans are able to repatriate 
to Korea at their own accord.  [original English from the document] 
80
 
  
The Occupation authorities in Osaka arrested the total of twenty-six Koreans for an act 
“prejudicial to the interests of the Occupation Forces” and sent them to an Occupation’s provost 
court.
81
  The Occupation officials in Osaka even suggested that SCAP authorize the Japanese 
local governments to “deport to Korea, not repatriate, all persons who [had] been and [were] 
officers of the Chosen Ren Mei [the Korean League in Japan].”82  The Eighth Army took this 
“interference” seriously and recommended to SCAP that the Japanese government “be directed 
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to cease using the Korean Association in any manner in the repatriation program.”83  On June 14, 
SCAP instructed the Japanese government to take full responsibility of planning and 
implementing the repatriation of Koreans and warned that such responsibility would “not be 
delegated wholly or in part to any of the various Korean associations or societies.”84  
The series of those actions SCAP had taken in early 1946 – the disbandment of the 
Korean Peace-Preservation Corps, the authorization of Japanese jurisdiction over the liberated 
people of Koreans, and the exclusion of the Korean League from the repatriation program – 
signaled what the Korean legal status as Japanese national would mean in SCAP policy.  As I 
discussed in the previous section, SCAP policy-makers reached an agreement by May 1946 that 
Koreans remaining in Japan would be considered “for purpose of treatment … as retaining their 
Japanese nationality.”  This new policy emerged as the crystallization of the series of actions that 
SCAP had been taking against the Korean population’s claim of autonomy and different 
treatment as “liberated people.”  In other words, the reassertion of Koreans’ “Japanese 
nationality” was not only the “betrayal” of what Korean leaders in Korea had understood as 
“liberation” promised by the Allied Powers – the termination of Japanese sovereignty over 
Koreans and the “restoration” of deprived Korean sovereignty.  The reassertion of Japanese 
nationality also reflected the actual negation of what Koreans in Japan had demonstrated as 
liberation.   
If liberation was supposed to mean the “restoration” of deprived sovereignty in Korea, 
Koreans leaders in Japan struggled to realize it on Japanese soil on their own terms, through the 
creation of a space for autonomy and self-determination.  Korean vigilante activities represented 
the claim for sovereignty over Korean bodies.  Korean leaders organized the Peace-Preservation 
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Corps because “the untrustworthy and ineffectual Japanese police would not be able to guarantee 
the life and property of [Korean] brethren remaining in Japan.”85  The Peace-Preservation Corps 
exercised their power not only to protect Korean residents from racial violence but also to 
establish Korean self-governance by “arresting” and “punishing” fellow Korean offenders in lieu 
of the “untrustworthy” Japanese police.  Yet, for SCAP and the Japanese government, such 
practice of liberation among Koreans in Japan appeared simply as “lawlessness” or as “self-
granted extra-territoriality.”86  Soon, this incompatibility between Koreans and the Japanese and 
the Occupation authorities further developed and escalated over the schooling of Korean children, 
becoming a flashpoint of nascent cold war politics in Japan. 
 
Cold War Politicization of the “Korean Problem”  
Korean schools initially developed from small Korean language classes that intellectuals 
and local leaders voluntarily started across the country in the wake of Japan’s defeat.  Private 
residential houses or makeshift shanties were often turned into classrooms for schoolchildren to 
learn the Korean language, and the Korean League in Japan opened up their local offices for a 
classroom.  Soon, the Korean League started to take the lead in building a Korean educational 
institution by incorporating and developing individual Korean language classes into small 
schools.  Parents and local Korean League organizers invested everything they could to make 
their own schools and create opportunities for their children to learn the language and history of 
their own nation.
87
  The large majority of Korean children only understood Japanese, and even 
young Koreans who had been born in Korea and then migrated to Japan barely understood their 
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own national language due to their experience of colonial “assimilation,” the negation and 
Japanization of Koreaness.  Thus, “liberation” – or “decolonization” to paraphrase Franz Fanon – 
was the “veritable creation of new men,”88 and Korean parents and leaders put extreme 
enthusiasm into their education for creating a new personhood as the decolonized both politically 
and culturally. 
Koreans had to start literally from nothing for their own schooling, but they were 
determined to use whatever resources could be found within the community.  “With money from 
those with wealth, with might from those with strength, and with knowledge from those with 
wisdom,” parents and Korean League organizers devoted themselves to crafting their own 
education system, from building schools by their own efforts, finding and training teachers, and 
writing their own Korean school textbooks which had not even existed before.  By early 1946, 
the Korean League completed the first Korean language textbook “Korean Reader” and 
published and distributed it to Korean schools.  One Korean newspaper in Japan reported that the 
publication of the Korean Reader marked the first significant step for teaching with “true Korean 
spirit” those Korean children who had “grown up without learning how to speak and read Korean 
language.”89  Korean League primary schools defined their purposes of education as the 
cultivation of “national pride,” “democratic thoughts,” and skills to become a “true patriot” who 
would contribute to the “development of a democratic Korean state” and “world peace.”  Korean 
education was also aimed at “cleansing elements of Japanese imperialism and residues of 
feudalism.”90  By October 1946, the Korean League set up a total of 525 primary schools, 4 
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secondary schools and 12 youth schools across Japan, and schools had more than forty thousand 
students in total.
91
 
The rapid expansion of Korean schools across Japan posed to the authorities a question of 
how to deal with those non-Japanese schools that had been providing their own education outside 
the standard of Japanese education system.  After SCAP issued a warning statement on 
November 20 in 1946 that Koreans “refusing repatriation and electing to remain” in Japan would 
be subject to “all appropriate local laws and regulations,”92 Japanese authority over Korean 
schools emerged as an important issue within the Occupation.  The local Occupation authorities 
were particularly anxious about ambiguous Japanese law enforcement against Koreans.  The 
Occupation in Chūgoku district insisted that Korean schools were required to obtain permission 
from the Japanese government and had to use qualified teachers who had passed tests and 
screening.
93
  Moreover, the Occupation and Japanese authorities agreed that Korean school 
children were subject to Japanese compulsory education the same as Japanese children.
94
  
Requested by SCAP to enforce fully Japanese authority over the education of Koreans, the 
Japanese Ministry of Education drafted a directive clarifying the obligations of Korean schools 
and schoolchildren and issued it to local governors on January 24 in 1948.
95
  The directive 
defined: 
Koreans currently living in Japan must obey Japanese laws, according to the 
statement made by SCAP on November 20, 1946….  Therefore, Korean children 
of school age must attend either public or private primary and secondary schools 
according to their age as in the case of Japanese children. 
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Moreover, in accordance with the School Education Act, it is required to obtain 
permission from the local authorities (governor) in order to establish private 
primary or secondary schools.
96
 
  
The government announcement immediately evoked angry reactions from Koreans.  On 
February 16, the Korean League sent a protest to the Japanese Minister of Education and 
criticized the government for distorting the meaning of SCAP’s statement of November 20 in 
1946.  In its protest, the Korean League critiqued the rationale the Japanese government had 
made for justifying the Japanese compulsory education of Korean children.  According to the 
Korean League, the SCAP’s statement only admitted Japanese judicial authority over Koreans 
remaining in Japan, and the fact that Koreans were subject to Japanese laws would not also mean 
that Korean children were subject to Japanese compulsory education as well.  The Korean 
League also claimed that Koreans remaining in Japan held “Korean nationality.”97   
On the contrary, the Occupation authorities presented the Japanese education of Korean 
children as an issue of equal rights.  In its statement issued on April 23, a Tokyo Military 
Government Team Officer emphasized that Koreans in Japan were guaranteed their fundamental 
rights of enjoying “equal opportunities” and “equal treatment,” including “educational privileges 
in Japanese schools” – thus, the Japanese government had to “respect” their rights.98  Needless to 
say, it was not “equal rights” that the Occupation authorities were concerned about in dealing 
with Korean schools.  What was more important for the Occupation was their principle that 
Koreans remaining in Japan had to be subject to “all appropriate local laws and regulations.”  In 
other words, “equal opportunities” and “equal treatment” simply meant treating Koreans in Japan 
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in the same way as the Japanese, as defeated nationals – a situation which Koreans had been 
rejecting as the betrayal of Korean liberation.   
Simultaneously, the local Japanese and Occupation authorities started to take aggressive 
action against Korean schools not obeying the directive issued by the Japanese Ministry of 
Education and launched forcible closure on the ground.  According to a report sent by a Japanese 
official to SCAP, the local Occupation in Hyogo Prefecture told the prefectural governor on 
March 5 to carry out the “evacuation of public school houses now occupied by the Koreans as 
their school-houses” and to enforce “[the] attendance of Korean children of school age to public 
elementary schools or secondary schools or approved private schools.”  In Okayama Prefecture, 
when the Governor ordered Korean schools to close in early April, the local Occupation 
authorities even “came out very strong and went so far as to say that unless they were closed 
within 48 hours the responsible persons would be referred to the Provost Marshal.”99  Similar 
actions were taken in other prefectures, and Koreans organized mass protests against the forcible 
closure across Japan during March and April.
100
  In Yamaguchi Prefecture, crowds of some 
6,000 to 8,000 gathered at the Prefectural Office on the day after the Governor issued an order 
for the closure on March 29.  Carrying out the wishes of the demonstrators, Korean 
representatives and Japanese supporters negotiated with the Yamaguchi prefectural government 
and won the suspension of the closure.  The victory encouraged Korean struggles in other 
regions, particularly those in the Kansai region such Osaka and Kobe, which ended with the 
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Occupation’s exercise of anti-communist countermeasures and its first declaration of a “state of 
limited emergency.”101 
On April 23, Korean residents in Osaka held protest rallies at eight municipal offices, and 
later some seven thousand demonstrators gathered together in the park near the Osaka 
Prefectural Office.  Representatives from the Korean League visited the Prefectural Office and 
requested a meeting with the Governor.  While representatives were negotiating for the meeting, 
a few hundreds demonstrators crowded into the Prefectural Office and staged sit-ins inside the 
Office building.  Soon, some three thousand police officers seized the building and dragged out 
the demonstrators.  The police arrested 179 demonstrators, including 9 Japanese participants.   
Next day in Kobe City, Hyogo Prefecture adjacent to Osaka, some five thousand Korean 
demonstrators gathered at the plaza in front of the Hyogo Prefectural Office, and a crowd of two 
hundred Koreans stormed into the Office demanding to meet and negotiate with the Governor.  
According to a report sent to SCAP by the Japanese government, “[a] call was made to the City 
Police, but within twenty minutes the Koreans had broken through the door and completely 
demolished all the furniture and cut off all communication with the outside.”  Soon, three U.S. 
military police officers came into the Office trying to rescue the Governor besieged by the crowd 
of Koreans.  When one officer pulled his gun, “Koreans defied him to shoot.”102  The three U.S. 
officers gave up taking the Governor and left the building.  The Governor succumbed and 
accepted Koreans’ request that the local government withdraw the order to close Korean schools, 
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grant Korean schools the status of a special school, and release those Koreans who had been 
arrested during previous demonstrations.   
The Occupation regarded those Korean demonstrations in Osaka and Kobe as the 
“activities inimical to the Occupation” and decided to launch direct “police action” by U.S. 
troops.  In the night after Korean demonstrators left the Hyogo Prefectural Office, the U.S. 
Commander of the Kobe Base declared a “state of limited emergency” in the Kobe area.  In lieu 
of the local Japanese government, U.S. Tactical Troops took the command of the Japanese 
police,
103
 and U.S. soldiers and Japanese police officers started to search and arrest Koreans 
indiscriminately – they arrested whoever identified as Koreans.104  Some Japanese were also 
arrested, including seven Japanese Communist Party members.
105
  According to a report later 
made by a SCAP official, “[f]rom the night of April 24 to April 27 about 2000 Koreans were 
taken into custody, the majority of them during the first twenty-four hours.”106  Moreover, the 
local Occupation and Japanese police took heavy-handed measures against a Korean mass 
protest rally held in the park near the Osaka Prefectural Office on April 26.  The Japanese police 
forcibly dispersed the demonstrators with water cannons and even fired on the crowd.  A sixteen-
year-old Korean young man was shot to death, and some twenty-three demonstrators were also 
severely injured.
107
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SCAP diplomatic official William J. Sebald pointed out the “unfortunate timeliness of the 
recent disturbances.”  The development of Korean protests against the closure marked an 
“unfortunate” event concurrent with spreading anti-U.S. protests in the Korean peninsula.108  In 
Korea, a general election plan that USAMGIK had pushed forward for establishing a separate 
regime in the U.S.-occupied south sparked massive anti-election movements in early 1948.  The 
South Korean Worker’s Party (SKWP) called for “national salvation struggles” (kuguk t’ujaeng) 
protesting against UN preparation for the election in the south and organized a general strike on 
February 7.  In Cheju Island, leftists organized anti-election mass rallies on March 1, and the 
Occupation’s violent suppression fomented serious tensions between the local state and society, 
which exploded into the popular uprisings in April.  Moreover, rightist and leftist political 
leaders from the south and north held joint conferences in Pyongyang in Soviet-occupied north 
Korea during mid- and late April, demonstrating against what USAMGIK was enforcing in the 
south.
109
  Indeed, as Japanese historian Ara Takashi has discussed by examining the 
Occupation’s internal documents of April 10 1948, Eighth Army officials in Japan worried that 
mounting anti-Occupation struggles in south Korea might provoke Korean dissidents in Japan 
into creating similar disturbances against the Occupation in Japan.
110
 
Eighth Army officials in Japan understood and denounced the Korean mass 
demonstrations in Kobe and Osaka as “riots” linked with the Communist offensive in the Korean 
peninsula.  In the press interview held in Kobe City on April 26, General Robert L. Eichelberger 
of the Eighth Army described those Korean demonstrations as “uncivilized,” “Communist-
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inspired” riots.111  General Charles A. Willoughby of the Intelligence Section repeated the same 
characterization – “Communists instigated riots” – and even stated that Koreans were “really 
dangerous.”112  An Eighth Army Intelligence official more explicitly pushed forward the view of 
international Communist conspiracy, telling the press: “I am convinced that Communists are 
behind these disorders, just as they are in southern Korea.  The school dispute is a pretext.”113  
The Japanese government also spotlighted the same story.  The Japanese national police 
headquarters pointed out that “Communists had been instructed to step up demonstrations in 
Japan and to reach a climax with a big rally in Tokyo, May 10, simultaneously with the Korean 
voting.
114
   
The disputes over Korean education in early 1948 marked a critical watershed in 
Occupation policy toward Koreans in Japan.  Policy-makers both in Washington and Japan 
began to approach the so-called “Korean problem” in Japan through the lens of cold war politics.  
Apparently, the “recent riots” in Kobe and Osaka had convinced one State Department official of 
the view that “a sizable Korean minority in Japan [was] undesirable” since the Korean minority 
was, “[p]oorly educated, emotionally unstable, and politically immature, they are an easy prey to 
Communist machinations.”115  A SCAP diplomat in Kobe also wrote in a similar vein about the 
Korean population in Kobe after the demonstration: 
They are of a low type generally, poorly educated and include among their 
number a high percentage of thugs and roughnecks.  Moreover, they harbor a 
virulent hatred of the Japanese who, while they had the opportunity, treated the 
Koreans in a most cavalier manner.  This large, boisterous and dissatisfied, alien 
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group in the population of the city is an easy prey to organizers and agitators.  
They are known to include among their leaders a number of communists and 
quasi-communists who probably receive instructions from Northern Korea or, if 
not that closely associated, certainly follow the party line.
116
 
 
  Under such a lens of cold war politics – with the typical attendant racial stigma – the 
Korean population in Japan simply appeared as either passive or irrationally vengeful people 
ready to be exploited by Communists.  What this sort of characterization left out was a 
fundamental question of why so many Koreans stood up in Kobe, Osaka, and other regions as 
well.  Korean protests against the forcible closure of Korean schools developed through their 
continuous struggles to create a space for certain autonomy and self-determination as a liberated 
people in defeated Japan.  Koreans remaining in Japan devoted themselves more than anything to 
building their own education system, and the spread of Korean schools across Japan symbolized 
their enthusiasm for political and cultural decolonization.  Korean struggles for self-
determination, or diasporic nationalism, was now simply understood by Occupation policy-
makers as Communist political manipulation through their lens of cold war politics.   By the 
same token, the suppression of Korean minority’s diasporic nationalism now became justified 
through cold war political rhetoric.     
 Moreover, the violent crackdowns on Koreans in Osaka and Kobe areas were a critical 
event that had, in the words of the SCAP diplomat in Kobe, “greatly strengthened the position of 
Japanese police and enhanced their prestige.”117  Since Japan’s defeat, the government and police 
had been striving to regain their lost authority and control over the Korean minority population, 
and the Korean school disputes in April 1948 became a watershed moment for the Japanese 
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police.  Under the “state of limited emergency” declared by the Occupation, the Japanese police 
were empowered to take heavy-handed measures against Koreans and flexed their muscles while 
working together with U.S. soldiers under the Occupation’s direct “police action.”  Furthermore, 
the event of April 1948 also became an “opportunity” for the U.S. Occupation troops to “test the 
efficacy of [their] plans for dealing with public disorders” in the words of the same SCAP 
diplomat in Kobe.  He continued:  
This has been accomplished without a major mishap.  The only casualty suffered 
by the Occupation forces was one colored military policeman who was wounded 
by a second during a midnight chase after a fugitive Korean.
118
 
 
 The U.S. Commander at Kobe Base had mobilized the so-called “Negro troops” for this 
“state of limited emergency.”  African-American soldiers and Japanese police forces worked side 
by side on the streets to put down Korean dissidents, described by the SCAP diplomat as the 
“most disturbing and unruly alien element in Kobe.”  Indeed, their successful joint operation 
became a timely showcase for U.S. muscle flexing amidst the emerging global cold war 
confrontation, and the “Negro troops” appeared in the center of the spotlight.  The U.S. major 
news media and some African-American newspapers published an Associated Press (AP) report 
on the Kobe incident by highlighting the use of the “American Negro troops” and their success in 
crushing “red riots” in Japan.119  According the AP report, General Eichelberger lavished the 
black unit with high praise – “a darned good outfit – full of good soldiers; I’m proud of them.”  
Eichelberger also told the press: “[T]he use of Negro troops was not resented, as no color line 
exists in Japan” (my emphasis).120  
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Against the backdrop of the “Negro problem” fast becoming America’s “Achilles’ heel” 
in the cold war propaganda battle with the Soviet Union, Eichelberger’s insistence that the Kobe 
incident evidenced the absence of a “color line” in Japan revealed the real preoccupations of the 
U.S. occupation forces.  The Soviet Union was ready to capitalize on negative images of 
American racial discrimination for its propaganda battle in the Third World, and “race” emerged 
as a crucial ideological component in the U.S. pursuit of global hegemony and anti-communist 
alignment.  This drove the Truman administration to determined efforts to present different 
stories of American race relations and also reshape Asian and African perceptions of the U.S. 
government’s treatment of racial minorities.121  In fact, a report sent by SCAP diplomat Sebald to 
the Secretary of State soon after the Kobe incident showed that U.S. Occupation policy-makers 
also shared such concern over how the world would perceive the U.S. handling of race relations 
in Japan.  In his long report of May 1948 titled “Status of Koreans in Japan,” Sebald presented 
the significance of the “Korean problem in Japan” by emphasizing:  
Any failure to resolve a minority problem of this sort would undoubtedly have 
unfortunate effects on United States foreign policy and might readily provide 
opportunity for subversive forces to exploit the situation to their own ends.”122   
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A radical critique of the Occupation’s handling of the minority problem in the event of 
Kobe did not come from the Soviet Union or “subversive forces” as Sebald worried.  It came 
from one American man living in New York City.  Thomas R. Jones, a reader of the African-
American newspaper New York Amsterdam News, wrote a letter to the editor concerning the 
Kobe incident and condemned the Occupation’s “use of Negro troops to attack the Koreans” as a 
“deliberate and provocative act.”123  His critique attempted to present what the race relations 
represented by Eichelberger as “no color line” actually manifested in relation to American race 
problems.  Such transpacific critical view of American racism was most probably the one thing 
that was touching a nerve in U.S. cold war warriors.         
In his letter to the editor, Jones argued that what had happened in Kobe, the event hailed 
by the Occupation as the swift suppression of “red riots,” deserved to “be denounced by true 
democrats everywhere.”  Although it was “so cavalierly presented to the American people as a 
just exercise of occupation authority,” Jones understood that what the event of Kobe actually 
manifested was “the denial of elementary democracy to the Korean minority in Japan” who had 
been “recently enslaved by the Japanese warlords and industrialists.”  He believed that the use of 
the black unit was aimed at fueling “antagonisms and hatred” between “the oppressed Koreans” 
and “the oppressed Negro people.”  Such attempt of racial estrangement was also equivalent to 
the “plan of American big business” to prevent those two “oppressed nationalities” from 
developing solidarity as they would “strive to liberate themselves.”  In his view, moreover, the 
suppression of Korean minority’s “just demands” for the use of their own national language not 
only resembled the “fascist tactic” that the “Nazis” had used before.  It also constituted an 
extension of the ongoing racial oppression in the United States.  Jones claimed: 
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We must see the calloused attitude of MacArthur’s lieutenants in Japan as a threat 
to our own liberties as well as an extension of the un-American policy in our own 
country toward Negroes, Indians, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans and the Chinese 
people.
124
 
 
What Jones saw in the event of Kobe was the cold war politicization of race that was 
taking place in U.S. society during 1947 and 1948.  As anti-communist zeal surged in Congress 
and the Truman administration in 1947, American segregationists took advantage of anti-
communist rhetoric to suppress black radicals.  Radical critiques of American race relations 
began to be stigmatized and marginalized as “reds” and “un-American,” or “Communist front.”  
The Civil Rights Congress was one of many examples of an organization labeled as “red” by the 
House Un-American Activities Committee, the public nerve center of anti-communism within 
the U.S. government.
125
  Race became closely associated with the discourse of the cold war 
within the context of U.S. domestic politics, in the same manner as the Korean minority question 
in Japan did so under U.S./Allied occupation.  In other words, the Kobe incident, where U.S. 
Occupation troops launched a direct crackdown on Korean diasporic nationalism as “red riots,” 
revealed the coterminous and constitutive process of the cold war politicization of American race 
relations – or an “extension of the un-American policy” toward occupied-Japan as Jones 
understood. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter examined how the ambiguity in Washington’s definition of the status of 
Koreans in Japan – “liberated people” and “enemy nationals” – developed into a primary site of 
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tensions and conflicts between the victors, vanquished and liberated.  Controversies over whether 
the liberated Koreans in Japan would still retain Japanese nationality evoked fierce anger and a 
sense of betrayal among Koreans toward the American victors who had liberated them.  The 
controversies revealed an insurmountable question and inconsistency within U.S. policy-makers, 
between U.S. Occupations in Korea and Japan, in articulating how to define the liberation of 
Korea – Does Korea still remain “a part of Japan” in a legal sense until a future peace treaty?  Do 
Koreans thereby retain Japanese nationality until then?  Furthermore, the controversies also 
brought to the surface long-enduring historical discrepancies over the legitimacy of the Japan-
Korea “annexation” treaties – the original sin of Japanese colonial rule – which had been 
endorsed by the United States and other imperialist forces at that time.  Korean leaders 
maintained the firm stance that the annexation treaties were signed by force and thus null and 
void from the beginning – and thus liberation meant the “restoration” of deprived sovereignty in 
Korea.  Later, the question of whether the annexation treaties signed during 1905 and 1910 had 
been legitimate or not emerged as an unbridgeable gap between South Korean and Japanese 
governments working on possible rapprochement. 
In other words, how to define the legal status of Koreans in Japan represented how to 
understand the meaning and scope of Korean liberation, and zainichi Korean leaders defined and 
demonstrated it through their practice of self-determination on Japanese soil.  Zainichi Korean 
vigilante activities claimed their authorities over Korean affairs – or sovereignty over Korean 
bodies – and refused Japanese police interference.  Local Korean leaders built Korean schools 
and education system to teach the language and history of their own nation, devoting themselves 
to the creation of a new decolonized (“de-Japanized”) personhood.  The Koreans in Japan 
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established a certain autonomy and the space of liberation on their own terms, although SCAP 
and the Japanese government immediately eviscerated their “liberated people” status. 
In a sense, the betrayal of liberation took place simultaneously both in U.S./Allied-
occupied Japan and U.S.-occupied Korea.  SCAP started acting deliberately with the aim of 
undermining zainichi Korean practice of liberation in early 1946, by disbanding the Korean 
Peace-Preservation Corps, authorizing Japanese jurisdiction over the liberated people of Koreans, 
and prohibiting the Korean League in Japan from engaging in the Korean repatriation program.  
In Korea, it was the time period when the U.S. Occupation had almost completely overturned the 
indigenous “regime of liberation” and forged a new unpopular order.  In the fall of 1946, sheer 
disillusionment with the promise of liberation also came as a surprise to Koreans in Japan when 
SCAP announced that Koreans remaining in Japan would retain Japanese nationality, while in 
Korea such disillusionment was already manifesting itself in violent uprisings across southern 
Korea.  In Japan, the climax of this serial betrayal was the Korean education disputes of early 
1948, where zainichi Korean persistent claims for autonomy and self-determination ended with 
the violent crushing of demonstrators by SCAP who had understood and framed them as “red 
riots” linked with the Communist anti-election offensive in south Korea. 
The Korean education disputes marked a critical convergence of the U.S. global cold war 
and Japanese “postcolonial” politics at the site of Korean liberation in Japan.  Occupation policy-
makers began framing zainichi Korean struggles for self-determination as a kind of Communist 
political manipulation.  The Occupation policy-makers also started to use anti-communism as a 
rationale for suppressing Korean minority’s diasporic nationalism.  The Japanese government 
and police who had been striving to regain their lost control over formerly colonized subjects 
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took advantage of the “limited state of emergency” during the disputes in strengthening and 
demonstrating their power and authority over Koreans in Japan.   
Moreover, what this cold war politicization of the “Korean problem” – or the Occupation 
policy-makers’ conflation of Korean minority’s racial politics (diasporic nationalism) with 
international communism – actually epitomized was the cold war politicization of American race 
relations.  Race became closely associated with the discourse of the cold war in a twofold 
manner within the context of U.S. domestic politics.  On one hand, the Truman administration 
and segregationists targeted and marginalized radical critiques of American race relations by 
stigmatizing them as “reds” and “un-American.”  At the same time, the Truman administration 
also took the initiative to reform race problems in U.S. society for the purpose of a cold war 
ideological battle.  Fighting against domestic racial discrimination emerged as integral part of 
cold war foreign policy to forge a multi-racial global anti-communist alliance against the Soviet 
Union.  The President Truman’s Executive Order 9981 of July 1948, a historic order stipulating 
desegregation in the U.S. military, was the most significant showcase for Truman’s commitment 
to racial equality.  Placed in this historical context, what happened in occupied-Japan in April 
1948 shows a different picture of race and the cold war.  The Occupation’s use of the black unit 
against “red riots” – and the General Eichelberger’s remarks of “no color line” – appears as if it 
symbolized the shifting political ground of race in the early cold war. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Containing Zainichi Korean Leftists: 
 The “Reverse Course,” Japanese and South Korean Anti-Communist Regimes, 
and the “Korean Problem” in Japan 
 
 
 
Introduction 
There is a strange phenomenon of frightening retrogression in the recent social landscape in Japan, which is 
completely distinct from the progressive mood that has sprung up in the wake of the establishment of the new 
constitution. 
—Editorial, “Reflecting on the ‘Reverse Course,’” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 15, 1951. 
 
Interviewer: When we look at our present and our past trajectory after liberation, it appears as if systems and 
institutions of our country are returning to the Japanese colonial period.  What do you think?   
Vice President: Of course, it should be.  Our nation is a backward country [hujin kukka].  How can we model 
ourselves after advanced nations such as the United States or Great Britain whose lifestyle is different from 
ours?  We have customs we have lived with before, so it is natural that we use things from the Japanese 
colonial period a lot.  What is wrong with Japanese things?  Isn’t it all right if those are useful for us? 
—An Interview with the South Korean Vice President Yi Siyŏng (early 1949)1 
 
[T]here exists a very strong distrust of the feasibility at this stage of bringing Koreans and Japanese into direct 
discussion.  It has been tried at various times, with unfortunate results. 
—SCAP Internal Memorandum, February 17, 1950.2  
 
On November 2, 1951, one of the major Japanese newspapers Yomiuri Shimbun 
published a column series titled “reverse course” (gyaku kōsu).  The series, which appeared 
almost every day on a Yomiuri page and completed its twenty-fifth episode on December 2, 
illuminated a growing trend of what Yomiuri described as the “revival” of various “things from 
the wartime era and before” (senzen mono) in Japan.  Yomiuri asserted, “We are living in the 
                                                 
1
 “Yi Siyŏng put’ongnyŏng kwa ponsa sajang Cho Sangwŏn ssi wa ŭi siguk taedamgi,” Kŏn’guk kongnon (February 
1, 1949), p.5, cited from Kwŏn T’aeŏk, “Kundaehwa, tonghwa, singminji yusan,” Han’guksa yŏn’gu 108 (March 
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the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State) National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, 
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middle of the ‘reverse course’ period.”3  In late 1951, when the U.S./Allied occupation of Japan 
was about to end, many Japanese were witnessing “things” re-entering their everyday life that 
were reminiscent of the ancien régime during and before World War II, from local customs and 
popular culture to political and social institutions.  On November 15, Yomiuri also published an 
editorial titled “Reflecting on the ‘Reverse Course’” and called attention to the recent 
“frightening retrogression” in society which differed completely from the previous “progressive 
mood” (kakushin teki kibun) that had sprung up in the wake of the establishment of the new 
constitution in 1947.
4
 
 Although the term “reverse course” was initially presented by Yomiuri to designate the 
widespread “revival” of “things” reminiscent of pre-defeat Japan, scholars have been using this 
concept for the analysis of U.S./Allied occupation policy in Japan.
5
  Historians of postwar Japan 
and U.S.-Japan relations once engaged in heated debates on how to define the shift of emphasis 
in occupation policy, the shift of its objectives from the initial “demilitarization” and 
“democratization” of defeated Japan toward economic recovery and possible rearmament.  While 
the majority of scholars both in the United States and Japan now agree to call this particular shift 
in U.S. occupation policy “reverse course,” the meaning of “reverse course” is not necessarily 
the same in Japanese and U.S. academia.  In Japanese academic narratives, the “reverse course” 
                                                 
3
 Yomiuri Shimbun, November 2, 1951. 
4
 Yomiuri Shimbun, November 15, 1951. 
5
 On scholarly debates about the “reverse course,” see Pītā Furosuto [Peter K. Frost], “Nihon senryō ni okeru ‘gyaku 
kōsu,’” in Rei Mūa [Ray A. Moore] ed., Tennō ga baiburu o yonda hi (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1982); Carol Gluck, 
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American-East Asian Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Howard B. Schonberger, “William 
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1993); Takano Kazumoto, “Nihon senryō kenkyū ni okeru ‘gyaku kōsu,’” Chūō Daigaku hōgaku kenkyūka 
daigakuin kenkyū nenpō 15, I-1 (1986); Ogura Yūji, “Makkāsā to Nihon Kyōsantō: senryō seisaku no renzokusei no 
kanten,” in Akazawa Shirō, ed., Ajia no gekihen to sengo Nihon (Tokyo: Gendai Shiryō Shuppan, 1998); Myōjin 
Isao, “Senryōshi kenkyū to ‘gyaku kōsu’ gainen: Furosuto setsu no ronpyō o chūshin ni,” Kushiro ronshū 35 
(November 2003); Hans Martin Krämer, “Just Who Reversed the Course? The Red Purge in the Higher Education 
during the Occupation of Japan,” Social Science Japan Journal 8, 1 (November 2004). 
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signifies a series of setbacks in “democratic revolution” initiated by the Occupation authorities 
(SCAP) in the immediate postwar months.  Some Japanese scholars trace the origins of the 
“reverse course” to MacArthur’s prohibition of the general strike in February 1947 and view its 
climax in the so-called “red purge” offensives during 1949 and 1950, the Japanese version of 
“McCarthyism.”6  In other words, the “reverse course” is understood as a continuum of turning 
points and a process of escalating social suppression enforced by SCAP or through collaboration 
between SCAP and the Japanese government.    
On the other hand, U.S. academic narratives mostly concern the shift in Washington’s 
policy toward occupied Japan during 1947 and 1948.  As U.S. scholars have demonstrated, the 
Washington’s revision of occupation policy was an outcome of the U.S. global policy of 
communist “containment” represented by the Truman Doctrine of early 1947.7  The containment 
of communist expansion emerged as the primary agenda for the reconstruction of the postwar 
global political economy, and Washington policy-planners, such as George Kennan and Dean 
Acheson, envisioned Germany and Japan as regional pivots for the recovery of the world 
capitalist economy and the balance of power against Soviet expansion.  On October 9, 1948, the 
Truman administration officially adopted the National Security Council’s proposal titled 
“Recommendations with Respect to U.S. Policy toward Japan” (NSC 13/2), which emphasized 
                                                 
6
 On the Japanese side of narratives, see Gluck, “Entangling Illusions: Japanese and American Views of the 
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7
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“economic recovery” as the “primary objective” of U.S. occupation policy in Japan other than 
“U.S. security interests.”8    
For a synthesis of those two separate narratives, Japanese historian Nakamura Masanori 
proposes formulating the “reverse course” as the convergence between a series of political 
setbacks in U.S.-occupied Japan and the shift of Washington’s occupation policy toward Japan in 
late 1948.
9
  Nakamura understands that the Washington’s revision of occupation policy was 
institutionalized into the “regime of reverse course” (gyaku kōsu taisei) once it intersected with 
the emergence of a strong Japanese conservative regime in early 1949.  Nakamura particularly 
emphasizes the significance of the landslide victory of Yoshida Shigeru’s conservative party in 
the House of the Representatives election in January 1949, which enabled Yoshida to form the 
first solid single-party administration (the “third Yoshida Cabinet”) in postwar Japan.  In other 
words, the anti-communist Yoshida administration emerged as a crucial “collaborator” for the 
Washington’s new policy.  Moreover, Nakamura pays attention to the agency of the occupied.  
He argues that Yoshida took advantage of the shift in occupation policy for his efforts to “rectify 
the excess” of radical democratic reforms initially pushed forward by SCAP.  In short, the 
Washington’s new policy converged with Japanese conservative “rollback” politics through the 
Yoshida administration participating as an indigenous “collaborator.”10   
This chapter reconceptualizes Nakamura’s idea of “regime of reverse course” by framing 
it as a critical constituent of what historian Steven Hugh Lee has characterized as U.S. “informal 
                                                 
8
 NSC 13/2 reproduced in Foreign Relations of the Unites States 1948, vol. VI (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1974), pp.857-862.  (Henceforth, FRUS.) 
9
 Nakamura Masanori, “Senryō towa nandattanoka,” pp.232-240.   
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empire” building in Asia.11  According to Lee, what became an “integral part of America’s 
global strategy of containment” was the making of “pro-Western governments” and anti-
communist allies of indigenous “collaborators.”  Through his analysis of U.S. foreign policy 
toward Korea and Vietnam, Lee argues that the United States attempted to “influence” both 
international and domestic affairs in the Third World through “informal mechanisms” rather than 
“formal colonial control.”  The “relatively independent” and also “interdependent” local actors 
on the communist perimeter were expected to play significant roles in containing communist 
expansion “without direct American involvement or expenditure of resources.”12  By 
incorporating both Nakamura’s and Lee’s theorizations, I posit the “regime of reverse course” 
during 1949 as a transnationally linked political process of communist containment under U.S. 
informal empire.  To put it differently, I reformulate Nakamura’s “regime of reverse course” as 
the transnational regime of communist containment where relatively independent indigenous 
“collaborators” interacted and negotiated with each other and with the United States against 
communist expansion in and beyond their own lands.   
In order to illuminate the formation of the transnational regime of communist 
containment, this chapter examines how Japanese Yoshida Shigeru and South Korean Syngman 
Rhee administrations, the two “collaborators” in the U.S. cold war strategy of containment in 
Asia, forged anti-communist regimes.  At the same time, I analyze how the two administrations 
addressed the problem of the growing zainichi Korean (Koreans-in-Japan) leftist forces linked 
with the North Korean regime and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP).  Although a close 
political alignment between Japanese and South Korean governments emerged as an urgent task 
for the U.S. remaking of the regional order in East Asia after the so-called “loss of China,” the 
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 Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 
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two governments approached this alignment with their respective – and ultimately conflicting – 
interests.  This chapter argues that the “Korean problem” in Japan became a sort of litmus test for 
the political alignment between anti-communist governments in the former colony and metropole.  
I explore how their mutual collaboration and friction over communist containment developed in 
the locus of the “Korean problem” in Japan. 
In addition to the transnational relationship of anti-communist regimes in Japan and 
South Korea, this chapter also pays attention to the temporal continuity between the South 
Korean anti-communist regime and the previous Japanese colonial regime in Korea.  I argue that 
the political and social trend that Yomiuri Shimbun characterized as “frightening retrogression” 
toward the past was not necessarily a unique phenomenon peculiar to Japan during the early cold 
war.  In South Korea, what Yomiuri called “things of the wartime and before” in late 1951 had 
already reemerged through the postcolonial “mimicry” or the Rhee administration’s 
reformulation of Japanese colonial system – although some colonial apparatuses like the 
overdeveloped police system had been preserved and reinforced much earlier by the U.S. Army 
Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK).  In early 1949, when asked about similarities 
between past (colonial) and present domestic institutions in South Korea, Vice President Yi 
Siyŏng responded: “What is wrong with Japanese things?  Isn’t it all right if those are useful for 
us?”13  I demonstrate in this chapter that the Rhee administration was indeed dusting off colonial 
legal-governmental devices which were “useful” for the government in order to crack down hard 
on both leftists and non-leftist dissidents.   
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The Formation of the Transnational Regime of Communist Containment 
If early 1947 marked a decisive turning point in U.S. foreign policy as represented by the 
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, 1948 was a year that heralded the U.S. global 
containment of communist expansion through military or economic commitment.  Congress 
passed the Marshall Plan, or officially the European Recovery Program, in April, and the U.S. 
government set up the Economic Cooperation Administration to stabilize the global capitalist 
economy through U.S. economic aid.  Simultaneously, the U.S. government started to negotiate 
with Canada and European countries to form a military alliance against Soviet expansion (and 
also the revival of German nationalism) and signed the North Atlantic Treaty with twelve nations 
in April 1949. 
In Asia, the escalation of the civil war in China and the subsequent Nationalist defeat 
during 1948 changed, in the words of historian Bruce Cumings, “the East Asian context of 
American policy profoundly.”14  Washington’s foreign policy toward Korea transformed into the 
“de facto containment” in Korea that USAMGIK had already been enforcing on the ground since 
the beginning of occupation, and Washington proceeded the making of an anti-communist 
regime in the south.
15
  The 38
th
 parallel on the Korean peninsula, the line that the United States 
and Soviet Union had initially drawn as a temporary demarcation between U.S. and Soviet 
military occupation, now turned into the frontline of U.S.-Soviet global cold war confrontation.  
Simultaneously, Japan emerged as a crucial regional bulwark for U.S. new strategy of global 
containment against communist expansion in Asia.  Washington shifted its occupation policy 
from initial “democratization” and “demilitarization” toward economic recovery and future 
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remilitarization, and SCAP and the Japanese government ratcheted up their heavy-handed 
polices toward labor and social movements.   
The regime of communist containment was soon established in Japan through the SCAP-
Yoshida collaboration during 1949.  With the support of SCAP, the newly formed Yoshida 
administration aggressively worked to undermine the Japanese Communist Party.  During mid-
1949, the Yoshida administration carried out the massive layoff of public employees, specifically 
targeting Communist and leftist union members.  This layoff was also the Yoshida 
administration’s efforts to enforce the austerity plan that SCAP had imposed in accordance with 
Washington’s new occupation policy of economic stabilization.  More importantly, the 
government’s anti-communist offensive with this large-scale layoff of public employees spelled 
out what would later be called “red purge” offensives.  During 1949 and 1950, the Japanese 
government and big business orchestrated, under SCAP’s supervision, the extensive elimination 
of Communists and alleged Communist sympathizers from the media, universities, public 
schools and the shop floor.
16
  The Yoshida administration also issued the Organization Control 
Ordinance (Dantai Tō Kiseirei) in April 1949 with the aim of cracking down and possibly 
disbanding “anti-democratic organizations.”17  The Korean League in Japan became the first 
main target of compulsory dissolution in September, as I discuss later in this chapter.    
Likewise, the South Korean Syngman Rhee administration reinforced the 
“Koreanization” of the anti-communist political landscape that Americans had already forged 
through the three-year occupation.  Unlike the Yoshida administration in occupied Japan, the 
Rhee administration was expected to accomplish regime consolidation by its own efforts, 
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through U.S. military and economic aid after the occupation.  In fact, the Rhee administration 
had to manage different crises that periled its survival during 1948 and 1949, as the government 
was faced with the leftist guerrilla warfare, border conflicts along the 38
th
 parallel, and the 
withdrawal of U.S. occupation troops by June 1949.     
On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established amidst the political 
and economic turmoil.  The Cheju popular uprisings of April 1948 had escalated into prolonged 
guerrilla struggles after USAMGIK sent counterinsurgency forces to the island.  Most of the 
villages located on the interior of the island were controlled by leftist guerrilla groups by early 
June 1948.  The guerrillas also had sabotaged the national assembly election of May 10 – among 
the three electoral districts, the two had not reached effective voting rates and thus 
representatives had not been elected.
18
  In mid-October, another popular uprising started from a 
rebellion within a unit of the ROK Army in South Chŏlla Province.  In mid-November, U.S. 
Ambassador John Muccio described the Syngman Rhee administration as an “incompetent 
government without strong public support and adequate security forces,” which would not be 
able to sustain itself without the “continued presence [of] United States occupation troops.”19  
Furthermore, chronic inflation in the economy posed a serious challenge to the political and 
social stabilization of the nascent anti-communist regime.
20
  By early 1950, Washington policy-
planners were concerned that the inflation might develop into an imminent internal threat to 
                                                 
18
 For English language studies on the Cheju insurgency, see John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the 
War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989), pp.55-83; Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War Volume II, 
pp.250-259.  There are numerous Korean language studies on this issue.  For instance, see Ko Ch’anghun, “4.3 
minjung hangjaeng ŭi chŏngae wa sŏngkyŏk,” in Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi insik 4 (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1989), pp.245-340; 
Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Ch’wijaeban, 4.3 ŭn marhanda, 1,2,3 (Seoul: Chŏnyewŏn, 1994-1995). 
19
 Muccio to Secretary of State (November 12, 1948,) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/11-1248, FRUS 1948, vol. VI, 
p.1326. 
20
 Secretary of State to Embassy in Korea (December 30, 1949), 895.50 Recovery/11-1449, FRUS 1949, vol.VII 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1976), p.1112-1113.  Also see Pak T’aegyun, “Miguk ŭi 
taehan kyŏngje puhŭng chŏngch’aek ŭi sŏngkyŏk, 1948-1950,” Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil 27 (March 1998), pp.76-111. 
  
198 
 
South Korea, as it did to Nationalist China where the inflation “contributed even more than the 
military inertia to bringing about the Nationalist downfall.”21   
As the Cheju guerrilla fighting progressed, another insurgency shook the Rhee 
administration more profoundly.  On October 19, 1948, leftist elements that had infiltrated the 
Fourteenth regiment of the ROK Army rose up in rebellion, refusing to embark for a 
counterinsurgency mission against guerrillas in Cheju Island.  By the following day, the rebels 
seized control of the port city Yŏsu and the town of Sunch’ŏn, and the rebellion spread through 
other areas in South Chŏlla Province.  Members of the underground South Korean Worker’s 
Party (SKWP) and local residents joined the rebellion and restored town people’s committees.  
Soon, rebels and people’s committees took over local government offices and courts.  The people 
committees held “people’s courts” and put captured policemen, government officials, landlords 
and members of rightist organizations on trial.  In Yŏsu City, 72 policemen and 16 others were 
executed by October 24.  There were also a number of popular reprisals against policemen and 
rightist members, particularly those who had supported the separate regime building in the south.  
The people’s committee in Yŏsu City also declared its revolutionary objectives, and among them 
was the task of “destroying the Syngman Rhee separate regime preparing to sell our [Korean] 
homeland to American Imperialism.”22 
This insurgency struck fear into the heart of the Rhee administration, and the government 
immediately mobilized almost all available troops for a counterinsurgency attack.
23
  The ROK 
military troops, under the direct control of the U.S. military in Korea, subdued rebels and carried 
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out on-the-spot executions, killing a number of local residents as “communist sympathizers.”24  
Simultaneously, the Rhee administration launched the intensive social control and containment 
of dissidents by dusting off colonial legal-governmental devices.  On December 1, the 
government enacted the National Security Act, which was almost identical replication of the 
notorious colonial legal device of Japanese “Peace Preservation Law” that had criminalized 
communist movements and colonial independence struggles.
25
  The National Security Act 
prohibited any anti-government action, and the government used this new legal weapon for 
arresting a total of 118,621 suspects during 1949.  A Korean scholar estimates that about eighty 
percent of criminals imprisoned during 1949 were “leftists.”26  In April 1949, the government 
also implemented the so-called “National Guidance Alliance” (Kungmin Podo Yŏnmaeng), a 
state ideological device that the Rhee administration had adopted from the Japanese colonial 
practice of “conversion” (tenkō) and applied it toward the reeducation of SKWP members and 
leftist sympathizers.
27
  The government reported that the number of “surrendered” or 
“converted” leftist sympathizers amounted to 39,986 by November 27.28   
Communist containment also extended into the everyday life of ordinary people.  The 
government’s counterinsurgency action toward the Yŏsu rebellion developed into the state 
reconfiguration of fragmented society.  The Rhee administration embarked on a “national 
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movement” (kungmin undong) through Syngman Rhee’s political campaign organization called 
“National Society for the Acceleration of Korean Independence” (Taehan Tongnip Ch’oksŏng 
Kungminhoe) in order to consolidate the nation under the Rhee regime.
29
  On October 26, 1948, 
the National Society announced that the “national movement” would center upon the three 
primary tasks of “developing anti-communist thought,” “forming the anti-communist nation” and 
“performing anti-communist society.”30  The government and the National Society began to 
reconstruct the regimentation of everyday life by restructuring the remains of the colonial 
residential “patriotic corps” (aeguk pan), the units of the wartime neighborhood association that 
had been created for the colonial “National Spiritual Mobilization Movement.”31  The National 
Society reorganized each ten or twenty household into “national corps” (kungmin pan) and 
controlled them through anti-communist indoctrination and mutual surveillance.
32
  This 
reorganization signified that the colonial neighborhood association, which had been forged for 
the making of colonial “Japanese” subjects, now re-emerged as a daily site of anti-communist 
subject making. 
In addition to the anti-communist regimentation of everyday life, the Rhee administration 
also sought the militarization of civil society.  For instance, schools became the site of military 
training.  The government trained physical-education teachers at the Military Academy and sent 
them back to schools as commissioned officers who would provide training in military drills – 
most of them were former colonial conscripts called “student soldiers” (hakpyŏng).33  The 
government also set up a “Student National Defense Corps” (Hakto Hoguktan) at each school by 
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late March 1949.  An Hosang, the Minister of Education and a leading anti-communist ideologue, 
called it the “vanguard” of national defense and communist containment.34  Moreover, the Rhee 
administration incorporated the newly unified youth organization called “Taehan Youth Corps” 
(Taehan Ch’ŏngnyŏndan) into the state’s apparatus.  The Taehan Youth was a conglomeration of 
youth auxiliaries of different rightist political parties, which had played significant roles in 
rightist and Occupations’ campaigns of terror against leftist forces.35  Rhee appointed himself its 
supreme commander, and the Taehan Youth declared its “absolute obedience” to President Rhee 
and devotion to “exterminating every single communist running dog.”36  The Taehan Youth 
Corps took the lead not only in the military training of the youth but also in their anti-communist 
indoctrination.  The Rhee administration used the Taehan Youth Corps to spread its official state 
ideology of “Ilminjuŭi” (The One-People Principle), the quasi-fascist ideology that pushed 
forward the elimination of class distinctions and the formation of the anti-communist, anti-
capitalist organic unity of the Korean nation.
37
 
Importantly, the South Korean government extended these state structures and tools of 
communist containment to Korean communities in Japan.  The “national movement” 
spearheaded by the National Society not only targeted every South Korean resident but also 
aimed to incorporate Koreans in Japan as well.  The National Society was planning to expand its 
organization and campaign to Korean communities in Japan in order to carry out the “ideological 
guidance [sasang chido] of six hundred thousand brethren in Japan” and to protect their “rights 
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and interests.”38  Indeed, U.S. Ambassador Muccio also recommended establishing a branch of 
the National Society in Japan if the zainichi Korean rightist Residents Union was not capable of 
overtaking the “rival Communist [Korean] League” in Japan.39  In other words, the Korean 
Residents Union in Japan was expected to operate as another National Society that would 
integrate the Korean communities in Japan into the single state society controlled by the Rhee 
administration.   
The Korean Residents Union in Japan was initially formed in October 1946 under the 
leadership of a famous Korean ex-anarchist, Pak Yŏl.  Since its inception, the Residents Union 
had built close ties with Syngman Rhee and voiced its strong support for Rhee’s political 
campaign to establish a separate regime in the U.S.-occupied south.  Once Rhee was elected the 
first President, the Residents Union claimed itself as the only official zainichi Korean association 
recognized by the only legitimate government in Korea.
40
  The head of the Residents Union Pak 
Yŏl was invited to the government inauguration ceremony in South Korea on August 15, 1948 
and met with President Rhee to discuss countermeasures against the leftist Korean League in 
Japan.  Pak revealed that President Rhee had agreed with his policy proposal that Pak viewed as 
necessary: “All Korean Communists in Japan should be deported to Korea.”41 
The Residents Union leader Pak Yŏl also presented himself to Americans as a critical 
zainichi Korean collaborator for U.S. cold war strategy of containment.  At a meeting with a U.S. 
Army official in Korea on August 18, Pak stressed the need to sever “[c]ommunications between 
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communists in Japan and communists in Korea.”  Pak claimed that he and his “boys” could find 
out “when a ship carrying communists or carrying goods intended for communist trade [would 
be] leaving Japan for Korean ports.”  He also requested U.S. assistance for “non-communists” 
and their “counter-propaganda,” insisting that the “non-communists” were “not nearly as 
effective with their counter-propaganda” as the Communists.  Indeed, Pak was the incarnation of 
a typical cold war warrior.  According to the same U.S. official, Pak expressed his idea of 
communist containment as follows: 
[U]nless the US wipes out communism in Japan, Korea will always be threatened.  
Unless the US wipes out communism in Korea, Korea will have a tremendous 
effect upon both communists and non-communists in Japan.
42
 
 
Along with the Korean Residents Union in Japan led by Pak Yŏl, the zainichi Korean 
rightist youth group named “Youth Alliance for the Acceleration of Korean Independence” 
(Chōsen Kenkoku Sokushin Seinen Dōmei) also transformed itself into an arm of the South 
Korean anti-communist regime apparatus.  In March 1950, former Chief of Staff of ROK Army 
Ch’ae Pyŏngdŏk visited Japan and requested zainichi Korean youth leaders to reorganize 
existing rightist youth groups under the name of Taehan Youth.
43
  In mid-June, President Rhee 
sent An Hosang, an ideologue of the Ilminjuŭi, to Japan to unite zainichi Korean youth groups.44  
As An told the press that the purpose of his visit to Japan was, in his words, the “ideological 
indoctrination” (sasang kyohwa) of the zainichi Korean youth,45 his ideological influence was 
indeed prominent among certain Koreans in Japan.  An Hosang established the Japan 
Headquarters of the Taehan Youth Corps on August 29, and the Taehan Youth in Japan called 
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upon the zainichi Korean youth to “unify our thought under the Ilminjuŭi.”46  When the war 
broke out in Korea on June 25, An launched a lecture tour across Japan for recruiting zainichi 
Koreans to volunteer and fight against North Korea.
47
  Through the recruiting campaign 
spearheaded by the rightist Korean Residents Union and the Taehan Youth in Japan, 642 zainichi 
Korean youth were sent to Korea as “volunteer soldiers.”48 
 
Japanese and Korean Leftist Transnational Solidarity  
 As the Chinese Nationalist defeat in the civil war during 1948 and 1949 changed U.S. 
foreign policy toward East Asia profoundly, the progress in China brought critical impacts on the 
political landscape in Korea and Japan as well.  The Communist victory in China no doubt 
buoyed up North Korean leaders and fueled their preparation for a revolutionary war against 
South Korea.  In the spring of 1949, Chinese and North Korean officials held a series of contacts 
and discussed possible Chinese support for the Korean revolution and the return of Korean 
soldiers in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to North Korea.49  Some 30,000 to 40,000 
Korean soldiers returned from China during the period from July to October in 1949, and the 
total number amounted to between 75,000 and 100,000 by the fall of 1950.
50
  In Japan, the 
downfall of Nationalist China plunged many Japanese into the fear of immediate political 
reverberations.  In mid-February 1949, the Occupation’s survey of intercepted Japanese private 
correspondence and communication reported that the “sweeping victories of the Chinese 
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Communist Armies” in China had “infected” the Japanese public “with fear and anxiety.”  The 
survey also concluded that Japanese people were “hoping for continued US support to prevent a 
similar situation from arising in Japan.”51 
Japanese Communists were gaining confidence so much so that Japanese police officers 
sometimes even became uncertain about how to handle Communist activities.  In December 
1948, the local Occupation authorities in Toyama Prefecture reported on permeating anxiety 
among Japanese police officers “as to how they would be treated in the event Japanese went 
Communistic.”  The report continued: 
Many times the Communists have threatened the police and public officials with; 
“wait until we take over Japan, then we’ll get even with you.  You will be taken 
care of properly.”  This fear complex among the police is becoming more 
pronounced since the Communist gains in China.
52
 
 
In fact, Japanese Communists were bolstering their confidence and prestige not only 
through the sweeping Chinese Communist victories since late 1948, but also through their 
unprecedented leap in voter support in the general election of January 1949.  In the general 
election, the JCP obtained almost three times as many votes as the previous election in mid-1947 
and multiplied its seats from four to thirty-five.  Although this remarkable gain owed much to the 
rifts in the Socialist Party and popular disappointment over the former Socialist-moderate rightist 
coalition government, the JCP rapidly expanded its party members during 1949.
53
  Japanese 
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Communists even envisioned the possible takeover of power.  In a May Day rally, JCP top leader 
Tokuda Kyūichi declared that the JCP would strengthen mass movements and overturn the 
Yoshida administration by September – although soon the JCP would experience a complete 
defeat by Yoshida’s counteroffensive.   
The JCP’s strong political ally, the Korean League in Japan, also radicalized its political 
movements during 1948 and 1949, reinforcing its ties with both the JCP and the North Korean 
regime.  Since its formation as the largest Korean organization in Japan, the Korean League had 
held strong connections with the JCP.  Zainichi Korean Communist leaders, such as Kim 
Ch’ŏnhae and Kim Tuyong, actively engaged in the Korean League and linked its activities with 
JCP’s agenda for “democratic revolution” in Japan.  At the same time, the Korean League built 
the close political relationship with the leftist camp in Korea, initially with the Democratic 
National Front in the south.  When the UN-observed general elections to create a separate regime 
in the U.S.-occupied south emerged as a critical issue in the international arena in late 1947, the 
Korean League spearheaded anti-election campaigns across Japan in support of the massive 
oppositional movements in Korea.
54
  The Korean League also sent representatives to the famous 
north-south joint conferences held in Pyongyang in April 1948, where north and south Korean 
political leaders, from both the left and the right, gathered to demonstrate their protest against the 
UN-observed general elections that would establish a separate regime in the south.
55
     
When north Korean leaders established the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) against the Republic of Korea in the south on September 9, 1948, the Korean League 
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immediately recognized the DPRK as the single legitimate government representing the entire 
Korean people.  On September 17, Chōren Chūō Jihō, the bulletin of the Korean League in 
Japan, published a statement expressing its support for the DPRK as the “people’s government” 
which was formed through the “truly democratic” general election conducted both in the north 
and south.
56
  At the Fifth General Convention held from October 14 to 16, the Korean League 
adopted a new manifesto that called upon zainichi Koreans to “defend the DPRK to the death” 
and “devote themselves with full vigor to the development of the DPRK.”  The Korean League 
also reaffirmed its “resolution to exterminate the south Korean reactionary forces completely,” 
characterizing the South Korean regime as the “puppet” connected with “anti-popular, anti-
pacifist international reactionary forces.”57  Moreover, at the Seventeenth Central Committee 
Meeting held in mid-February 1949, the Korean League leadership adopted new slogans that 
pushed forward a “direct link” with the DPRK, a new political line that had been proposed by the 
North Korean leader Kim Il Sung through his radio speech on January 12.
58
     
The leaders of the Korean League also attempted to have a direct meeting with Kim Il 
Sung through their visit to North Korea.  On October 8, the Korean League received an official 
invitation from Prime Minister Kim through a telegram and the Pyongyang radio broadcast.
59
  
The Korean League formed a group of some hundred delegates to visit North Korea and 
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requested SCAP for permission to travel.  Once SCAP refused to give permission, the Korean 
League decided to send some ten delegates to North Korea secretly, through an unauthorized 
(illegal) route.  According zainichi Korean historian O Kyusang, Han Tŏksu, the leader of the 
delegate group, had a meeting with Prime Minister Kim on December 23, and other delegates 
also met with Kim on January 10, 1949.  In these meetings, Kim emphasized the need to unite 
zainichi Koreans as overseas nationals of the DPRK and nurture young zainichi Koreans as 
engineers of the new nation-state in Korea.
60
 
During September to November 1948, the Korean League and its local offices embarked 
upon mass campaigns across Japan to demonstrate Korean and Japanese support for the DPRK.
61
  
In Ishikawa Prefecture, for instance, the local branch organized a ceremonial rally on November 
9, and some five hundred participated in the rally for the celebration of becoming members of 
the “independent nation.”  In the ceremony, according to a police intelligence report, a local 
Korean League leader spoke to the audience and stressed that Koreans should no longer be afraid 
of Japanese government’s oppression because the “independent DPRK government” was 
established.
62
  The ceremony also exhibited some sort of international solidarity.  Japanese and 
Chinese representatives from local labor and farmer unions, Communist Party, and an overseas 
Chinese association in Japan participated and made congratulatory speeches on the stage on 
which the portrait of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung was displayed.  The Chinese leader called 
upon “our brothers of Koreans” for solidarity between the same “oppressed” peoples.  Araki 
Tsugio, a local union leader from the National Railway Workers’ Union, congratulated Koreans 
for establishing a “government of working people,” which had “not come into in Japan” yet.  
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Conveying his congratulations, Communist representative Nakata Kikuo expressed his concern 
over government’s suppression of Koreans and Japanese workers and made an earnest appeal to 
Koreans for “enormous support” for building a “democratic state” in Japan. 
Indeed, many Koreans did support the JCP by becoming Party members.  During early 
and mid-1949, the Korean League launched a political campaign across Japan to encourage local 
Korean residents to join the JCP and fight together against the Yoshida administration.  In Kobe, 
the ceremony that the Korean League held to remember the victims of the Korean education 
disputes in April 1948 turned into a dramatic event where 358 Korean men and women among 
some forty-five thousand participants declared to join the JCP.
63
  In Kyoto Prefecture, a local 
office of the JCP held a welcome ceremony for new 300 Korean members on June 2.  At the 
ceremony, another 200 Koreans also volunteered to join the Party.
64
  During the months from 
April to July, more than thirteen hundred Koreans became JCP members.
65
  A Korean League 
spokesperson stated in a press interview that the mass participation in the JCP meant “our 
League’s response to the oppression” by the Japanese government.  The spokesperson also 
emphasized that the JCP was the only political forces who had “always fought for Korean rights 
to subsistence and Korean education.”66   
The Korean League expected that the Korean mass entry into the JCP would build the 
solid foundation for grassroots inter-racial struggles between Koreans and Japanese.  The 
leadership of the Korean League understood that the lack of support from Japanese people had 
been one of the most urgent problems facing Korean struggles for political and social rights in 
Japan.  In the aftermath of the Korean education disputes of April 1948, some Korean League 
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leaders attributed the failure of Korean struggles to their “parochial national sentiments” 
(p’yŏnhyŏphan minjok jok kamjŏng) and “isolation” from Japanese people.  The leaders pointed 
out the need to link Korean movements with “Japanese revolutionary forces” fighting for 
democratic reforms in Japan.
67
  Thus, Korean mass participation in the JCP was, in the words of 
the Korean League spokesperson, “the most concrete way to develop joint struggles with 
Japanese people.”68  Moreover, Korean leaders had learned lessons from the racial bashings 
against Koreans in Japan spearheaded by the former Yoshida administration during mid- and late 
1946.  In a press interview held by Haebang Sinmun in July 1949, the chief secretary of the 
Korean League pointed out Japanese government’s continuous efforts to increase the racial 
estrangement between the Koreans and Japanese.
69
   
The leadership of the Korean League believed that the establishment of the “democratic 
people’s government” in Japan – the objective of the JCP’s ongoing fight – would be the only 
solution to the problem of institutionalized racial discrimination against Koreans.  More 
importantly, the leadership viewed that the time was ripe for JCP-led democratic revolution at 
that moment in early and mid-1949, as JCP leader Tokuda claimed that they would overturn the 
Yoshida administration by September.  At the Korean League’s Central Committee Convention 
in late May, leaders argued that “Japanese revolutionary movements” were growing “through 
popular struggles” like everywhere in the world.   The leadership understood that Japanese 
popular struggles over livelihood were “extending beyond economic struggles and becoming 
political struggles for power.”  In its slogan adopted in the Convention, the Central Committee 
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declared that the Korean League would fight with Japanese people against the Yoshida 
administration in order to establish the “democratic people’s government” in Japan.70  
As Communist-led labor unions radicalized their struggles against government’s and big 
business’s massive layoffs and labor restructuring in mid-1949, the Korean League approached 
the shop floor as a critical site for demonstrating Korean direct participation in the “democratic 
people’s government” building in Japan.  In Chiba Prefecture, the members of the Korean 
League and its affiliated Korean associations took part in a National Railways’ labor dispute at 
Chiba Station on June 10.  The Koreans and Japanese workers clashed with some three hundred 
Japanese police, and 21 Korean Youth group members and 117 women from the Korean 
Democratic Women League in Japan were arrested with 4 JCP members – most of them were 
soon released.
71
  In Hiroshima Prefecture in mid-June, local branches of the Korean League 
supported worker’s sit-down strikes at the Japan Steel Works factory by mobilizing food, relief 
money and Korean youth corps who would fight with the Japanese workers.  The sit-down 
strikes ended up with a violent crackdown by the police, and some three hundred Koreans and 
Japanese workers were injured.
72
  The Japanese intelligence reported that the total of some 
sixteen hundred Koreans participated during the five days of the sit-down strikes and 
demonstrations at the Japan Steel Works factory in Hiroshima.
73
 
Such joint struggles were also taking shape behind the scenes between Korean League 
leaders, the JCP, and the North Korean regime.  According to a U.S. intelligence report, 
Communists in Korea and Japan were constantly contacting each other and building secret 
collaborations.  The report dated on March 30, 1950 described: 
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J.C.P. members regularily [sic] or temporarily conducted secret passages to attend 
the North Korean Conference, while considerable number of Koreans secretly 
entered Japan to give directives to the JCP.  Among them there were various 
elements connected with Communist activities such as the self-styled North 
Korean Organization Unit Members, influential leaders of the South Korean 
Labor Party, Japanese and Korean Communists who carried santonin from 
Vladivostok to Japan, leaders of the former CHOREN [Korean League in Japan], 
who secretly started from the Japanese San [San’in] coast to attend the rally for 
celebrating the independence of North Korean government (held in August 1949), 
etc.
74
     
   
It was true that North Korean agents secretly entered Japan and contacted Communist 
leaders of the Korean League in Japan.  For instance, the so-called “North Korean spy net in 
Japan” that was exposed in May 1951 revealed such linkages and interactions behind the scenes.  
According to Japanese police interrogation reports on “spy” suspects, Hŏ Kilsong (alias Iwamura 
Yoshimatsu) and Ko Ch’angman made a secret entry into Japan in late August 1949 with the 
mission of gathering information on Japan’s remilitarization and sending the zainichi Korean 
youth to North Korea.
75
  Hŏ and Ko were told by the DPRK’s Political Security Department to 
visit the headquarters of the Korean League in Japan, who were supposed to prepare a group of 
the zainichi Korean youth to send.  According to Hŏ’s testimony, he understood that the group 
would be used for fields of political affairs, education, intelligence and engineering.  With the 
collaboration of Korean League leaders, Hŏ sent some thirty zainichi Koreans to North Korea in 
early October.         
Ko Ch’angman, another North Korean “spy” who was sent to Japan with Hŏ, had a 
political background as a former member of the South Korean Worker’s Party in Cheju Island.76  
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According to his testimony, Ko joined the Party in March 1948 and soon participated in the 
Cheju uprisings of April 3, which escalated into prolonged guerrilla warfare and ended up with 
the Rhee regime’s brutal civilian massacre.  In early May, Ko fled from the police 
counterinsurgency attack and hid in Pusan.  In late May, he decided to attempt an escape to 
Japan and took a smuggling ship to Osaka, where his uncle was running a small shoemaking 
factory.  In Osaka, he then became acquainted with a Korean man from the same village in Cheju 
Island, who had been engaged in political activities in the Osaka area.  A year later, in mid-June 
1949, the man arranged a trip to North Korea for him, and Ko made a visit to the Political 
Security Department in Pyongyang.  After receiving education and training at a youth training 
camp in the northern city of Chongjin, Ko was told by the Political Security Department to go to 
Japan with Hŏ Kilsong on an intelligence mission.  The trajectory of Ko’s life – his participation 
in the Cheju uprisings, escape to Japan, return to Korea and secret reentry into Japan on the 
mission of the North Korean regime – shows how deeply Japan became the integral part of the 
politics, civil warfare and human tragedies in post-liberation divided Korea.
77
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Tensions and Collaborations over the “Korean Problem”  
The Yoshida and Rhee administrations shared the common agenda of diminishing the 
predominance of the Korean League among Korean communities in Japan.  Since the aftermath 
of defeat, the Japanese government had confronted the Korean League as the chief obstacle to 
regaining full authority and control over Korean former colonial subjects in Japan.
78
  For the 
Japanese government, the Korean League had represented the “lawlessness” and “self-granted 
extra-territoriality” of Koreans in Japan, and it now also had become the immediate target of U.S. 
and Japanese cold war politics after the establishment of the DPRK.   
For instance, SCAP banned the Korean League from displaying the national flag of the 
DPRK in public, and political rallies held by the Korean League across Japan in celebration of 
DPRK’s inauguration often ended with violent clashes with the Japanese police over the display 
of the national flags.
79
  In Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture, some hundred armed U.S. military 
police and Japanese police officers carried out a raid on the Korean League’s rally held on 
October 12, 1948, and arrested three Korean League leaders for displaying DPRK’s national 
flags.  The military police fired on a recalcitrant crowd, and six Korean and Japanese participants 
were severely injured.  Among those arrested, three were sent to an Occupation’s provost court 
and sentenced to deportation to South Korea following the term of three years’ confinement with 
hard labor.
80
  In Osaka on October 21, some eighty armed police stormed into the rally held by 
the Osaka branch of the Korean Democratic Youth Alliance in Japan and arrested its local 
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branch leaders.  The two of them were sentenced to eight years’ confinement with hard labor and 
deportation to South Korea.
81
  
The Korean League also became a primary target of South Korean diplomacy toward 
SCAP.  It was the Rhee administration’s immediate mission to uproot zainichi Korean 
Communists leaders and weaken the Korean League with the support of SCAP so that the 
rightist Korean Residents Union could take over and control zainichi Korean communities.  
When he dispatched a Korean diplomatic mission to Japan in December 1948, President Rhee 
explained to Ambassador Chŏng Han’gyŏng the significance of his tasks and explicitly 
instructed him to “disband the Korean League in Japan through the cooperation of SCAP.”82  
The U.S. Ambassador in Korea, John Muccio, also discussed this issue with Chŏng on December 
22, and Muccio stressed the significance of “defeating the efforts of the Communist-controlled 
League of Korean Residing in Japan [the Korean League in Japan] in forwarding Communist 
aims in Japan and in Korea.”  Moreover, Muccio advised Chŏng to set up an “alert and 
progressive Korean residents’ association” as early as possible which would be capable of 
“winning the support of Korean residents of Japan to the Government of the Republic of 
Korea.”83 
 Upon starting his diplomatic mission in Japan, Chŏng met with General Douglas 
MacArthur and William J. Sebald of the Diplomatic Section of SCAP on December 27.  When 
Chŏng raised the question of “certain strong armed tactics used by Leftist Korean elements,” 
MacArthur encouraged him by implying that SCAP would “dea[l] with severely” those Korean 
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Communists “using Japan as a base of operations to damage the Republic of Korea.”84  Chŏng 
also approached the Government Section (GS) of SCAP and asked for its cooperation in 
undercutting the material resources of the zainichi Korean leftist forces.  On January 17, 1949, 
the Korean Diplomatic Mission sent an official letter requesting the GS to “drastically cut” 
newsprint allocations to “leftist Korean newspapers” and stop allowing the Korean League and 
its branches to use gasoline “imported … for the rehabilitation of the Japanese economy.”  
According to the Korean Diplomatic Mission, the Korean League and its members had been 
“successful” in obtaining allocations of special rations “under the guise that these special rations 
[were] to be distributed … to all Korean residents in Japan,” which they had actually distributed 
only to “individuals who cooperate[d] with the League” in order to “foster communism.”  In the 
letter, the Korean Diplomatic Mission presented its primary task as follows: 
The curtailment of communist activity among the Koreans in Japan is of primary 
interest to this mission.  The mission is anxious to cooperate with SCAP in all 
measures which will dislodge the League and lead to its eventual dissolution.
85
 
 
The South Korean government also took an active interest in forging an anti-communist 
political alignment with the former colonial power of Japan.  Although President Rhee often 
stirred up and mobilized fiery popular anti-Japanese sentiments for his domestic political 
purposes, his diplomatic stance toward Japan was surprisingly conciliatory – or pragmatic – 
unlike his public image as an emotionally demonstrative “anti-Japanese nationalist leader” 
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during the 1950s.
86
  On October 22, 1948, shortly after the establishment of the ROK, President 
Rhee expressed his willingness to rebuild economic ties with Japan as follows:  
 I hope to reestablish normal trade relations between South Korea and Japan.  We 
will try to forget about the past, and we will forget it.  If the Japanese treat 
Koreans sincerely, amicable relations will be improved.
87
 
 
When President Rhee visited Japan and met with General MacArthur and Prime Minister 
Yoshida on February 18, 1950, Rhee characterized this visit to Japan as the “demonstration of 
Korean government’s will” to forget the past and cooperate with a different “democratic nation” 
in the locus of the “united front against communism.”88  In a press interview on the same day, 
President Rhee stressed that the “cold war” was now “turning into a serious flame in Korea,” and 
appealed to Japanese people to “consider the fact” that the South Korean troops “fighting for the 
freedom of Koreans” were also “defending the freedom of Japanese people.”89  The South 
Korean Minister portrayed the government’s diplomatic approach to Japan as “anti-communist 
cooperation” (pan’gong hyŏpcho) or “preventive cooperation against communism” (panggong 
hyŏpcho).90  In fact, during Japan-South Korea trade talks held in Seoul in October 1949, South 
Korean government officials had even proposed setting up an “intelligence service” within the 
                                                 
86
 On Rhee administration’s anti-Japanese political rhetoric, see Sung-Hwa Cheong, The Politics of Anti-Japanese 
Sentiment in Korea: Japanese-South Korean Relations under American Occupation, 1945-1952 (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991).  According to Chong-Sik Lee, scholars have attributed clashes in Japanese-South Korean 
normalization talks during the 1950s to President Rhee’s “truculent anti-Japanese attitude.”  Lee also portrays Japan-
South Korea relations during the Rhee administration as “the clash of emotions.”  See Chong-Sik Lee, Japan and 
Korea: The Political Dimension (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), pp.23-24.       
87
 Syngman Rhee, “On South Korea-Japan Trade Relations” (October 23, 1948), in Collections of President 
Syngman Rhee’s Speeches (Seoul: Public Information Office, 1953), p.183, National Assembly Library, Seoul, 
Korea. 
88
 Chosŏn Ilbo, February 19, 1950. 
89
 Kukto Sinmun, February 19, 1950. 
90
 Chosŏn Ilbo, February 22, 1950 
  
218 
 
Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan so that the Mission could “work in cooperation with [the] 
Japanese police” against the “misdeeds” of Koreans in Japan.91 
Although the cold war realpolitik for “anti-communist cooperation” brought the two top 
government leaders to the same table in February 1950, Japan-South Korea relations had in fact 
been infused with bitter discordance at the site of the “Korean problem in Japan.”  For the South 
Korean authorities, the heavy-handed measures toward the “misdeeds” of Koreans in Japan that 
the Japanese government and police authorities had continued to employ appeared as the lack of 
respect for the new Korean government and its claim of sovereignty over overseas Koreans.  On 
April 21, 1949, in the aftermath of the so-called “Fukagawa incident” where some six hundred 
Japanese police officers besieged a Korean residential area and searched every single Korean 
passerby to arrest suspects, the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan wrote to SCAP as follows: 
In spite of the fact that due respect and proper pro[t]ection should be accorded to 
the right of the Korean residents in Japan as foreign nationals, there are still 
innumerable cases of maltreatment of Korean nationals by the Japanese.
92
 
      
There had been even some difficulty between Japanese and South Korean authorities to 
have pragmatic conversations together about the “Korean problem” in Japan.  According to 
Cloyce Huston of SCAP Diplomatic Section, SCAP brought Japanese and South Korean officials 
into direct discussion with each other at “various times, with unfortunate results.”  When SCAP 
arranged a conference between Korean Diplomatic Mission representatives and Japanese 
Ministry of Education officials in order to discuss the “Korean school question” in Japan, their 
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talks “degenerated into a battle of bitterness and recrimination.”  Huston described their 
emotional discordance as follows: 
Although we have no doubt of the bona fide desire of high Korean Government 
officials to put aside Korean prejudices in favor of the practical advantages to be 
gained in recognizing the mutuality of Japanese-Korean interests, the fact remains 
that in almost every case when such direct negotiations or discussions have been 
permitted[,] the participants have betrayed their inability to control their 
sentiments and expressions thereof.  [my emphasis]
93
  
 
In other words, what had characterized Japan-South Korea relations behind the scenes 
was not so much cold war realpolitik manifested as “anti-communist cooperation.”  It was rather 
the politics of postcolonial recognition even at the government higher official level, or what 
Edward Said has called “politics of blame” between the former colonizers and colonized.94  
Moreover, although Huston attributed their discordance only to “Korean prejudices,” the idea of 
Japanese racial superiority that Japanese elites (and the general populace as well) still held was 
probably another obstacle in Japanese-South Korean direct negotiations.  The following 
conversation the Director of the Control Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office Wajima Eiji had 
with a SCAP official shows how Japanese imperial racial ideology still lingered in official 
parlance: 
Mr. Wajima said that the Japanese have always considered the Koreans to be an 
inferior race.  He said that a very elaborate study on the racial characteristics of 
Koreans had been prepared during the war and that it had concluded that the 
mental and social capacities of the Koreans were of a very primitive nature.  He 
said that this feeling on the part of the Japanese that Koreans are inferior to a great 
extent motivates Japanese uncertainty and hostility in regard to the Koreans.
95
  
 
                                                 
93
 Huston to Allison, [no title] (February 17, 1950), Folder: 1950-52: 510.1 Korea-Japan, Box 71, RG 84, FSP 429, 
USPOLAD Classified General Correspondence, NDL. 
94
 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993), p.19. 
95
 Richard Finn, “Memorandum of Conversation: Koreans in Japan” (February 3, 1949), enclosure to “Status of 
Koreans in Japan” (February 18, 1949), 894.4016/2-1849, Reel 15, Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating 
to the Internal Affairs of Japan, 1945-1949. 
  
220 
 
 Indeed, the government policy where such “Japanese uncertainty and hostility” was most 
explicitly reflected was the unfulfilled project for the mass deportation of Koreans in Japan.  The 
Japanese government desired to deport the entire Korean population from Japan, and Prime 
Minister Yoshida attempted in vain to convince SCAP of the necessity of mass deportation.  On 
July 11, 1949, the time when the government had been reinforcing its counter-offensive against 
the JCP and a series of radicalized labor strikes, Prime Minister Yoshida sent his representatives 
to a SCAP official to discuss the “problems resulting from the large number of Koreans residing 
in Japan.”  According to the memorandum of their conversations, Shirasu Jirō, one of the 
Japanese representatives, referred to “several recent outbreaks of violence and labor disorder” 
and claimed that “considerable numbers of Koreans” had been involved in these outbreaks and in 
some cases had “provided the initiatives.”  As a possible countermeasure, Shirasu proposed the 
deportation of “some 500,000 or 600,000 Koreans, both of North Korean sympathy and of 
sympathy with the Republic of Korea.”96  Soon, Prime Minister Yoshida wrote directly to 
MacArthur: 
[W]e are compelled to seek an early solution of the question of the Korean 
residents, who total approximately 1,000,000, of whom about one half are illegal 
entrants.  I would like to see all these Koreans repatriated to their home peninsula.  
My reasons are: (1) The food situation, now and in future, of Japan does not 
permit the maintenance of the excess population….  (2) A great majority of the 
Koreans are not contributing at all to the economic reconstruction of Japan.  (3) 
Worse still, there is a large percentage of criminal elements among the 
Koreans….97  [English from the original text] 
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Undoubtedly, the South Korean government would not want, nor agree to, the 
deportation of the entire Korean population that Yoshida described as “not contributing at all to 
the economic reconstruction of Japan.”  However, to a certain degree, South Korean President 
Rhee did hold one thing in common with Yoshida – the idea that the deportation of certain 
groups of Koreans in Japan to the South Korean regime was necessary.  Since its inauguration in 
August 1948, President Rhee repeatedly asked SCAP to deport Korean “troublemakers” and 
“terrorists” (read: Communists) to South Korea, the undesirable elements that the Rhee 
administration believed were damaging its reputation outside Korea.  In early September 1948, 
within a month after Rhee had seized presidential power, one U.S. official in South Korea 
informed the U.S. Political Advisor in Japan that “it was [President Rhee’s] intention to 
repatriate all the low class and criminal Koreans living in Japan who were giving a Korea bad 
reputation” and Rhee had expressed this idea to him “several times before.”98  Likewise, in April 
1949, President Rhee notified SCAP that the South Korean government would be “pleased to 
facilitate the return to Korea some of the Koreans who may cause trouble in Japan by agitation, 
by spreading pernicious propaganda, by violation of laws, or by disturbance of peace.”99  The 
Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan even sent a list to SCAP of those whom the Mission 
recommended for deportation, a list filled mostly with the names of zainichi Korean Communist 
leaders.
100
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SCAP never accepted the South Korean proposals, nor gave the green light to the 
Japanese government for its drastic deportation plan.  However, the forcible mass deportation of 
Koreans from Japan indeed had been a serious option among SCAP policy-planners seeking a 
“solution” to the “Korean problem” in Japan.  According to a SCAP report sent to the Secretary 
of State on May 6, 1948, policy-planners within SCAP had previously suggested during the early 
stage of occupation that “all Koreans in Japan should be forcibly repatriated to Korea” – a 
recommendation that had been declined by “higher authority.”  Later, in the wake of what the 
Occupation authorities called “Kobe riots” in late April 1948, “informal suggestions” emerged 
within SCAP that “forcible repatriation might be the only solution to the Korean problem in 
Japan.”101  In August 1948, when SCAP policy-planners began to draft the first comprehensive 
“staff study” on the Korean problem in Japan, the possibility of forcible deportation became an 
issue for consideration again.  The intelligence section (G-2) admitted that the “ideal solution” to 
the Korean problem would be to “rid Japan of this large national minority,” by means of either 
“compulsory, progressive repatriation” or the “election of Japanese nationality” on the part of 
Koreans.  Yet, G-2 understood that a “compulsory solution” would be “undesirable.”102  The 
Legal Section of SCAP also warned that “any official statement to the effect that a minority in 
Japan ought to leave, [sic] might be cause for concern and misinterpretation by other minorities 
in the Far East.”103 
It is important to note that these concerns within SCAP about the “compulsory solution” 
came up amidst increasing global concern over the treatment of racial minorities and racial 
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discrimination.  The United Nations established the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities within the Commission on Human Rights in 1947, 
and the UN Assembly often became the locus of the international criticism not only of South 
Africa’s apartheid policies and violations of human rights but also of U.S. domestic race 
relations.  As historian Penny M. Von Eschen has succinctly argued, the Truman administration 
understood “racial discrimination in America as its Achilles heel in a propaganda battle with the 
Soviet Union for the allegiance of Africa and Asia.”104  “Race” emerged as a crucial ideological 
component in the U.S. pursuit of global hegemony and anti-communist alignment.  As I have 
shown in the previous chapter, a SCAP report sent to the Secretary of State in early May 1948 
presented the significance of the “Korean problem in Japan” and emphasized that “[a]ny failure 
to resolve a minority problem of this sort would undoubtedly have unfortunate effects on United 
States foreign policy and might readily provide opportunity for subversive forces to exploit the 
situation to their own ends.”105   
 Obviously, SCAP was aware of the growing significance of race and minority issues in 
the international arena and abandoned the “ideal solution” of “rid[ding] Japan of this large 
national minority.”  Instead, SCAP decided to get rid of the symbol and source of postwar 
zainichi Korean empowerment, the Korean League in Japan.  On August 22, 1949, Colonel Jack 
Napier of the Government Section of SCAP had a meeting with Japanese government officials in 
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the wake of a shocking incident in Yamaguchi Prefecture on August 19, where members of the 
Korean League carried out assaults on the office of rightist Residents Union and its members as a 
result of ongoing conflicts.
106
  Napier told the Japanese officials, Attorney-General Ueda and the 
Chief of the Special Investigation Bureau Yoshikawa, that the incident in Yamaguchi Prefecture 
“gave bad impressions to the people of the world” concerning the Korean League and thus it was 
the “best time to dissolve” the Korean League as an “undemocratic and terroristic 
organization.”107 
 The Japanese officials supported SCAP’s decision.  In the meeting, Attorney-General 
Ueda told Napier that he had “always felt the necessity” of disbanding the Korean League.  Ueda 
even proposed the dissolution of the rightist Korean Residents Union as well, claiming:  
Furthermore, the Korean League is not the only one that resorts to mass violence.  
There is a group in Mindan (other Korean organization) who resorts to mass 
violence in cooperation with Japanese gangs and bosses.  It is necessary to take 
steps against this group. 
 
However, Napier held a different view.  Apparently, SCAP expected the Korean Residents 
Union to become a useful collaborator for the U.S. occupation of Japan.  Napier explained to the 
Japanese officials that the Korean Residents Union “should be strengthened” because it had been 
working for “a certain foreign country” (read the United States).108   
 The Japanese government soon began to prepare for the compulsory dissolution of the 
Korean League.  The Chief of the Special Investigation Bureau Yoshikawa Mitsusada, a former 
Higher Thought Police officer who had earned a reputation by breaking the Richard Sorge spy 
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ring in 1941, took the lead in crafting a dissolution plan in the Japanese government.
109
  
Yoshikawa and Attorney-General Ueda took advantage of the Organization Control Ordinance 
that the government had enacted in April 1949 for cracking down “anti-democratic 
organizations,” and targeted the entire organization of the Korean League and the leftist Korean 
Youth Alliance in Japan.  On September 8, the Japanese government ordered the Korean League 
and Korean Democratic Youth Alliance to disband their organizations, including Korean 
League’s 48 local headquarters, 620 branches and 1,214 offices and Youth Alliance’s 48 local 
headquarters, 458 branches and 306 offices.
110
  The Japanese government also confiscated all 
their properties.  A Japanese major newspaper characterized these countermeasures as “the first 
shot at the extreme left,”111 and the clampdown on the two major zainichi Korean leftist 
associations indeed marked the “declaration of war on leftist forces” by the Japanese 
government.
112
   
   
Conclusion 
In a press interview on September 16, 1949, a week after the Japanese government 
ordered the dissolution of the Korean League and Korean Democratic Youth Alliance in Japan, 
South Korean President Rhee expressed his view on the Japanese government’s action as 
follows:  
I heard that a Korean communist party in Japan [sic] was disbanded.  Yet, it is 
nonsense if the Japanese government imposed dissolution only on Korean 
organizations for the reason that communist parties were not desirable….  If the 
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Japanese government launches countermeasures against communist parties, it 
should deal with the Japanese Communist Party as well….113  [my emphasis] 
 
In this statement, President Rhee criticized the Japanese government for not so much disbanding 
Korean “communist” organizations in Japan but for targeting “only” Koreans and not doing the 
same to the Japanese Communist Party.  In other words, President Rhee, known as an “anti-
Japanese” nationalist leader, did not necessarily take a “nationalist” approach to the Korean 
problem in Japan when the “problem” required “anti-communist cooperation” with the Japanese 
government.    
Yet, while both South Korean and Japanese governments shared common concerns in 
consolidating their anti-communist regimes respectively, particularly over the “Korean problem” 
in Japan, the two governments approached the problem with conflicting interests as revealed in 
the deportation issue.  The South Korean government limited the scope of deportation within the 
frame of communist containment, with the objective of uprooting zainichi Korean Communist 
leaders.  However, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida approached deportation measures as an 
ultimate solution to the “Korean problem” by means of uprooting the entire postcolonial Korean 
population in Japan, which the South Korean government would not accept.   
Likewise, their approaches to the “problem” of the Korean League in Japan differed in a 
fundamental level.  The Rhee administration targeted the Korean League primarily out of 
concern over its close ties with the North Korean regime and its anti-South activities and 
propaganda spreading among Koreans in Japan.  On the other hand, the Japanese government 
had been striving to regain full authority and control over Korean former colonial subjects in 
Japan since the aftermath of defeat, and viewed the Korean League as the symbol and source of 
zainichi Korean empowerment.  During 1949, the Yoshida administration took full advantage of 
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emerging global cold war politics in order to subjugate and possibly eliminate the Korean 
population in Japan.  In short, the “Korean problem” became a locus of possible mutual 
collaborations and postcolonial frictions between anti-communist governments in the former 
metropole and colony. 
 In this sense, U.S. “informal empire” in East Asia was not necessarily the monolithic 
transnational regime of communist containment.  As I have discussed above, Japanese Prime 
Minister Yoshida and South Korean President Rhee emerged as the critical local actors of U.S. 
“informal empire,” the political “collaborators” in the U.S. cold war strategy of global 
communist containment.  During 1948 and 1950, both administrations respectively consolidated 
their anti-communist regimes through either U.S. direct or indirect control.  Japanese and South 
Korean governments also started to work on the establishment of political and economic ties for 
“anti-communist cooperation.”  However, the political alliance between the two local 
collaborators was still deeply anchored in racial antagonism and the postcolonial “politics of 
blame” behind the scenes.  In their bilateral relations, the immediate issue of how to treat the 
postcolonial Korean population in Japan often prevailed over the necessities of cold war 
realpolitik that the United States was pushing forward. 
 Although the Japanese and South Korean political alliance took the form of more indirect 
and rather fragile cooperation in their cold war diplomacy, their efforts to contain zainichi 
Korean leftist movements developed in tandem in the both countries, constituting the 
transnational regime of communist containment.  The Syngman Rhee administration extended 
the reach of its oppressive state structures to cover even the Korean communities in Japan.  In 
other words, the Rhee administration attempted to construct a trans-border anti-communist 
regimentation of Korean society – whether on the peninsula or in Japan.  The Rhee regime 
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transformed the two major zainichi Korean rightist organizations into an arm of the South 
Korean state apparatus of social control and mobilization, such as the National Society and the 
Taehan Youth Corps.  The rightist Korean Residents Union also accepted its role as a zainichi 
Korean collaborator to implement U.S. cold war strategy on the ground.  In Japan, the Yoshida 
administration reinforced its counter-offensive against radicalizing Communist-led labor 
movements and the growing inter-racial solidarity between Japanese and zainichi Korean leftists.  
Under the instruction of SCAP, the Yoshida administration prepared for the aggressive 
countermeasure of disbanding the Korean League in Japan, the symbol and source of postwar 
zainichi Korean empowerment.  The compulsory dissolution of the Korean League in September 
1949 heralded the Japanese government’s “declaration of war on leftist forces.”  
 In contrast to the cold war collaborator regimes and their fragile and indirect “anti-
communist cooperation,” the JCP and the Korean League in Japan demonstrated strong inter-
racial solidarity on the ground.  During 1949, the Korean League leaders launched a campaign to 
spur local Korean residents to join the JCP and fight together against Japanese reactionary 
politics fueled by the Yoshida administration.  Moreover, zainichi Korean leftist movements 
established close ties with the North Korean regime.  Soon, during the Korean War, the 
collaboration between zainichi Korean leftists’ and JCP’s “anti-war” (and anti-U.S.) movements 
would mark the critical convergence between Japanese revolutionary struggles in U.S./Allied-
occupied Japan and North Korean revolutionary war in the Korean peninsula.  The next chapter 
provides a further examination of the transnational linkages between (zainichi) Korean and 
Japanese revolutionary movements. 
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PART III 
The Korean War Comes to U.S./Allied-Occupied Japan, 1950-1952 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Fighting the Korean War in Japan: 
 Revolutionary and Counter-Revolutionary Struggles and Blurred National 
Boundaries 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
National unification [choguk t’ong’il] is the first and most important wish that every single Korean brethren has 
been hoping will be fulfilled….  The thirty million brethren are now at a critical juncture where we have to fight and 
beat off any obstacle that interferes and intervenes in our war for liberation [haebang chŏn], the war to recover our 
national lands by our own efforts and seek the complete fulfillment of the happiness and freedom of the nation. 
—Korean United Democratic Front in Japan (Chaeil Chosŏn T’ong’il Minju Chŏnsŏn), July 20, 1950.1 
     
The Korea problem [Chōsen mondai] is the principal locus of current struggles for the Japanese revolution. … Ever 
since the war of imperialist aggression against Korea began, the masses of both the Japanese and Korean peoples 
[minzoku] came to see clearly who the common enemy is.  Now is the time to form joint struggles against the 
common enemy, and it is the glorious duty mandated by proletarian internationalism. 
—Japanese Communist Party, September 3, 1950.2 
 
[T]he Japanese say that deportation of from two to three hundred [subversive Koreans in Japan] would make a great 
difference in the behavior of the remainder.  … [A]t one time the Rhee government expressed a willingness to take 
on all whom SCAP wished to send there, but it was generally understood that this would be sending the deportees to 
certain death.  Now, of course, deportees could be sent to a UN camp. 
—Committee on Counter Measures against Communism in the Far East, June 15, 1951.3          
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 Korean United Democratic Front in Japan, ―An Appeal to All Brethren concerning the Establishment of the 
Korean Democratic Front in Japan for Unification‖ (July 20, 1950), reprinted in Pak Kyŏngsik, Zainichi Chōsenjin 
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p.3. 
2
 Japanese Communist Party, ―Directive 415: On Zainichi Korean Movements‖ (September 3, 1950), Reel 5, Sengo 
Nihon Kyōsantō kankei shiryō (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 2007-2008). 
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1951), Folder: Committee on Counter Measures against Communism in the Far East, Box 2223, Government 
Section, SCAP, Record Group 331 (Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II), National 
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If the Korean War eventually became memorialized as the ―forgotten war‖ for the 
mainstream American public, then the war, from its outset, was already the ―fire on the opposite 
shore‖ (taigan no kaji) for the Japanese – a Japanese saying which means watching someone 
else‘s misfortune as a bystander.  On July 1, 1950, a week after the outbreak of the war across 
the sea, the Japanese major national newspaper Asahi Shimbun published an editorial titled ―The 
War in Korea and the Stance of Japan,‖ where the editors asserted that Japan and Japanese 
people had ―nothing to do with this war‖ and that they were ―outsiders‖ (daisansha).4  For the 
Japanese in the midst of a still-tottering economic recovery, the war across the sea even appeared 
as a possible welcome ―boom‖ in their eyes.  On July 18, Asahi also published another editorial 
about the impact of the war on the Japanese economy, titled ―The Korean Boom.‖  Within a 
month after the outbreak of the war in Korea, people had already started to believe in an 
economic ―boom‖ so much so that Asahi warned its readers against being ―too optimistic.‖5   
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru later called the Korean War ―a gift of the 
gods,‖6 and scholars in turn have also replicated this narrative framework by portraying Japan as 
simply the one-dimensional beneficiary of the wartime boom.  Yet, Japan under U.S./Allied 
occupation was not at all a passive bystander or outsider in the Korean War.  When the full-
fledged civil war broke out in the Korean peninsula on June 25, 1950, Washington expanded the 
authority of General Douglas MacArthur, who was the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers 
in Japan, to become also the commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea.  MacArthur 
immediately mobilized the U.S. military troops occupying Japan to fight against North Korean 
forces in Korea.  As a result, U.S./Allied-occupied Japan emerged as an indispensable ―rear 
                                                 
4
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5
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base‖ for the UN war effort in Korea.  ―[W]ith amazing speed,‖ in the words of Robert Murphy, 
the first postwar U.S. Ambassador to Japan, the Japanese government ―did transform their 
islands into one huge supply depot, without which the Korean War could not have been fought.‖7  
The government and people in Japan provided practically everything that the UN Command 
needed: from the production of munitions to the manpower and transportation for sending these 
materials to Korea, and even the minesweeping of the Korean coast – everything but soldiers.8   
Although the Korean War, as Murphy emphasizes, ―could not have been fought‖ without 
Japan‘s commitment, Japan occupies little space in the scholarship of Korean War history.  
International and Cold War histories focus primarily on state actors who directly fought in or 
maneuvered the first ―hot war‖ of the Cold War: the United States, Soviet Union, mainland 
China and the North and South Koreas.  The new counter-narratives of social history that South 
Korean scholars have recently put forth center their focus on the Korean peninsula, in search of 
―people‖ in Korean War history.9  In both historical narratives, however, Japan is almost 
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massacres and ―popular experiences‖ of wartime violence and mobilization.  Their primary concern is centered on 
how Koreans living in the Korean peninsula suffered and lived through the tragedy of the war, and thus their 
narrative framework and unit of analysis is uni-nationally focused.  For a ground-breaking work of the social history 
of the Korean War, see Kim Tongch‘un, Chŏnjaeng kwa sahwe: Uri ege Han’guk chŏnjaeng ŭn muŏsiŏnna? 
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completely missing.  On the other hand, in the history of postwar Japan, the Korean War appears 
as no more than a distant historical event that changed or impacted the trajectory of postwar 
reconstruction, particularly Japan‘s remilitarization and economic recovery.10  While Japan is 
portrayed as an outsider in Korean War history, Korea is nowhere to be found in the historical 
account of postwar Japan.  
In order to reveal and trace the complexity of the transnational linkages of the Korean 
War, this chapter discusses previously unexplored issues regarding the scope of the war: How 
was the Korean War fought in Japan?  In particular, this chapter illuminates the political 
dynamics of the Korean and Japanese Communist-led ―anti-war‖ (anti-U.S. military 
intervention) movement and the U.S.-Japan-South Korea communist containment.  Moreover, I 
demonstrate that the Korean War brought the two separate national entities of Japan and South 
Korea into the same field of vision and practice of revolution and counterrevolution.   
Indeed, what was at stake during the Korean War was the newly established national 
boundaries of a post-empire nation-state Japan and two-state Korea.  The U.S./Allied defeat of 
Japan in World War II and their subsequent occupation of Japan and Korea shattered, if not 
completely destroyed, the structural edifice of the Japanese empire and disintegrated the forced 
unity of Naisen-ittai, the Japanese imperial agenda of forging ―Japan and Korea as one body.‖  
                                                                                                                                                             
(Kyŏnggi-do: Tolbege, 2000) (English translation, The Unending Korean War: A Social History [Larkspur: Tamal 
Vista Publications, 2009]).  Since the publication of Kim‘s monograph, numerous works that address civilian 
massacres and popular experiences in Korea during the Korean War have been published in South Korean academia 
and journalism.              
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of the Korean War (Norfolk: General Douglas MacArthur Foundation, 1990); Roger Dingman, ―The Dagger and the 
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War (Drifte, ―Japan‘s Involvement in the Korean War‖).   
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The former metropole of Japan and the former colony of Korea became separate entities as new 
nation-states, although the Korean nation had two state structures.  The outbreak of the Korean 
War blurred this separation between these two national entities.  UN Commander General 
MacArthur seized command of the ROK (Republic of Korea) Army and reined in wartime South 
Korea as the de facto sovereign power.  MacArthur of Supreme Commander for Allied Powers 
(SCAP), the sovereign power of U.S./Allied-occupied Japan, transformed Japan into a rear base 
that was directly linked with the UN war effort in Korea; ―Korea‖ now became part and parcel of 
the objectives of the U.S./Allied occupation of Japan.  Under the single de facto sovereign power 
of the U.S. military authorities, Japan and ROK functioned as two overlapping regions rather 
than two separate national entities.  If, as historian Steven Hugh Lee has discussed, the U.S. 
global cold war strategy of containment took the form of ―informal empire‖ building in Asia, this 
chapter shows that the Korean War marked a critical event that revealed what this ―informal 
empire‖ looked like.11 
Moreover, the blurring between Korea and Japan under the UN war effort created a new 
space for zainichi Koreans (Koreans in Japan) to fight directly for the ongoing civil war in Korea 
ever since at least 1949.  In June 1950, zainichi Korean rightist leaders of ROK-affiliated 
associations launched a campaign for recruiting ―volunteer soldiers,‖ and sent some 600 zainichi 
Korean youths to South Korea via the UN Command.
12
  On the other hand, zainichi Korean 
Communist leaders, who belonged to the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), mobilized a massive 
anti-war campaign that protested against and also tried to sabotage the U.S. remaking of Japan as 
a rear base for military intervention in the Korean War.  Working for the cause of national 
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unification under the North Korean regime, the zainichi Korean Communist leaders also 
participated in JCP-led revolutionary movements in Japan, believing that the Communist seizure 
of power in the rear base would be the only way to defeat the ongoing U.S. military ―invasion‖ 
of their nation that was fighting a war for unification.  In this chapter, I discuss how Japan 
became a crucial locus of the transnationally linked revolutionary and counter-revolutionary 
struggles conterminous with the development of the civil war in the Korean peninsula.  I first 
briefly analyze the impact of the Korean War on zainichi Korean and Japanese Communist 
revolutionary strategy in the following section, and then examine the political dynamics between 
zainichi Korean and Japanese Communist anti-war campaigns and U.S.-Japan-South Korea 
communist containment.            
          
Converging Visions: Zainichi Korean and Japanese Communists for Solidarity  
Nation/class, nationalism/proletarian internationalism, and Korea/Japan – the questions of 
the proper aim, scope, and method of revolution had always haunted zainichi Korean Communist 
revolutionaries.  Zainichi Korean leaders, whether Communist or not, all shared a great passion 
for participating directly or indirectly in the new nation-state building in their now-liberated 
homeland of Korea under U.S. and Soviet occupations.  Simultaneously, zainichi Korean leaders 
were also faced with the reality that their own physical and material lives and those of their over 
600,000 liberated brethren, other zainichi Koreans, were still anchored in the former metropole, 
Japanese society.  The zainichi Korean Communist leaders, who had been serving both Korean 
Communities in Japan and the Japanese Communist Party, understood that the thorough 
―liberation‖ of Koreans remaining in Japan would depend primarily on the radical ―democratic 
revolution‖ of Japan that the JCP was fighting against the Japanese ancien régime.  They 
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believed that the liberation of zainichi Koreans from ―exploitation‖ and institutionalized racial 
discrimination in Japanese society was contingent on the elimination of old ―reactionary forces‖ 
and ultimately the emperor system.  Thus, the task in front of the zainichi Korean Communists 
was a twofold nature to their commitment to revolution.  One side required their devotion to the 
establishment of a unified, democratic government in Korea – what they called ―democratic 
revolution in the homeland.‖  The other side was for joint struggle together with the rising 
democratic revolutionary movements in Japan.  
The core question confronting zainichi Korean Communists was how to synthesize the 
Korean national agenda and the communist principle of class-based internationalist solidarity.  
Forging the synthesis of these two different but simultaneous tasks of zainichi Korean 
Communists presented a critical conundrum.  For Kim Tuyong, a long-time zainichi Korean 
independence fighter and one of the JCP leaders, a Korean ―national question‖ (minzoku mondai) 
had to be ―completely subordinate‖ to a class struggle when ―nation‘s interests‖ (minzokuteki 
rieki) and ―class interests‖ were incompatible with each other.13  From the ―standpoint of the 
communist principle,‖ according to Kim‘s article published in May 1947, zainichi Korean 
Communists were obliged to work beyond ―Korean‖ movements on behalf of ―broader 
revolutionary movements.‖  The ―nationalist bias‖ of both zainichi Koreans and the Japanese 
would only divide the two movements and thereby would ―prevent the Party from uniting 
together through internationalism.‖  Thus, Kim believed that zainichi Korean Communists had to 
work toward both allying themselves with the Japanese proletariat and also ―integrating 
correctly‖ the zainichi Korean movements into the Japanese revolutionary movements led by the 
JCP, the only party that would represent both the Japanese proletariat and zainichi Koreans.   
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But, other zainichi Korean Communist leaders and the JCP leadership held a different 
theory and approach to the reconciliation between two supposed binaries.  Apparently, Kim‘s 
―standpoint of the communist principle‖ regarding the binary of ―nation‖ and ―class‖ appeared 
too dichotomous and inflexible to other zainichi Korean Communist leaders and the JCP 
leadership.  In the JCP‘s directive of September 7, 1947, a document titled ―For the 
Strengthening of Korean Movements,‖ the Party declared that the ―two tasks‖ of zainichi Korean 
Communists could achieve a ―harmonious synthesis.‖14  According to the directive, the current 
zainichi Korean movements contained two types of ―pernicious‖ approaches to the national issue 
of building a unified, democratic nation-state in Korea.  On the one hand, zainichi Korean 
rightist leaders were establishing close ties with the leader of the ―reactionary camp‖ in Korea, 
those responsible for hindering the democratic united front in the Korean nation-state building.  
On the other hand, some leftists only believed in the necessity of fighting against reactionary 
forces in Japan, underestimating the Korean ―nation‘s [minzoku no] strong passion for 
accomplishing the full independence of their homeland.‖  The JCP leadership presented the latter, 
let alone the former, approach as ―pernicious‖ because it formulated the two tasks of zainichi 
Korean Communists as if they were in conflict.  In other words, it was wrong to ―ask what 
[would come] first, the homeland‘s revolution or Japan‘s revolution, and nationalism 
[minzokushugi] or class principle [kaikyūshugi].‖  The Party insisted that a ―harmonious 
synthesis‖ between two tasks of zainichi Korean Communists would be possible in the locus of 
democratic revolutionary movements in Japan.  
 Yet, the question still remained: how would the ―harmonious synthesis‖ take place in the 
locus of democratic movements in Japan?  What was the logic behind the possible ―harmonious 
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synthesis‖ between the ―national‖ question and ―class‖ interests, nationalism and 
internationalism, the homeland‘s revolution and Japan‘s revolution?  What was the rationale that 
would satisfy zainichi Koreans‘ ―strong passion for accomplishing the full independence of their 
homeland‖ and the necessity of fighting together with Japanese revolutionary movements?   
The JCP leadership did not elaborate upon any concrete details to achieve the synthesis 
between the ―two tasks‖ of zainichi Korean Communists in the directive.  It simply pointed out 
the significance of the democratic revolution of Japan for Korea‘s independence: ―We cannot 
allow Japan to become an aggressor toward Korean independence again[.]‖15  In fact, it was the 
―independence of Korea‖ that zainichi Korean Communist leaders often presented as the 
rationale for zainichi Korean collaboration with the JCP fighting for the radical democratic 
revolution that would uproot the vestiges of the Japanese ancien régime and the surviving 
emperor system in particular.
16
  According to their logic, the fight against the emperor system 
would not only liberate both zainichi Koreans and Japanese people from the oppressive regime 
but also influence the fate of the Korean nation.  For instance, Kim Ch‘ŏnhae, a zainichi Korean 
leader and one of the core members of the JCP leadership, believed that the ―independence of 
Korea,‖ as well as ―world peace,‖ would be secured ―only‖ through ―eliminating the Japanese 
emperor system responsible for aggression‖ and ―establishing the government of a pacifist, 
democratic people‘s republic in Japan.‖17  However, it was still not evident how the zainichi 
Korean fight for the ―independence of Korea‖ was directly linked to their participation in the 
Japanese revolution.  In short, the two did not constitute a thoroughly identical task in the 
communist revolutionary strategy.  The ―harmonious synthesis‖ between the two tasks of 
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zainichi Korean Communists remained unresolved until ―Korea‖ emerged as the central site of 
the Japanese revolutionary movement during the Korean War.       
The outbreak of the full-fledged war in Korea in June 1950 heralded a transformative 
event for the JCP and zainichi Korean Communist leaders in synthesizing the three key binaries: 
nation and class, nationalism and internationalism, and Korean national question and the 
Japanese revolutionary movement.  On September 3, 1950, the JCP leadership issued a new 
directive titled ―On Zainichi Korean Movements,‖ where the JCP declared the ―Korea problem‖ 
(Chōsen mondai) as the ―principal locus of current struggles for the Japanese revolution.‖18  The 
directive stated that ever since the ―war of imperialist aggression against Korea‖ began, the 
current Yoshida administration, ―the puppet of international imperialism,‖ had revealed its 
willingness to transform Japan into a rear base and to involve Japanese people in the war for the 
―invasion of Korea.‖  Zainichi Korean Communist members were fighting to defend their 
―homeland‖ against foreign military intervention, making determined efforts to sabotage the 
production and transportation of munitions through collaboration with Japanese workers.  The 
JCP leadership praised the zainichi Korean nationalistic struggles as ―identical‖ (icchi suru) with 
the task of the Japanese revolutionary movement, the objective of ―sweeping imperialist forces 
from Japan and smashing their puppet, domestic reactionaries.‖   
Here, the puzzling ―two tasks‖ conundrum of zainichi Korean Communists finally 
became a ―harmonious synthesis,‖ and the outbreak of the Korean War brought the two national 
entities, Korea and Japan, into the same field of vision of zainichi Korean and Japanese 
Communist strategy.  Moreover, the nationalistic struggles of the zainichi Korean Communists 
now resonated with the JCP leadership, who had drastically shifted their revolutionary 
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orientation toward a nationalistic anti-imperialism – Japanese ―national liberation‖ (minzoku 
kaihō) – since early 1950 in line with the Cominform in Moscow.19  Ironically, it was the JCP‘s 
and zainichi Korean Communists‘ nationalistic visions that enabled internationalist solidarity.  
Fighting the Korean War in Japan emerged as the principal locus of nationalistic synthesis 
between the Japanese and zainichi Korean movements in the JCP agenda.  Now was the time, in 
the words of the JCP directive, to ―form joint struggles against the common enemy‖ in 
accordance with the ―glorious duty mandated by proletarian internationalism.‖20 
 
Blurred Boundaries: The UN War Effort in Korea and the U.S./Allied Occupation in Japan  
As soon as news of the Korean War reached the shores of Japan, appeals for proletarian 
internationalism burst out onto the streets.  Zainichi Korean and Japanese activists, although not 
necessarily Communists, spearheaded guerrilla-like ―anti-war‖ campaigns by scattering leaflets 
and handbills that blared protests against U.S. and Japanese intervention in the Korean affairs.  
On June 27, the Japanese local police found a group of Koreans in Sendai City printing leaflets 
that contained the slogans such as ―Non-intervention with racial [sic] independence,‖ ―Crush the 
war-mongers‖ and ―Do not repeat Hiroshima.‖21  In Nagasaki Prefecture on July 1, Japanese 
Communist members in Sasebo City distributed to passersby anti-American handbills that 
accused ―American imperialism‖ of ―plotting to wage a war with the blood of the Japanese 
nation [minzoku].‖22  In Shimane Prefecture on July 2, one Communist day laborer posted a wall 
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newspaper with the headline, ―North Korean Army is the liberation army‖ on a bulletin board in 
front of a train station.
23
  In Kanagawa Prefecture on July 4, two Korean men carried anti-war 
handbills into a train and scattered them at several train stations.  The handbills exclaimed: ―Do 
not drive Japan into war!  Do not send weapons to South Korea!‖24  In Yamaguchi Prefecture on 
July 11, local Korean leaders distributed handbills calling upon railway workers, stevedores and 
factory workers in Shimonoseki City to ―stop railway transportation of American arms to 
Korea,‖ ―delay sailing of vessels to Korea,‖ and ―investigate which factory or factories [sic] are 
manufacturing arms for Korea.‖25  Similarly, the police found several Koreans putting up antiwar 
leaflets that blared, ―Do not let Japan become a powder keg!‖ and ―Oppose the loading of arms 
in Yokosuka and Yokohama!‖26   
The Tokyo-Yokohama metropolitan area, particularly the bay area in the vicinity of the 
military ports in Yokohama and U.S. military base in Yokosuka, became the first and primary 
site of on-the-ground Korean and Japanese resistance against U.S. intervention in the Korean 
War.  On June 27 at the Tsurumi Ward Employment Office in Yokohama, the office assigned 
seventeen day laborers to load munitions in the Yokosuka area.  The day laborers were about to 
get on a truck.  Soon, a group of Korean Communist members of the Day Laborers‘ Union 
approached the laborers and told them to refuse the job and oppose the war.  The Koreans 
successfully dissuaded them from working for the loading of munitions.  The following day, 
some 300 day laborers, mostly Koreans, held a mass meeting in front of the office and adopted a 
resolution that none of them would accept the job of loading ammunition destined for South 
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Korea.  Similarly, on June 29, eleven Koreans appeared at the branch office of the Suzue Gumi 
Stevedoring Company in Yokohama and told the manager not to send workers to the dock for the 
loading of ammunition.  When the manager simply ignored them, the Koreans started to pass out 
leaflets and post handwritten posters that stated their opposition to the ―shipment of arms to 
South Korea‖ and ―foreign intervention in the liberation of South Korea.‖27  A U.S. official in 
Yokohama reported that ―Communist groups, particularly Korean Communists, during July 
threatened prospective workers, agitated against the acceptance by laborers of employment and 
otherwise attempted to impede the flow of ammunition and materials to South Korea.‖28  
The Japanese police and Occupation authorities in Yokohama took ―prompt action‖ in 
arresting ―dissident elements.‖29  On July 3, the police arrested one of the Koreans who had 
visited the branch office of the Suzue Gumi Stevedoring Company in Yokohama on June 29 and 
had made, in the words of the police, ―inflammatory remarks slandering the United States and 
Allied Powers.‖30  On July 6, the police caught a Japanese Communist member who also had 
engaged in the dissuasion of the day laborers at the Tsurumi Ward Employment Office on June 
27.  The man was arrested on charges of ―slandering the occupation policy of the Allied Powers‖ 
with his allegedly ―inflammatory‖ remarks: ―The so-called service for the Occupation forces is 
the job of loading bullets.  You know where those bullets are used.  Those are for killing fellow 
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Koreans in Korea.‖31  According to the U.S. official in Yokohama, the Yokohama City Police, 
acting ―under instructions from the Occupation authorities,‖ arrested 102 Japanese and Korean 
suspects on June 30 and subsequently 39 more for ―distributing anti-American propaganda.‖32  
Furthermore, the police launched a massive raid on Communist students‘ cells at several 
universities and the homes of Communist student leaders in the Yokohama area on July 13.  The 
police confiscated anti-war pamphlets at multiple sites.
33
      
The Japanese police and Occupation authorities were determined not only to contain 
every single Japanese and Korean ―dissident‖ voice but also to punish any activity that supported 
Koreans fighting in Japan against foreign military intervention in the civil war in Korea.  For 
instance, the local police headquarters in Yamanashi Prefecture issued a statement warning that 
anyone who helped pro-North Korean elements or worked for their ―anti-war propaganda‖ would 
be arrested for ―offenses against the interests of the Occupation‖ under Japanese Imperial 
Ordinance No. 311 – the ordinance that prohibited ―an act prejudicial to the objectives of the 
U.S./Allied Occupation forces.‖34  The statement declared:  
Any act which solicits or invites contributions of money or goods to any Korean 
association (or body) in support of the North Korean army.  This includes the 
printing aimed at such support.  Person producing or distributing anti-war 
propaganda will also be punished.
35
 
 
In Hiroshima Prefecture, for instance, the police arrested 35 Koreans, 22 Japanese Communists 
and 13 Japanese for the violation of the Imperial Ordinance 311 during the week from July 1 to 
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July 7.
36
  According to Japanese police reports, the total number of the arrests across Japan 
during the period between June 1 and July 21 amounted to 363, including 132 Koreans, 97 
Japanese Communists, 84 labor union members and others.  By August 31, the number increased 
to 613, including 215 Koreans, 216 Japanese Communists, 116 labor union members and 
others.
37
  Their arrests were mostly for distributing anti-war leaflets, and some even for 
possessing the leaflets. 
Those arrested for anti-war activities often had to pay a heavy price for raising a voice 
against foreign intervention and Japanese involvement in the Korean War.  Pak Chŏnho, who 
was arrested for distributing anti-war leaflets in Yokohama on July 1, was tried by Yokohama 
Provost Court on July 11.  The provost court sentenced him to five years‘ confinement with hard 
labor.
38
  On July 14, the Yokohama Provost Court also put on trial three Koreans who were 
arrested in Kawasaki City for distributing leaflets that appealed to Japanese workers not to send 
arms to South Korea.  The provost court sentenced the three to six years‘ confinement with hard 
labor.
39
  In Tokyo, a provost court sentenced a Korean man to deportation to South Korea, in 
addition to five years‘ confinement at hard labor.40  Similarly, two Korean college students were 
also sentenced by a provost court to deportation to South Korea following the term of three 
years‘ confinement with hard labor.41   
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With a more than hint of protest against the disproportionately harsh punishments, one 
zainichi Korean newspaper compared those sentences for anti-war activities to the fate of 
Japanese Class-A war criminal Shigemitsu Mamoru, who had been sentenced to seven years‘ 
imprisonment without hard labor.
42
  A local branch of the Korean Liberation Relief Association 
(Chōsen Kaihō Kyūenkai) wrote in its statement that some 200 Korean anti-war ―patriots‖ were 
arrested and detained in Sugamo Prison without a warrant, while Japanese war criminals had 
been pardoned and were walking out of the prison gates.
43
  This stark contrast between Japanese 
war criminals walking out as free men from Sugamo Prison and anti-war Koreans sentenced to 
hard labor or multiple-year imprisonment exposed the reality of the so-called ―reverse course‖ in 
occupation policy, SCAP‘s reactionary turn from its initial project of ―demilitarization‖ and 
―democratization.‖  It was ironic that SCAP, the very authorities that had disarmed Japan‘s 
militarist regime and institutionalized the new democratic, ―pacifist‖ constitution, now 
criminalized pacifist dissident voices opposing Japan‘s involvement in the Korean War.   
In fact, the Occupation‘s criminalization of anti-war voices by means of the Imperial 
Ordinance 311 raised a fundamental question of how ―anti-war‖ activities could be considered 
―anti-American‖ and ―anti-Occupation,‖ or ―an act prejudicial to the objectives of the 
U.S./Allied Occupation forces.‖  People began to raise a simple question: ―What is wrong about 
anti-war movements?‖  In its handbill, a JCP local committee in Kagawa Prefecture claimed that 
the reason the Japanese were opposing the war was that people had suffered enough from the 
previous war and did not want to be dragged into another war.  Given their immediate memories 
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of wartime hardships, they wondered, ―What is wrong about anti-war movements?‖44  A Korean 
who witnessed the trial and conviction of the three Korean men at the Yokohama Provost Court 
questioned how their protest against Japanese involvement in the Korean War could become a 
crime of ―anti-American propaganda‖: 
They call it anti-American that we Koreans expressed our opposition to the 
transportation of arms and ammunition that would [be used to] destroy our 
homeland and kill our family.  Yet, did we really do anti-American propaganda?
45
         
 
More fundamental criticism of the criminalization of anti-war voices came from the 
courtroom.  In the trial of Pak Chŏnho who was arrested for distributing anti-war leaflets, his 
lawyer disputed whether it was legally valid to apply the Imperial Ordinance 311 to peaceful 
anti-war activities under the pacifist constitution of Japan.  The lawyer emphasized that the 
message articulated in the leaflets Pak had distributed was the promotion of pacifism in Japan 
and thus the message was consonant with the ―renouncement of the use of force‖ declared in the 
Japanese new constitution – therefore, the distribution of the leaflets would not constitute a 
―prejudicial‖ action.  The lawyer also pointed out that the Imperial Ordinance 311, which 
prohibited an act prejudicial to the ―objectives of the U.S./Allied Occupation forces,‖ could not 
be applied to an act aimed toward ―Korea.‖46  In other words, the lawyer argued that the 
objectives of the U.S./Allied occupation of Japan were supposed to have nothing to do with the 
Korean War. 
What was at stake in the Occupations‘ provost court was not only the legal rationale for 
silencing Korean and Japanese anti-war voices under the new Japanese pacifist constitution that 
U.S./Allied Occupation had institutionalized.  At stake was also the supposed separation between 
                                                 
44
 JCP Takamatsu City Committee, ―What Is Wrong about ‗Anti-war Movements‘?‖ (July 5, 1950), attached to 
Shikoku Civil Affairs Region to Civil Affairs Section, ―Communist Handbill‖ (July 19, 1950), Folder: Korean 
Incidents, Box 2294, SCAP, Civil Affairs Section, RG 331, NARA.  
45
 Kaihō, July 17, 1950. 
46
 Kaihō, July 14, 1950. 
  
246 
 
the UN war effort in Korea and the U.S./Allied occupation of Japan.  How could Korean and 
Japanese peaceful protests against the UN war effort constitute a crime ―prejudicial‖ to the 
occupation of Japan? 
The provost court most likely did not have a convincing answer to this question.  Even 
among the U.S. policy-makers of the Occupation authorities, there was not a clear consensus 
concerning how to articulate officially the relationship between the UN war effort in Korea and 
the objectives of the U.S./Allied Occupation forces.  For the Judge Advocate Section (JA) of the 
General Headquarters for the Far East Command, the two were legally, if not practically, 
separate matters and SCAP should officially declare the two to be identical if provost courts 
were responsible for ―the prosecution of individuals resisting the effort of the United Nations in 
the present conflict.‖47  In its memorandum to SCAP on August 1, 1950, the JA argued that in a 
legal sense, ―the military assistance being given the Republic of Korea by the United Nations 
against the armed forces of the so-called Democratic People‘s Republic of (North) Korea [had] 
no connection per se [sic] with the objectives of the military occupation, under SCAP, of the 
main islands of Japan‖: 
Therefore, all [sic] acts which may be detrimental to the military efforts of the 
United Nations in Korea cannot be considered by virtue of that fact alone to be 
offenses prejudicial to the objectives of the occupation of Japan and punishable as 
such.
48
 
 
In order for provost courts to impose punishment on peaceful anti-war activities, the UN war 
effort in Korea had to be declared as part of the objectives of the Occupation in Japan.  Thus, the 
JA proposed that SCAP take legislative action by promulgating a Military Proclamation that any 
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acts aimed at supporting North Korea would be ―deemed to commit an act prejudicial to the 
security of the Occupation.‖  The JA understood that such action would mean the official 
declaration of the ―unneutral position‖ of Japan.49 
In reality, it was self-evident that U.S./Allied-occupied Japan was committed to playing a 
critical role in the internationalized Korean civil war.  Japan was a critical site of the first ―hot 
war‖ of the cold war, as the Legal Section of SCAP admitted in its response to the JA: ―The 
Occupation Forces are now committed in the United Nations effort to suppress unlawful 
aggression which threatens the peace of Japan and the world.‖50  In official discourse, however, 
Japan had to be separate from the war in Korea – officially, Japan was not at all involved in ―the 
threat and use of force as means of settling international disputes,‖ as the SCAP-drafted new 
Japanese Constitution renounced.  Opposing the JA‘s proposal as ―unwise and dangerous‖ to the 
position of SCAP, the Government Section of SCAP refused to take any action that would result 
in admitting that ―the present U.N. effort in defense of the Republic of South Korea [sic]‖ had 
become ―an objective of the Occupation of Japan under SCAP.‖  The Government Section even 
went as far as to deny the Legal Section‘s acknowledgement of the self-evident reality that 
―Japan [was] committed to the support of the objectives of the U.N., including the present action 
in Korea.‖51 
Indeed, this sheer denial of Japan‘s commitment also characterized the official parlance 
of the Japanese government, although taking a more rhetorical form.  On July 15, 1950, when 
SCAP and the Japanese government had already started mobilizing Japanese resources, materials 
and manpower for the UN forces fighting in Korea, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru portrayed 
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Japan‘s stance on the UN war effort as ―spiritual cooperation‖ (seishin teki ni kyōryoku suru).52  
Moreover, the Japanese government also refused to admit the reality that the practical separation 
between the occupation of Japan and the UN war effort in Korea had become virtually 
impossible.  In the National Diet on July 29, a Communist lawmaker argued that Japanese people 
were ―getting confused‖ about whether recent Occupation directives were aimed for Japan or 
Korea – blurred boundaries of the occupation.  The lawmaker questioned how the Japanese 
government was drawing a distinction and was dealing with those Occupation directives 
unrelated to Japan.  The Japanese government official, Attorney-General Ōhashi Takeo, simply 
insisted that the government should not care about such distinctions because General MacArthur 
never issued Occupation directives in the name of the UN Commander.  In other words, the 
distinction, whether those directives were ―practically‖ (jisshitsu teki ni) aimed for the 
occupation of Japan or the UN war effort in Korea, would not matter as long as the directives 
were issued in the ―form‖ (keishiki) of a SCAP directive, in the name of General MacArthur as 
the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, not as the UN Commander.
53
  In this logic – or the 
rhetoric of separation between Japan and Korea – Japan was supposedly not committed to the 
Korean War, and the Japanese government and SCAP clung to this rhetoric to the end, fighting 
the Korean War in Japan.  
 
Overlapping Struggles: For the Revolution of Japan and the “Homeland Defense” of Korea 
As Koreans‘ guerrilla-like anti-war activities spread across Japan, zainichi Korean 
Communist leaders, who had been preparing a new Korean united front, took swift action to 
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reorganize leftist zainichi Korean youths into a new movement.  On June 28, 1950, the Korean 
Communist leaders held a meeting at the headquarters of the JCP and discussed a plan to set up a 
new zainichi Korean agency that would direct military action for the ―defense of the homeland.‖  
In this meeting, the leaders decided to launch an underground campaign for organizing 
―Homeland Defense‖ (sokoku bōei) committees and youth corps across Japan and also to issue a 
statement to the zainichi Korean population.
54
  Their statement appeared in a zainichi Korean 
newspaper, Haebang Sinmun, on July 6.  In the statement, the Homeland Defense Committee 
made an appeal to all zainichi Koreans ―fighting for national independence‖ to unite under the 
―control and leadership‖ of the Homeland Defense Committee.  The Committee particularly 
emphasized the necessity of organized action to defend the homeland against Japanese-made 
weapons: ―We have to … fight against the production and transportation of weapons that will be 
sent from our neighborhood to Syngman Rhee and his conspirators.‖55  On August 27, some 
thirty zainichi Korean Communist leaders from all over Japan gathered at the JCP headquarters 
in Tokyo and formulated an overall strategy for the future zainichi Korean movements.  The 
leaders agreed to mobilize Homeland Defense Corps and other youth groups to sabotage the 
production and transportation of munitions through collaboration with Japanese workers.
56
           
While zainichi Korean Communist leaders were developing the ―homeland defense‖ 
campaign across Japan, the JCP issued a directive to Party members and declared that the ―Korea 
problem‖ had become ―the principal locus of current struggles for the Japanese revolution.‖57  
The JCP leadership emphasized that the zainichi Koreans who were fighting against Japan‘s role 
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in foreign military intervention in the Korean War were also fighting for the Japanese revolution, 
in helping to ―sweep imperialist forces from Japan and smash their puppet, domestic 
reactionaries.‖  The JCP leadership admitted that Japanese members in the Party were still not 
engaging enough in zainichi Korean movements and thus the zainichi Korean anti-war 
movements had developed separately from mass-based daily struggles.  For instance, zainichi 
Korean youth activists had distributed ―highly political‖ leaflets that had ―nothing to do with 
issues in the everyday life of Japanese workers‖ and thus had sometimes ended up rather 
intimidating the workers.  The JCP leadership urged the Party members to strengthen their 
leadership in zainichi Korean activities in order to expand Korean movements into mass-based, 
joint struggles with Japanese people (Nihon jinmin). 
One major agenda that had emerged as a possible key locus of a mass-based, joint 
movement at that moment was what the JCP called ―anti-tax struggles.‖  On July 31, the Yoshida 
administration passed the new Local Tax Law in the National Diet despite mounting criticism 
and opposition.  The JCP soon reenergized a campaign against the newly-institutionalized local 
tax collection, in an attempt to mobilize workers and labor unions against the current regime.  
For the Party heavily damaged by its internal conflict and SCAP‘s anti-communist offensive, the 
―anti-tax‖ appeared to be a critical opportunity to seize the initiative of mass-based ―people‘s 
struggles‖ (jinmin tōsō).58  Moreover, the JCP‘s ―anti-tax struggles‖ agenda was also closely 
linked with its fight against the ―red purge‖ offensive that had been escalating ever since the 
outbreak of the Korean War.
59
  In their resistance against companies‘ ―unlawful‖ firing and 
expelling of Communist members and sympathizers from the workplace, Communist workers 
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often found themselves lacking broad support from other workers and unions.  The JCP 
leadership believed (and hoped) that the ―anti-tax‖ campaign would allow the JCP to form a 
mass joint struggle against the ―red purge‖ offensive by uniting Communist and non-Communist 
workers as well as unions from different sectors.
60
  Simultaneously, the JCP leaders held a 
meeting in late September with some twenty zainichi Korean Communist leaders from all over 
Japan and discussed their new task.  According to a Japanese intelligence report, their new tasks 
were now centered on daily life issues like ―anti-tax struggles‖ rather than ―spy tactics.‖61   
Parallel to the changing revolutionary strategy among the zainichi Korean Communist 
leaders, the orientation of their underground ―homeland defense‖ activities also began to shift 
toward ―mass-based struggles.‖  On October 29, at a crucial moment after the UN forces had 
crossed the 38
th
 parallel and the Chinese People‘s Volunteer Army had just crossed the Yalu 
River into Korea, some seventy representatives of youth corps across Japan and leaders of the 
Homeland Defense Committee held an underground convention to form a new youth front, 
called ―Zainichi Korean Youth Front for Homeland Defense (Sokoku Bōei Zainichi Chōsen 
Seinen Sensen).
62
  According to the Youth Front‘s resolution statement obtained by the Japanese 
intelligence, the new policy that the Youth Front adopted was mass-based, Korean-Japanese joint 
struggle aimed at making a revolution in Japan.  The Youth Front declared that ―interests‖ of the 
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Korean nation (minzoku) had become completely identical with those of Japanese people (Nihon 
jinmin) under the current situation.  In other words, the Japanese people‘s revolutionary 
movement for ―national independence‖ (minzoku dokuritsu) was now simply ―our [zainichi 
Korean] own struggles.‖  The Youth Front also emphasized that in order to make a real 
revolution against ―American imperialism‖ (beitei) and its ―puppet reactionary‖ regime in Japan, 
it was no longer sufficient simply to maintain the current form of activities that had attempted to 
sabotage the production and transportation of munitions from Japan to South Korea.  Thus, it 
was time for zainichi Korean youths to demonstrate their strong determination to ―make a 
revolution not a street demonstration.‖63   
 Then, what was the new task of the determined zainichi Korean youths?  The task that the 
Youth Front presented in its new policy was indeed, to paraphrase Mao Zedong‘s famous 
revolutionary strategy, ―from the masses to the masses.‖  According to the Youth Front 
resolution, the current zainichi Korean movements failed to take seriously the everyday problems 
of zainichi Korean livelihood, such as tax burdens and pervasive unemployment, or treated them 
simply as economic issues through an ―economism‖ approach.  Zainichi Korean activists had to 
address those everyday problems from the ―viewpoint of class and nation‖ (kaikyūteki 
minzokuteki kanten).  In other words, those problems had to be understood in terms of ―class,‖ on 
the one hand, as the problems that the majority of both zainichi Korean and Japanese masses 
were facing.  On the other hand, those problems were also closely associated with the current 
issue of the ―national‖ independence of both Korea and Japan or, as the resolution presented, the 
current U.S. ―invasion of the homeland‖ and ―colonization of Japan.‖  Therefore, in the logic of 
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the Youth Front, zainichi Korean mass struggles over their livelihood could develop into mass-
based, Korean-Japanese joint political action and further into a joint revolutionary struggle.  In 
the resolution, the Youth Front declared: 
We have to … make a drastic leap in advancing the local-based people‘s struggles 
that will lead to the masses‘ seizure of power by force….64 
 
Before long, during late November to early December, small-scale, local popular 
uprisings suddenly started to take place one after another across Japan, particularly in the Kinki 
region.  The Japanese intelligence agency reported on numerous Korean and Japanese 
demonstrations that had often ended up with a violent clash with the local police forces.  As 
many as some hundred Korean and Japanese local residents and day workers took to the streets 
and besieged local municipal offices with urgent demands for jobs, tax reduction, social welfare, 
or the right to have Korean-led education.  The popular uprisings demanding employment and 
protesting against new local taxes resulted in seventeen cases of arrest in Osaka, Kyoto and 
Hyogo Prefectures of the Kansai area alone from November 28 to December 6.
65
  According to a 
government investigation, the total of 7,000 to 9,000 participated in those demonstrations across 
the Kinki region, including protests against the ―red purge,‖ during mid-September to early 
December.
66
   
In Kobe City, Korean residents – men, women, students, and schoolchildren – 
particularly fought hard for their subsistence by demanding social welfare.  Approximately 
16,500 Koreans were living in Kobe City, which constituted nearly the one-third of the Korean 
population in Hyogo Prefecture.  Among the Korean residents in Kobe City, 7,600 to 9,000 were 
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living in Nagata Ward, where the series of large Korean demonstrations and bloody clashes with 
the police took place during the week between November 20 and 27. 
In the early morning on November 20, local Korean youth activists made door-to-door 
visits to Korean residents in Nagata Ward and told them, ―If you have difficulty in paying tax or 
making ends meet, please join us at the [Korean] school.  We are going [to the Nagata Ward 
Office] to present a petition now.‖67  Some eighty Korean residents, mostly women and children, 
gathered at the Nishi-Kobe Korean School nearby and visited the mayor‘s office in droves led by 
two local Korean leaders.  The group met the mayor and demanded that the ward office provide 
them with a means of livelihood, help the poor by granting welfare benefits, and exempt them 
from local tax.  Unsatisfied with the mayor‘s response, the group refused to leave the mayors‘ 
office and continued to push for their demands.  Meanwhile, teachers from the Korean school 
brought some 200 junior high school (middle school) students to the Nagata Ward Office.  The 
students started to cheer the group in the mayor‘s office by singing upbeat, rousing songs of 
Korean national liberation outside the office building.  The group pressed the mayor harder to 
accept their demands.  Soon, nearly 100 police men arrived and surrounded the office building, 
and ordered the group to dismiss.  While the group was exiting out of the building, there was a 
minor scuffle between some Koreans and policemen and the police arrested one Korean leader. 
This incident spelled further confrontation between Korean residents and the local 
authorities in Kobe City.  On November 24, four days after this incident, some 400 Korean 
residents and students gathered at the Nishi-Kobe Korean School near the Nagata Ward Office 
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again.  A group of some 300 Koreans launched a demonstration in front of the ward office, and 
another group of some 120 Koreans headed toward the Nagata Police Station to demand the 
release of the Korean leader arrested on November 20.  At the ward office, the mass of Koreans 
occupied the square outside the office building and a group of leaders crowded into the building 
to present the demands they had made previously.  Simultaneously, the group of Koreans 
carrying out their demonstration at the Nagata Police Station found that police officers were 
ready to be dispatched to the ward office where another group was making a demonstration.  The 
Korean students staged a sit-in in front of police cars and tried in vain to stop the police.  
Meanwhile, the police officers arrived at the ward office and started to drag the demonstrators 
out of the building, cracking them over the head with nightsticks.  The demonstrators resisted 
hard the police raid, throwing red pepper powder in the face of police officers, and some were 
severely injured, including students.  The police arrested 22 Koreans and 4 Japanese participants.                 
The climax of the Korean demonstrations in Kobe City came on November 27.  After the 
bloody crush of November 24, the Korean local activists spread words on the police violence and 
arrest of demonstrators and called for urgent support from Korean residents outside Nagata Ward.  
In the morning of November 27, crowds of agitated and concerned Koreans started to gather 
across Hyogo Prefecture at the Nishi-Kobe School, where nearly 900 Koreans – men, women, 
students, schoolchildren, and one Japanese teacher of the Korean school – held a mass rally and 
adopted a resolution to make a group appeal for social welfare and the release of those arrested at 
previous demonstrations.  The Kobe Municipal Police ordered the rally to disband immediately, 
putting 2600 police officers on standby outside the school and its vicinity.  The angry crowd 
responded by throwing stones over the fence at the police officers besieging the school.  Soon, 
the crowd, arming themselves with wooden sticks, stones and powdered red pepper, launched a 
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demonstration march toward the Nagata Ward Office, led by a group of determined young men 
with their arms locked together.  When the demonstrators came to the vicinity of the ward office, 
large police squads stormed out of alleyways and started to arrest the demonstrators, beating 
them up with nightsticks.  The crowd scattered, and some fought back, stoning the police.  Those 
who escaped arrest by the police burst into the ward office and ward tax office, where they 
smashed doors, desks, and windows in a frenzy.  According to a police report, the police arrested 
181 on the spot, and 50 police officers and 37 ―suspects‖ were injured – the number of injuries 
on the side of the police was allegedly higher than the demonstrators. 
 
 
The Japanese police surrounding the Nishi-Kōbe Korean School.  Kōbeshi Keisatsushi (Kobe: Kōbeshi Keisatsubu, 
1956).   
 
The so-called ―Kobe incident‖ marked the largest and most crucial event in the series of 
Korean demonstrations at that time, sparking other uprisings outside Hyogo Prefecture, in the 
Kinki region.  The following table shows the outline of Korean demonstrations in Hyogo and 
other prefectures during late November to early December.
68
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*Hyogo Prefecture 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Napier Papers, MMA; Chairman of the Committee on Judicial Affairs, ―An Investigation Report on Riots in Kobe 
and Other Areas‖ (February 16, 1951); Kurihara Satoshi, Shūdan hanzai sōsa ni kansuru jisshōteki kōsatsu (Tokyo: 
Kensatsu Kenkyūjo, 1951) [excerpt reprinted in Kim and Horiuchi, Zainichi Chōsenjin seikatsu yōgo no tatakai].   
Date Location Number of Participants Demands 
Nov    
20 Fukiai Ward Office, 
Kobe 
50 Koreans social welfare, reduction of tax 
20 Nagata Ward Office, 
Kobe 
80 Koreans and 200 
students 
social welfare, reduction of tax 
24 Nagata Ward Office, 
Kobe 
300-400 Koreans, 
including students  
food, social welfare, reduction of tax 
 Nagata Police Station, 
Kobe 
120 Koreans, including 
100 students 
 
350 Koreans, including 
200 students 
release of a Korean leader who was 
arrested during the demonstration at the 
Nagata Ward Office on November 20 
 
release of the Koreans who were arrested 
during the demonstrations at the Nagata 
Ward Office on November 20 and 24  
 Nada Ward Office, Kobe 20 Koreans social welfare, reduction of tax 
 Fukiai Ward Office, 
Kobe 
150 Koreans social welfare, reduction of tax 
 Okubo Town Office, 
Akashi 
120-130 day laborers, 
mostly Koreans 
employment 
 Akashi City Office, 
Akashi 
70 Korean children and 
a teacher 
Korean education 
 Asada Chemical, Inc. 
Mitsubishi Electric, Inc 
Nihon Satetsu, Inc, 
Himeji 
Koreans and Japanese protest against ―red purge‖ firing 
25 Himeji Police Station, 
Himeji 
50 Koreans including 
students 
release of a Korean who was arrested 
during the anti-―red purge‖ protest at the 
Mitsubishi Electric on November 24  
 Ikuta Ward Office, Kobe 30 day laborers social welfare 
27 Itami City Office, 30 Koreans reduction of tax, employment 
 Ikuta Ward Office, Kobe 40 day laborers [unknown] 
 Nagata Ward Office, 
Kobe 
800-900 Koreans, 
including 
schoolchildren 
social welfare, release of arrested 
Koreans 
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*Other Prefectures  
Nov.    
27 Aichi Prefectural Office 250-300 Koreans, 
including students 
Korean education, social welfare 
28 Aichi Prefectural Office 100-150 Koreans, 
including students 
release of Koreans who were arrested 
during the demonstration at the Aichi 
Prefectural Office on the previous day 
Dec.    
1 Kyoto City Office 100 Koreans, including 
30 schoolchildren 
Korean education 
 Otsu City Office, Otsu 
District Prosecutor‘s 
Office 
100 Korean and 
Japanese day laborers 
social welfare, release of arrested day 
laborers 
 Otsu District 
Prosecutor‘s Office, 
Shiga Prefecture 
100-150 Koreans, 
including students 
 
200 Koreans 
release of arrested Koreans and Japanese   
 
 
release of arrested Koreans and Japanese 
4 Kawasaki City Office, 
Kanagawa Prefecture 
30-50 Koreans and 
Japanese 
social welfare, reduction of tax 
 Tsurumi Ward Office, 
Yokohama, Kanagawa 
40 Koreans and 20 
Japanese 
reduction of tax 
 Isoko Ward Office, 
Yokohama, Kanagawa 
30 Koreans and 
Japanese  
reduction of tax 
 Kita Ward Office, 
Nagoya, Aichi 
16 Koreans reduction of tax 
 Morioka District 
Prosecutor‘s Office, 
Iwate Prefecture 
70 Koreans, including 
children 
release of an arrested Korean school 
superintendent   
 
 
The Japanese government and major media characterized the Korean demonstrations as 
―riots‖ and a ―Communist plot‖ to launch a ―revolution by force.‖  Asahi Shimbun reported on 
the Korean men, women and children demanding social welfare at the Nagata Ward Office on 
November 24 in Kobe City and portrayed them as a ―red mob‖ in its news article, titled: ―Four 
Hundred Children and Others Participated.  A ‗Red Mob‘ Made a Disturbance in Kobe, 
Attacking City Office, etc.‖69  In the National Diet, Attorney-General Ōhashi Takeo gave a 
speech and explicitly linked the Korean demonstrations with the JCP and ―international 
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communist forces‖ fighting the war in Korea.70  A government investigation team submitted a 
report to the House of Representatives on February 16, 1951 and presented the series of Korean 
and Japanese ―riots‖ (sōran) during late November to early December as the harbinger of the 
Communist offensive for ―revolution by force‖ (bōryoku kakumeika).  The investigation report 
concluded that the series of the disturbance ranging from the workers‘ counter-―red purge‖ 
offensive to the Korean daily protests, which had emerged in tandem with the ―course of the war 
in Korea,‖ seemed to be ―a plot to obstruct [Japan‘s] cooperation with the UN forces.‖71  
It was true that the JCP was radically shifting toward becoming a more aggressive 
revolutionary vanguard at that time.  Since the JCP leadership had accepted the Cominform‘s 
harsh criticism of its initial revolutionary strategy of ―peaceful revolution‖ (heiwa kakumei) – or 
the peaceful seizure of power through the parliamentary system under U.S./Allied occupation – 
the JCP leadership started to tread a more radical path toward making revolution by force.  In the 
middle of the Party‘s festering internal conflict, the mainstream faction proposed ―armed 
struggles‖ in October 1950 through its underground journals and soon established a militant 
strategy in the Party‘s Fourth Congress of February 1951.72  The new militant line was modeled 
on the Chinese Communist revolution, although it only partially adopted the Maoist strategy of 
guerrilla warfare ―from the countryside to the cities.‖73  Moreover, the JCP also stressed in its 
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Fourth Congress resolution that the Party would reinforce the collaboration with ―ethnic 
minorities in Japan‖ (zainichi shōsū minzoku) fighting for their ―rights and interests.‖74  
However, the Korean mass demonstrations and local uprisings were not simply the 
product of the JCP‘s radicalization.  Even though the Japanese intelligence agency believed that 
the JCP took advantage of Korean ethnic minority ―in the van‖ of ―terroristic revolution,‖ it was 
not the case.
75
  In the case of the ―Kobe incident,‖ the JCP and zainichi Korean Communist 
leaders probably played a certain role behind the local Korean leaders in mobilizing the 
demonstrations.
76
  Yet, ordinary Koreans had their own reasons to rise up.  Some observers 
correctly understood that what had caused those uprisings was the ―discontent of a large element 
of the Korean minority resulting from their inability to obtain regular employment in Japan.‖77  
Indeed, according to a survey of the zainichi Korean livelihood in 1952, 50 to 60 percent of the 
workforce was jobless or only held a temporary job.
78
  A lawmaker and former Socialist Party 
member Adachi Umeichi, who had participated in a non-governmental investigation of the 
―Kobe incident,‖ expressed a similar view on the causes of the incident.  He pointed out that 
Koreans were ―jobless,‖ ―deprived of freedom in education,‖ and ―suffering from extreme 
poverty.‖  Adachi regarded the Korean uprisings as the Koreans‘ attempt to ―protect themselves 
from hard living for this reason and not for some political reason[s].‖79   
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Adachi was only half right.  There were certain ―political‖ reasons and motivations 
behind the Korean uprisings in Kobe, although those motivations had mostly nothing to do with 
the ―revolution‖ in Japan that the JCP and zainichi Korean Communist leaders had been pursuing.  
For instance, Ri Ponghak, who was a member of a local Korean youth group in Kobe, believed 
that if zainichi Koreans rose up to demand social welfare, they would force the Japanese 
government to spend more money and thereby would be able to do certain ―damage to Japanese 
reactionary forces‖ collaborating with the U.S. war effort in Korea.  Ri encouraged local Korean 
residents to participate in the mass demonstration at the Nagata Ward Office on November 20 by 
telling them that obtaining social welfare would reduce the Japanese government‘s budget for 
remilitarization aimed at ―invading our [Korean] homeland again.‖80  It was this rationale that 
the local leaders pushed forward for the demonstration, and a number of zainichi Koreans in 
need of livelihood and social welfare embraced it, too.  Ro Chaesok, who was a teacher at a 
Korean school in Himeji City, traveled to Kobe with other Koreans and participated in the local 
uprising of November 27 for the same reason.  He considered it crucial to make a collective 
demand for social welfare not only for the sake of the zainichi Korean livelihood itself, but also 
for their homeland.
81
  The ordinary Koreans had their own reasons to rise up.  They took to the 
streets demanding for social welfare out of poverty and also out of concern for their homeland.   
      
Intertwined Fates: Korean Deportation      
The Japanese government immediately took advantage of the surge in Korean ―riots‖ to 
prepare extreme measures against zainichi Korean leftists – namely, the compulsory deportation 
of Korean ―subversives‖ to South Korea.  A Japanese newspaper reported on December 24, 1950 
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that the government had decided to work on the deportation of Korean ―subversive elements‖ 
with the permission of SCAP.
82
  The Chief Cabinet Secretary issued a statement on December 26 
and announced that the Japanese government was planning to deport those Koreans who ―had 
broken the law and disturbed public security‖ to South Korea.83  The South Korean government 
also responded favorably.  On January 13, 1951, the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan 
delivered its statement to the Japanese press and declared that the South Korean government 
would request SCAP and the Japanese government to send back ―malignant elements‖ (akushitsu 
bunshi) among Korean residents in Japan.
84
  Moreover, a major South Korean newspaper 
reported that the South Korean Ministry of Justice was planning to devise new countermeasures 
that would introduce the tactics of ―thought war‖ (sasang chŏn) into the ideological 
rehabilitation of leftist Koreans in Japan.  What the Ministry of Justice had in mind as a 
successful example was the National Guidance Alliance (Kungmin Podo Yŏnmaeng), a state 
ideological device for the conversion and reeducation of leftists and leftist sympathizers that the 
South Korean regime had learned from Japanese colonial rule.
85
  
Simultaneously, the Foreign Office of the Japanese government formulated a proposal to 
deport the ―undesirable Koreans in Japan‖ to South Korea and submitted it to the Government 
Section of SCAP for consideration.  In the proposal, the Foreign Office acknowledged that the 
―behavior and actions of the undesirable Korean elements may not have posed up to [then] a 
serious threat to law and order in Japan.‖  However, the Foreign Office maintained that the 
―antipathy of the Japanese people in general‖ toward Koreans in Japan had been increasing since 
Japan‘s defeat, and thus in the interest of ―fostering friendly relations‖ between Japanese and 
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Koreans, it would be desirable if ―these destructive elements be removed from the scene by such 
measure as deportation.‖86   
For SCAP, who had categorized and treated Korean residents in Japan as a postcolonial 
population still retaining Japanese nationality, the mass deportation of Korean ―Japanese 
nationals‖ was a sensitive matter in both the legal and political sense.  Particularly, in the wake 
of the local zainichi Korean uprisings of late 1950 that was coterminous with the ongoing war in 
Korea, the deportation issue became a highly political concern and required SCAP and the 
Japanese government to invent a sophisticated legal device.  Amidst the Korean War, SCAP was 
concerned considerably about the possible grave impact that the compulsory deportation of 
Korean leftists to South Korea might have on the North Korean treatment of American POWs.
87
  
At the same time, SCAP was fully aware that ―[t]he Japanese Government [was] faced with the 
problem of moving from Japan by deportation in a legal manner and with due principles of 
human rights a group of individual aliens who [were] now undermining the stability of the 
country[.]‖88  Soon, the Government Section of SCAP started to work with American 
immigration expert Nicholas D. Collaer, a retired senior official of the United States Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, in order to help the Japanese government craft effective migration 
controls ―in agreement with generally accepted international practice.‖89 
                                                 
86
 Japanese Foreign Office, ―The Deportation of Koreans in Japan‖ (December 30, 1950), Folder: Japanese 
Government, Foreign Office: The Departure of Korean in Japan, Box 2, Reel 1082, Napier Papers, MMA. 
87
 A Japanese government official stated that General Staff-1 (G-1) took into consideration the treatment of 
American POWs in dealing with the Korean deportation issue.  See ―Deportation of Korean Issue [sic]‖ (March 9, 
1950), Folder: Immigration, Box 2189, Government Section, RG 331 (GS(B) 01602, GHQ/SCAP Records, NDL).  
88
 Cottrell to Napier, ―Laws Relating to Immigration and Control of Aliens in Japan‖ (March 13, 1951), ibid.   
89
 For the detail of Collaer‘s role in making a postwar Japanese immigration system, see Ōnuma Yasuaki, Tan’itsu 
minzoku shakai no shinwa o koete: zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin to shutsunyūkoku kanri taisei (Tokyo: Tōshindō, 
1986), pp.77-94; Robāto Riketto [Robert Ricketts], ―Chōsen Sensō zengo ni okeru zainichi Chōsenjin seisaku‖ in 
Ōnuma Hisao, ed., Chōsen Sensō to Nihon (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2006), pp.222-232; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, 
Borderline Japan: Foreigners and Frontier Controls in the Postwar Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), pp.97-115. 
  
264 
 
While Collaer and the Japanese government were drafting new Japanese immigration 
laws together, the deportation of ―subversive Koreans‖ also emerged as a critical agenda in an 
Occupation‘s inter-staff meeting of the ―Committee on Countermeasures against Communism in 
the Far East.‖  The newly appointed Supreme Commander, General Matthew B. Ridgway, set up 
the Committee in May 1951, and in the Committee, the U.S. officials from SCAP, Eighth Army 
and the Far East Command discussed broad issues concerning Communist influence and 
designed various proposals for SCAP policy.
90
 
 In the wake of SCAP intelligence‘s exposure of the so-called ―North Korean spy net in 
Japan‖ in May 1951, the Committee began discussing the possibility of deportation in earnest.91  
In the fourth meeting held on June 15, Colonel Jack Napier from the Government Section of 
SCAP first informed the Committee about the Japanese government‘s pro-deportation stance.92  
According to Napier, the Japanese government officials with whom he had discussed this issue 
believed that ―the deportation of from two to three hundred would make a great difference in the 
behavior of remainder.‖  However, the Japanese government did not have any ―exact legal 
authority for such action,‖ and there was also another problem concerning the deportation of 
―subversive Koreans.‖  Napier mentioned that the problem was ―where to send the deportees and 
what [would] happen to them once they [were] deported.‖  He continued: 
[A]t one time the Rhee Government expressed a willingness to take on all whom 
SCAP wished to send there, but it was generally understood that this would be 
sending the deportees to certain death.  [my emphasis] 
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Napier also added that ―[n]ow, of course, deportees could be sent to a UN camp.  It was decided 
that G-1 [General Staff-1 Section] would undertake a Staff Study on the subject.‖93 
The UN camp to which Napier referred as the possible destination of Korean deportees 
was wartime POW camps in South Korea, where the United Nation Command held North 
Korean and Chinese soldiers and Korean civilians captured by UN and South Korean troops.  
Quickly, the U.S. policy-makers of the Occupation authorities formulated a ―top secret‖ plan to 
send ―undesirable‖ Koreans in Japan to UN-controlled POW camps in South Korea.      
After the June 15
th
 meeting, the Committee members discussed the deportation issue 
further in a subcommittee called the ―Planning Subcommittee of the Committee on Counter 
Measures against Communism in the Far East.‖  In the subcommittee meeting held on July 3, the 
members reached an agreement that the compulsory deportation of ―undesirable aliens‖ from 
Japan would be a ―beneficial counter measure against Communism in the Far East.‖  According 
to the short proposal the Subcommittee had drawn up and classified ―top secret,‖ SCAP, in lieu 
of the Japanese government, would direct the deportation of aliens ―whose continued presence in 
Japan [was] determined to be undesirable,‖ including Koreans in Japan.  For this purpose, the 
Subcommittee proposed that SCAP establish a board that would review ―individual cases of 
potential ‗undesirables‘‖ and make recommendations to deport those aliens deemed 
―undesirable.‖  Moreover, the Subcommittee also clarified where ―undesirable‖ Koreans should 
be sent – a UN POW camp in South Korea.  The Subcommittee presented:  
Upon arrival of a deportee within the area of jurisdiction of the Commander, 
United Nations Forces in Korea, that Commander will take such deportee into 
custody as a potential threat to the security of his Command and will intern the 
deportees … in a UN POW camp.94 
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The policy-makers acknowledged that such action might unfavorably affect the ongoing 
preparation for a ceasefire negotiation in Korea.  Therefore, they recommend that ―no actual 
deportation take place‖ until the completion of the ceasefire negotiations.    
The deportation plan that the Committee on Measures against Communism in the Far 
East had formulated would have had serious repercussions not only for the delicate politics 
surrounding the possible ceasefire in the Korean War but also for the U.S. global confrontation 
with communist anti-U.S. propaganda in the international arena.  On July 17, the Legal Section 
(LS) of SCAP sent a long internal memorandum that expressed its deep concern over the 
deportation policy proposed by the Committee.  The LS contended that the method and 
procedure formulated in the proposal for Korean deportation were highly problematic both 
legally and politically.  In the ―true legal sense of the word,‖ the LS argued, Koreans who had 
been continuously living in Japan before Japan‘s official surrender (September 2, 1945) were not 
―aliens‖ and would retain the ―status quo of Japanese nationals‖ until their nationality issue was 
settled in the future.
 95
   
Politically, the deportation project seemed to entail too many political ―risks and 
dangers‖ from the viewpoint of the LS.  The deportation of ―undesirable‖ legal Korean residents 
would be not only ―interpreted by the world at large as a discrimination against a racial minority‖ 
but also ―conflict with basic UN policy.‖  The LS also called attention to the fact that the 
―civilized world‖ had always condemned the ―Russian practice of deporting politically 
undesirables to Siberia‖ and that ―[t]he history of the two world wars offer[ed] similar 
examples.‖  Moreover, the LS believed that if SCAP created the screening agency that would 
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determine suspected subversives aliens for deportation, ―Red propaganda‖ would exploit such 
―star-chamber proceedings‖ by claiming that SCAP had established an ―American Gestapo‖ in 
Japan.
96
 
 In the end, SCAP did not enforce the Committee‘s secret proposal, and the mass 
deportation of ―undesirable‖ legal Korean residents from Japan became an unfulfilled project.  
But, SCAP and the Japanese government took full advantage of an existing legal-governmental 
device that rendered ―undesirable‖ Koreans deportable to South Korea.  As discussed above, 
Occupation‘s provost courts often sentenced to deportation those Korean anti-war activists who 
were charged with ―an act prejudicial to the objectives of the U.S./Allied Occupation forces,‖ the 
violation of the Imperial Ordinance No. 311.  Deportees like anti-war activists who belonged to 
the Japanese Communist Party and leftist zainichi Korean groups might have been doomed to 
death in South Korea, as SCAP official Colonel Napier had once worried in planning the mass 
deportation of ―subversive Koreans‖ to the Syngman Rhee regime: ―[I]t was generally 
understood that this would be sending the deportees to certain death.‖  Later, one South Korean 
diplomat denied such a ―generally understood‖ fate of Korean deportees after their arrival in 
South Korea.  In a meeting between South Korean and Japanese representatives held on February 
28, 1952, a South Korean diplomat told the Japanese representatives that Korean deportees 
would ―not be punished by death, if blacklisted, only for joining the Communist Party in Japan‖ 
(my emphasis).
97
  Apparently, however, the fate of deportees with a political background of 
more than simply joining the Japanese Communist Party was not the case, and indeed certain 
punishment would await those deportees once they arrived in South Korea.        
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For instance, Ri Pyŏngho found his younger brother who had been deported to South 
Korea imprisoned in Pusan, the port city where Korean deportees from Japan were turned over to 
the South Korean authorities.  In October 1948, his brother Ri Yŏngmun, a local leader of a 
leftist zainichi Korean youth group, was arrested for the violation of the Imperial Ordinance 311, 
for arranging a display of the North Korean national flag at a convention of the Osaka branch of 
the Korean Democratic Youth Alliance in Japan.
98
  A provost court tried Ri Yŏngmun and 
sentenced him to eight years‘ confinement with hard labor and deportation.  At midnight on 
March 24, 1950, the Occupation authorities suddenly took him out of a prison in Osaka and sent 
him in prison garb to a deportation camp in Nagasaki Prefecture via train.
99
  Ri Pyŏngho, 
concerned about what would happen to his younger brother once deported to South Korea, 
secretly travelled to Pusan and found out that his brother had been put in jail again after 
deportation.
100
              
Similarly, the deportation to South Korea meant death sentence to Kim Posŏng, a ―North 
Korean spy‖ who had been captured in Japan in August 1950.  Kim Posŏng grew up in Wonsan 
in northern Korea, a port city located in the north-east coast of the Korean peninsula.  According 
to Japanese police interrogation and defense attorney‘s investigation, Kim went to Japan at the 
age of sixteen to find a job and worked in Osaka for some twelve years, until 1927 when he 
returned to his family in Wonsan.  There, Kim worked for a cargo company and became the 
captain of a cargo ship.  In March 1949, he asked the mayor of the Wonsan City under the North 
Korean regime to find a different job for him.  The mayor, in contact with a local branch of the 
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North Korean Worker‘s Party, arranged a new job for Kim – a mission of gathering information 
on how to set up a money-making business in Japan.  In February 1950, Kim visited the 
government agency in Pyongyang and received training in gathering information and making an 
intelligence network.  Kim successfully made a secret entry into Japan in April, but soon he was 
arrested by the Japanese police in August, when they discovered that he was carrying a 
counterfeit alien registration card.
101
   
The Japanese and Occupation authorities sent Kim Posŏng to a provost court in May 
1951, with other seventeen Korean and Japanese suspects for the so-called ―North Korean spy 
net in Japan.‖102  According to CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) records, Kim was released 
―from Occupation custody to the custody of the Japanese Government‖ due to the ―unavailability 
of a key witness to testify‖ against him in the provost court.  Soon, the Japanese authorities put 
Kim in a deportation camp for having entered Japan illegally, and deported him to South – not 
North – Korea on July 31.  Kim arrived in Pusan next day, and CIC agents in Pusan, who had 
been informed of Kim‘s arrival through the CIC in Japan, placed him ―protective custody‖ until 
August 3 and then turned him over to the South Korean counterintelligence agency.
103
  Later, a 
leftist zainichi Korean association reported that Kim Posŏng had been ―sentenced to death‖ 
immediately after his arrival in South Korea.
104
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The fates of Ri Yŏngmun and Kim Posŏng were not unique.  Their stories had parallels 
with multitudes of those in Korea who were suspected or fingered as ―reds‖ or leftist 
sympathizers under the South Korean regime.  If lucky, these victims ended up being arrested 
and imprisoned, or sent to UN-controlled POW camps as a civilian internee.  But, it was more 
likely that immediate execution awaited them during the Korean War.  The ―special decree‖ that 
President Syngman Rhee had proclaimed on June 28, 1950 mandated the swift execution and 
severe punishment of those who committed acts of sabotage and collaboration with the enemy.  
This decree, ―Special Decree on the Punishment of Criminals under a State of Emergency,‖ 
fomented a subsequent massive wave of state terror where the South Korean military police and 
rightist youth corps massacred and executed those suspected as leftists on the spot.  When the 
South Korean regime occupied the North, the military police and rightist youth corps also 
executed, with the connivance of the UN forces, thousands North Korean residents without any 
legal procedure, often in retaliation for what the North Korean regime had done in the South.
105
  
The North Korean regime also did the same against South Korean rightists and rightist 
sympathizers.  For instance, the CIC reported that in Taejŏn ―[a]pproximately five hundred such 
bodies [of South Korean rightists and rightist sympathizers] were found in mass graves which 
were left uncovered in the haste of the NK [North Korean] Army retreat‖ in late September 
1950.
106
  The fate of Kim Posŏng, who was captured in Japan and executed in South Korea, 
became part of those North and South Korean – and their allies‘ – atrocities during the civil war. 
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Conclusion 
The political and social dynamics of U.S./Allied-occupied Japan during the Korean War 
were deeply intertwined and coterminous with the development of the civil war in Korea.  The 
new social history of the Korean War, as well as the dominant international history approach, has 
overlooked such intertwined and coterminous experiences of the war beyond the Korean 
peninsula.  The internationalized civil war in Korea involved multiple state and non-state actors 
outside the Korean peninsula, whose experiences demonstrated the significance of 
transnationally linked revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggles between zainichi 
Koreans, Japanese, and the United States.  The outbreak of the Korean War and the subsequent 
Japan‘s transformation into a rear base under U.S./Allied occupation brought the two national 
entities of Korea and Japan into the same field of vision of Japanese and zainichi Korean 
Communist strategy.  The Japanese Communist Party declared the ―Korea problem‖ to be the 
―principal locus of current struggles for the Japanese revolution.‖  The Korean War heralded a 
transformative event for zainichi Korean and Japanese Communist leaders in dissolving the two 
nationalisms in the move against the U.S. ―imperialism,‖ who was the common enemy both 
―invading Korea‖ and ―colonizing Japan.‖   
Although SCAP and Japanese government never officially admitted this structural reality, 
the UN war effort in Korea had become part and parcel of the objectives of the U.S./Allied 
occupation of Japan.  SCAP transformed Japan into a rear base that was directly linked with the 
UN military intervention in Korea.  It was ironic that SCAP, the very authorities that had 
disarmed Japan‘s militarist regime and institutionalized the new democratic, ―pacifist‖ 
constitution, began to criminalize even pacifist ―anti-war‖ voices opposing Japan‘s involvement 
in the Korean War.  The Occupation and Japanese authorities contained every single zainichi 
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Korean and Japanese protest against the UN war effort in Korea as ―an act prejudicial to the 
objectives of the U.S./Allied Occupation forces.‖   
Moreover, the deportation of zainichi Korean Communists also emerged as a critical 
agenda of U.S. containment policy in Japan.  U.S., Japanese and South Korean authorities agreed 
on the necessity of deporting ―Korean subversives‖ in Japan, and a group of Occupation policy-
makers crafted a top secret plan to send groups of leftist ―undesirable‖ Koreans in Japan to UN-
controlled POW camps in South Korea.  Whereas the Occupation in the end did not enforce this 
top secret plan for mass deportation, SCAP and the Japanese government deported zainichi 
Korean dissidents to South Korea through the criminalization of their anti-war activities.  For 
those who had worked for the cause of national unification under the North Korean regime, the 
deportation to South Korea meant, as an Occupation official understood, ―certain death‖ amidst 
chaos and a state of emergency during the civil war.  In any sense, Japan was not merely 
committed to collaborating on the U.S. (UN) war effort in Korea.  U.S./Allied-occupied Japan 
was a critical locus of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggles coterminous with the 
internationalized civil war in the Korean peninsula.     
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Epilogue 
 
 On September 8, 1951, six years after Japan’s surrender, Japanese Prime Minister 
Yoshida Shigeru signed a peace treaty with forty-eight nations in San Francisco.  On the same 
day, Yoshida signed another treaty with the United States, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security between the United States and Japan.  The conclusion of the two treaties marked 
Japan’s official return to the international arena as a U.S. cold war ally, and Japanese scholars 
designate this historical event as the inception of the “San Francisco System” (San Francisco 
taisei), the beginning of “subordinate independence.” 
The so-called “San Francisco System” was also premised upon the marginalization of the 
“postcolonial.”  The peace treaty did not include Japan’s former colony Korea, nor China.  The 
U.S. government instead arranged direct meetings between South Korea and Japan in October 
for future normalization, and these talks started in February 1952.  At these talks, the typical 
“politics of blame” soon developed – if South Korean delegates condemned what Japan had done 
in Korea as an unjust colonial rule, the Japanese fought back by claiming that Japan modernized 
Korea.  As a result, it took more than a decade to reach their diplomatic rapprochement in 1965, 
after a series of negotiations and breakdowns.  Moreover, there were strong protests against 
normalization in both countries, particularly in South Korea, for different reasons.  South 
Koreans opposed normalization because the treaty did not address at all popular demands for 
justice and compensation for Japan’s past colonial victimization of Koreans.  On the other hand, 
the dismissal of past colonial issues was not a serious matter with the Japanese majority.  Rather, 
what made Japanese pacifists worried about the normalization was that the official diplomatic 
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ties with South Korea might result in dragging their country into Korean affairs, the North-South 
Korean cold war confrontation across the shore. 
The exclusion of South Korea from the peace treaty of 1951 also shows us what was at 
stake in post-empire Japanese-Korean relations.  During the process of planning a peace treaty, 
Prime Minister Yoshida and Japanese government officials expressed their concern about a U.S. 
plan to include South Korea in a peace treaty.  In negotiations with the U.S. Delegate to Japan, 
John Foster Dulles, Yoshida insisted that South Korea should not become a signatory to the 
treaty because the “one million Koreans residing in Japan, most of them Communist,” would 
acquire the status of Allied nationals and have “property and compensation rights.”1  Yoshida 
even brought to table again his unfulfilled proposal of sending “all Koreans in Japan” to Korea.2   
In fact, the “San Francisco System” was characterized not only by the exclusion of 
Japan’s former colony and China from the peace treaty, but also by the elimination of the 
domestic postcolonial “minority question” in Japan.  On April 19, 1952, the Japanese General-
Attorney office issued a notice – not a law or ordinance – declaring that Koreans and Taiwanese 
would lose Japanese nationality when the peace treaty came into effect on April 28.  Under the 
legal system of new independent Japan, Korean and Taiwanese postcolonial populations were 
categorized into “foreigners,” a category that erased the colonial origins of the “minority 
question.”  Indeed, this drastic measure the Japanese government took was something even 
SCAP had never took into consideration as an “ideal solution” to the Korean minority question.  
As I mentioned in chapter 4, the intelligence section of SCAP had claimed in mid-August 1948 
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that “[t]he ideal solution of the Korean problem would be to rid Japan of this large national 
minority, either by compulsory, progressive repatriation or election of Japanese nationality on 
the part of said Koreans.”3  Although the Japanese government had once considered granting 
Japanese nationality to Koreans based on elective choice, the solution that the government finally 
took up after giving up its compulsory deportation plan was completely different kind of 
“solution.”  As a result, Japan as a homogeneously reimagined nation could now disavow the 
urgent presence of a “racial minority” question within its national bounds – Japan now only held 
a “foreign” population of Koreans. 
Most probably, Japanese people were not ready to embrace Koreans and Taiwanese in 
Japan as fellow members of the same national state after the end of the “multi-ethnic” empire.  
One Japanese anthropologist carried out an interesting survey of Japanese racial views right 
before the peace treaty conference started in San Francisco on September 4, 1951.  The 
anthropologist, Izumi Seiichi, focused his survey on the two days before the treaty conference 
started because, in his words, “it was considered the time when Japanese positive sentiment 
toward the United States was reaching a peak amidst the journalistic frenzy of discussing the 
peace treaty conference.”4  According to his survey targeting 385 Tokyo residents, the category 
of “Americans” had the highest favorability rating among the whole sixteen racial and national 
categories.  The category of Koreans (Chōsenjin) had the second lowest rating, next to the 
category of “Negroes” (nigurojin).  The survey also showed that Koreans had the highest or 
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second highest rating for a group that the interviewees considered “insulting the Japanese,” 
“holding a grudge against Japan,” or “not useful for Japan.”     
This survey provides us with a glimpse of the unchanged structure of feeling that 
Japanese society was creating through everyday encounters with now-liberated Koreans and the 
ideological reformulation of the “Korean problem” in public discourse.  As I examined in 
chapters 1 and 2, Koreans celebrating Japan’s defeat and demonstrating “liberation” simply 
appeared as insulting or vengeful in the eyes of the Japanese majority.  The racialized view of 
social problems that the government and media had spread intersected with popular anxiety 
toward Koreans in Japan.  In their letters sent to Generous Douglas MacArthur during late 1946 
and 1947, in the aftermath of the government’s making of the “Korean problem,” the Japanese 
requested MacArthur to get rid of the entire Korean population in Japan, portraying this 
population as the obstacle to the reconstruction of Japan.  Such views did not easily change 
thereafter.  Indeed, one can see the same kind of language and phrase in Japanese letters sent to 
MacArthur during 1949.  A curious difference one will find in those letters is that the Japanese 
also began to request the expatriation of Communists out of Japan, often in the same letters 
asking for the deportation of Koreans.
5
  Communists and Koreans were now juxtaposed together 
as troublemakers and obstacles.   
With historical hindsight, it was rather tragic that Communists and Koreans became 
associated with each other as the target of blame and hatred among the majority of the Japanese 
populace, if not among everyone.  As the CIA correctly understood, the Japanese Communist 
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Party (JCP) had been “the only political party sympathetic to the Koreans’ problems” in Japan,6 
and Japanese and zainichi Korean Communists were trying hard to build international (inter-
racial) solidarity on the ground.  As I argued in chapter 4, a number of zainichi Koreans 
participated in the JCP during 1949 in order to overcome grassroots racial estrangement.  
However, the JCP’s drastic radicalization during the Korean War, particularly its new militant 
strategy officially established in the Party’s Fourth Congress of February 1951, resulted in 
further popular estrangement from the Party itself.  So-called “firebomb struggles” (kaenbin 
tōsō) Japanese and zainichi Korean militants employed in their anti-war and revolutionary 
movements during 1952 both outraged and frightened the nation that had just started to tread a 
new path as an independent country.  The reputation of the Party was severely damaged, and the 
JCP lost all seats in the Lower House as a result of the general election of October 1952.  In the 
Party’s Fifth Congress of July 1955, the JCP officially denied and criticized its previous militant 
activities as “extreme-leftist adventurism” (kyokusa bōkenshugi).  The Party’s about-face deeply 
shocked and hurt those who had devoted themselves to the Party’s militant policy, both Japanese 
and zainichi Korean Party members, and many left the Party thereafter. 
In the same year of 1955, zainichi Korean leftist leaders also made an abrupt about-face.  
In May, the leftist leaders transformed the existing Korean United Democratic Front in Japan 
into a new entity affiliated directly with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), a 
new association named “the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan” or so-called 
Chōsen Sōren.  Under the new Korean General Association, past post-liberation zainichi Korean 
movements were negatively judged as the “deviation from the correct line,” as misguided 
“intervention” in Japanese political affairs.  The “correct” line now became DPRK-oriented, not 
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JCP-led, zainichi Korean movements united under the banner of the DPRK and the great leader 
Kim Il Sung.  Since 1955, the memories of Japanese and Korean radical international solidarity 
receded into marginalized positions in Communist and zainichi Korean leftist official histories. 
The so-called “1955 system” (gojūgonen taisei) is not about these painful stories of the 
JCP and zainichi Korean movements.  In postwar Japanese historiography, 1955 is a year that 
marked another significant turning point after the treaties of 1951 in San Francisco, a critical 
watershed in Japanese politics that marked the consolidation of Japanese conservative hegemony 
and the beginning of the long one-party-dominant regime (“1955 system”).  However, the 
separation between the JCP and zainichi Korean movements in 1955 – or some might 
characterize it as the end of the subordination of zainichi Korean movements to the JCP – 
epitomizes, I would say, the end of the “crucible of the post-empire” in Japan.  The Japanese 
empire brought metropolitan and colonial societies and peoples into a single sphere of 
dominance, even though such integration operated on multi-layered racial and legal hierarchy 
(asymmetrical relations of dominance) as well as uneven and combined development.  As the 
empire expanded, so did “contact zones” and thereby boundaries became blurred in every 
dimension under the empire.
7
  The post-empire was the crucible from which new symmetrical 
solidarities and non-monolithic entities and “national” identities could come out.  Until 1955, the 
Japanese and zainichi Korean fight against the revival of the Japanese old guard regime and U.S. 
cold war interventionism could have become such crucible, although even Japanese and zainichi 
Korean Communist solidarity was not necessarily a symmetrical relationship. 
Simultaneously, Korean decolonization turned out to become an unfulfilled project by 
then as well.  In the Korean peninsula, political struggles over the vision of a decolonized nation 
                                                 
7
 But, the Japanese imperial government never discarded the hierarchical distinction in the legal status between the 
metropole and colonies. 
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escalated into the division of the nation into two separate regimes and ended up with a civil war.  
The war for unification, the North Korean attempt to accomplish the full decolonization of the 
Korean peninsula, immediately developed into an internationalized civil war through U.S. cold 
war interventionism.  When an armistice was signed in July 1953, the ceasefire line between the 
north and the south remained almost the same as the previous 38
th
 parallel dividing line.  The 
armistice agreement stipulated the future “peaceful settlement of the Korean question.”  
Although the Korean question was discussed in the international Geneva Conference in 1954 – 
where the partition of Vietnam was agreed – no progress was made.  The ceasefire line gradually 
turned into a de facto borderline as the two-Korea problem was left behind, and it marked the 
end of the “crucible of the post-empire” in Korea.  
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